


EAST EUROPE

A Monthly Review of East European Affairs



Escape from the Baltika —

AN INTERVIEW WITH VICTOR JAANIMETS

Problems of the Parties —

THE REVOLUTION GROWS COLD

Between Collectivism and the Horse —

ORGANIZING THE POLISH PEASANT

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Eastern Europe at the UN

"Janek, Pass the Cement"

The Bulgarian Muse

DECEMBER 1960

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EAST EUROPE

Formerly NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

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EAST EUROPE is a monthly review of political, economic, social and intellectual trends and events in the Soviet orbit. Information contained in this magazine is based on a thorough analysis by specialists from East European countries of all major Communist publications as well as the monitoring of Communist broadcasts.

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THE MONTH IN REVIEW

SILENCE

MORE THAN TWO WEEKS after all the leading Communists of the world trooped into Moscow for the highest-level conference since 1957, their deliberations were still shrouded in a rumor-spotted silence. They had been greeted on their arrival by a long speech from Soviet Party Secretary Frol Kozlov (see Texts and Documents) which laid down the current Moscow line over the whole ideological spectrum. Particular emphasis was given to Khrushchev's position that war is not inevitable because the "Socialist camp" is strong enough to prevent "imperialist aggression." But after this speech, silence. Almost two weeks later the Czechoslovak Party leader and president left for home, presumably to fulfill pressing commitments there. The others remained, but the world heard nothing.

Report and rumor, however, filtered to the West, saying that the meeting was locked in struggle between Khrushchev and the Chinese. The latter have been maintaining that war is inevitable, that the sacred texts of Lenin cannot be brought up to date as Khrushchev has tried to do, that fear of atomic holocaust should not deter world Communism from moving against "the imperialists." The Chinese have so far refused to gloss over their differences and sign a joint manifesto as they did in 1957. But in 1957, of course, Mao Tse-tung himself was in Moscow. This time, his position much hardened, he did not deign to come himself but sent the titular chief of State to represent him.

The astonishing alliance between China and Albania seemed to be continuing in Moscow. It was reported that in addition to the general line on peace and war, there were two specific areas on which this ill-assorted coalition was opposing the Kremlin. One was on relations with Yugoslavia, where they were protesting the general bloc-wide relaxation of hostility toward Tito, and particularly the overt gestures of comradeship made by Gomulka, presumably with Khrushchev's backing. Secondly, they were demanding action against West Berlin, supported in this by East Germany's Ulbricht.

Albania, in its strange role as an avatar of Communist puritanism took upon itself to denounce Gomulka's attitude at the UN General Assembly session in New York, complaining that he showed an "excessive spirit of personal initiative" in seeking to improve relations with the West.

It seemed probable that these differences would be at least superficially and outwardly smoothed over, that some formula would be found to which all parties could voice agreement. Indeed, as the silence from Moscow stretched on it vitiated the Communist claim to monolithic unity, day by day arousing suspicion and speculation; the longer the silence, the greater the necessity to end it with a show of unity. Already the Moscow meeting had underlined what recent months have made clear: the ideological polarization within world Communism is growing increasingly solid, increasingly difficult to change.

AFTER THE ELECTION

HOW FAR THIS POLARIZATION has gone, and the degree to which Albania has defected from the Khrushchev camp, is demonstrated in the reactions to the victory of President-elect John Kennedy. Here, certainly, one would have thought that the Albanian Communists could for once relax their fierce posture as the only (European) defenders of real Marxism in a sea of wooly-headed revisionists. Relax,



however, they refused to do. The general Soviet-Satellite line was that "The results of the election are a crushing blow to the Eisenhowers, the Nixons, the HerTERS and the Lodges, those men of yesterday who were consciously enticing the world to the abyss of war. . . . The result of the election campaign in the United States is a serious warning to all those who endeavor to build their policy on lies and threats. . . . The future will show that lessons have been drawn from this by . . . Kennedy." Thus Radio Moscow. The very next day, Radio Tirana sounded off: "Bourgeois propaganda is now trying to say that the coming return to power, so to speak, of the Democratic Party of John Kennedy will mark the beginning of a new attitude toward important problems of foreign policy. . . . If judgment is made on the basis of facts then it is understandable that no essential change can be expected in US policy because of Eisenhower's replacement by Kennedy."

If, indeed, Radio Moscow is now in the hands of the "bourgeois propagandists," the alarm of the Albanians and the Chinese (who, of course, also mourned that the election meant no change in the spots of imperialism) is easy to understand. What is more difficult to comprehend is how long the Albanian leaders think they can go on flouting the Moscow policy line, not only in these matters of great moment for them, such as relations with Yugoslavia, but in peripheral areas where the simplest common sense would dictate some degree of overt conformity.

NEW RUBLE

THE SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT that the gold content of the ruble has been increased was a clever maneuver designed to make positive propaganda out of what is in essence a negative fact. For years past the ruble has been officially valued at four to a dollar, a claim which could be maintained only because the ruble did not function as a medium of international exchange. Tourists were allowed to buy rubles at ten to a dollar because few of them could have afforded their meals and lodgings at the inflated official rate. Most experts thought that a realistic value for the ruble would be even less than ten cents. The new gold content makes the ruble equal to \$1.11—officially. Simultaneously, as of January 1, a new domestic "heavy ruble" will be introduced which will equal ten old rubles; since a corresponding adjustment will be made in internal prices, the domestic purchasing power of the ruble will not change. For tourists from abroad, however, the ruble will probably exchange for about eleven cents in United States money, which is close to the present rate.

The world public, hearing of these changes, will of course make nothing of the arithmetic and retain only the impression that the Russian ruble is increasing in value at a time when the United States dollar is encountering difficulties. In fact, the official value of the ruble is of little moment so long as Soviet trade is conducted largely in barter terms. There can be no "foreign exchange problem" so long as the State has a monopoly of foreign trade. Some observers have speculated that by putting the ruble on a more realistic footing, the Soviets may be making an initial step toward convertability as it exists in the West. But this would require such a thorough overhaul of the economy, with its central planning and its arbitrary price system, as to seem hardly possible in the foreseeable future. The magnitude of the problem can be seen when it is recalled that the trade negotiations of Communist countries—not only with the "capitalist" world but among themselves—are conducted in terms of world market prices calculated in dollars. There is no other common standard.

Man Going Ashore



Photo by Claire Packman

An Interview with Viktor Jaanimets

While Soviet Premier Khrushchev was holding the world's attention at the United Nations General Assembly in October, a man he had never met proceeded to demonstrate what many of Khrushchev's subjects think of him. The Estonian sailor who created an international sensation when he fled from the S. S. Baltika, which brought Khrushchev to New York, tells how it feels to be a man without a country.

"IT ISN'T EASY to jump off a Russian ship in a strange port, even when the port is New York City and the land is America. To whom can you go in this town if you speak only Estonian and a few words of Russian? I guess I was lucky, because it turned out all right." Jaanimets had wanted to flee for a long time, but he "just couldn't get up the nerve." In an interview with the editors of *East Europe*, he said that many other Estonians would leave their country, which was absorbed by the USSR in 1944, if it were not for the physical and psychological barriers which hem them in.

"First, there are the other men in your group going ashore who watch you from the moment you leave the ship,

and dare not return without you. If you manage to give them the slip, where do you go next? I never thought of going to the police, because all my life I have had reason to fear the police. In Estonia the police represent authority—Russian authority—and I've felt what it means to fall into their hands." One reason why he chose an American port was that "the US is the strongest country in the West, and I knew that if I could find friends here I would be safe. The United States would never turn me back to the Russians."

The story of his escape from Khrushchev's ship, the *Baltika*, has received worldwide press coverage. The act itself was simple. He had gone ashore with four shipmates



Part of the old city of Tallinn. Since 1944 there has been an influx of Russians, who now comprise more than a third of the population.

Photo from TALLINN, Estonian State Publishing House, 1958

—three Russians and another Estonian—and they had entered a department store on Fourteenth Street that was crowded with early afternoon shoppers. They were standing near the main door when Jaanimets told his companions that he wanted to buy some hair tonic at a counter some distance away. Losing himself in the crowd, he left by another door and started walking. At one point he tried to get a cab, but he was unable to tell the driver what he wanted and was forced to proceed on foot. Finally, in a bar, he found a stranger who understood him and took him by bus to the Estonian Relief Committee, which turned him over to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Service kept him in custody for several days until it had verified his story and accepted him as a bona fide political refugee; then it released him under the sponsorship of the International Rescue Committee which will help him to find a job and get settled in his new country.

The Bus Ride

Psychologically, however, his escape was not so simple. There was the chaos of a great foreign city where nobody

spoke his language. As he watched people getting on and off of buses with bored looks on their faces he was reminded of the time in Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, when he got off a street car through the wrong door. He was arrested by the police, dragged to the station and beaten. (The incident sounds incredible to most Westerners, but other Estonians attest that such brutality is not uncommon in their country where the Soviet authorities regard most native inhabitants as politically dangerous.) As a foreigner in New York, the simplest act was full of unexpected difficulties: the effort to buy a glass of beer in a strange currency, his fumbling efforts to master a cigarette machine in the bar, the struggle to talk to a friendly stranger who might be able to help him. Somehow, in the few words of English he knew, he managed to convey to the stranger the fact that he was from a Russian ship but was not himself a Russian and did not want to go back. This was a moment of luck, for the stranger had met Estonians before and knew what his problem was.

The man hunted through a phone book and found the number of the Estonian Relief Committee. Someone there told Jaanimets to get a cab and come right away. For some unknown reason, the other man insisted on taking a bus, and now began the most harrowing experience of all. The bus went slowly, inexorably back toward the East River near the very point where the Baltika was tied up. To complicate things even more, the stranger suggested that perhaps the Estonian Relief Committee was not the best place to go; there was an organization called the Assembly of Captive European Nations, of which he had heard much; it was across the street from the United Nations, and perhaps they ought to go there. All that Jaanimets understood of this was that they were heading toward the Baltika and that the stranger wanted to take him to the United Nations, where Khrushchev was. He jumped up and tried to get off the bus.

The man grabbed his arm and hauled him back, persuading him that everything would be all right and that, yes, they would go to the Estonian Relief Committee. When they arrived there they found a group of worried Estonians wondering what had become of them. Jaanimets was worried too. "I could not feel sure that I was safe even here. What if some Russian strongmen came in and got me? Then an inner door opened and some big men walked by. My hosts said, 'See, we have strong men here too.'"

That was not the end of it. There were interrogations, and the talks with newspapermen who asked the same questions over and over, and the magazine writers who wanted to know if he had ever slept with any of those Russian girls on the Baltika. Then two men came from the Soviet Embassy and tried to persuade him to return. They began by telling him that it was his duty to go back to the ship, but when he made it quite clear that he had no intention of returning they changed their tune. "They said that a citizen of the Soviet Union is free to live wherever he chooses, and that if I returned I would not be punished in any way. I told them they were full of lies." The biggest lie of all was the one uttered by Premier Khrushchev when he heard of the escape. Addressing the press from his balcony on Park Avenue, he said that if

Jaanimets had only come to him on shipboard, "I would have given him some money for the first period until he finds a job." Jaanimets' relief, when he was told after four days that the United States had granted him asylum, was exceeded only by his feelings on the next day when the Baltika pulled anchor and steamed away down the East River.

Life on the Baltika

According to Jaanimets, life aboard the Baltika was not the sort of democratic process that Khrushchev implied. In fact, he did not even see Khrushchev during the trip until the great man insisted on posing for photographs by the crew members, and Jaanimets went and pointed his camera at him along with the others. As he described it, the life of an Estonian sailor aboard a Russian ship is intensely lonely. He knew only a few words of Russian, and none of the Russians understood Estonian (which is akin to Finnish and Hungarian). Until he became a crew member of the Baltika, on which there was one other Estonian sailor, he had sailed on ships where he was alone. The general attitude of the Russians was that they were a superior people as compared with the other nationalities in the USSR. They had created the "first land of Socialism," they had defeated Hitler, they were showing other nations the way to the future, etc. But the Russian sailors were not too happy among themselves. There was constant spying upon each other under orders of the authorities. "Every man had two jobs," said Jaanimets, "his official job and his secret job. My secret job was to report on smugglers among the crew, a task which would have been impossible even if I had tried much harder than I did. Everybody smuggled. It was the sailor's way of raising his wage, and his chief compensation for the hardships of life aboard a boat."

Smuggling, to a Russian sailor, means something almost incomprehensible in the West. The most popular items were clothing, particularly nylon goods; these could be bought cheaply in the cities of Western Europe and sold immediately on return to a Soviet port. A particularly brisk trade developed in cheap cotton bedspreads, which cost the equivalent of five dollars (20 rubles at the official rate of exchange) and could be sold for 800 rubles in the USSR where they were used not as bedspreads but as window curtains and wall hangings. The demand for Western goods is so great in the USSR that the authorities make no effort to stamp out sailors' smuggling altogether, but try to stop only the most outrageous manifestations of it. "Bribery wasn't necessary," said Jaanimets. "Everybody smuggled, and so long as you were careful the customs men would look the other way."


With one of these bedspreads Jaanimets was able to

double his monthly wage. As an oiler first class he received 750 rubles a month, which was relatively good pay by Soviet standards (the average doctor in the Soviet Union gets the same), but not very high in purchasing power. "The suit I was wearing when I left the ship cost 1,600 rubles—more than twice my monthly pay. I would say that the standard of living in the USSR is only one fourth or one fifth that of other European countries whose ports I have visited." Smuggling was so important to the sailors on the Baltika that they saved as much of their foreign currency as possible for this purpose. For their shore leave in New York they were given thirty dollars, but instead of spending it on cigarettes and other American luxuries they preferred to invest it in things they could carry home and sell.

Food on the Baltika was better than on other Soviet ships where he had served, and it was also better than what was offered in factory canteens in Leningrad. But the ship was no paradise for gourmets. Breakfast consisted of bread, butter, two thin slices of bologna or cheese, and a cup of tea. Sometimes there was cereal. For lunch they had soup, bread (but no butter), a small portion of meat or fish, and sometimes stewed fruit. Supper was the same as lunch. Later in the evening there was tea with bread and butter. When Khrushchev came on board the menu improved. The tea was replaced by coffee, and the daily food budget rose from 14 rubles per man to 20. Khrushchev, of course, brought his own cook and his own groceries. When the dignitaries had salad for lunch the sailors sometimes had it too.

"We were warned that America would look rich to us," said Jaanimets. "We were told that the shops would have many more things in them than the stores back home, but that was because the masses were too poor to buy them." Asked if the authorities weren't afraid that many of the sailors would do as he did, he answered: "Of course. But the crew had been very carefully screened. Most of the men had wives and children at home. In order to get a job on a Soviet ship you have to be sponsored by two Communist Party members. I had been very highly recommended. One of my sponsors was the Political Director of the school where I got my technical training. She was a nice lady who had taken a liking to me, and because of her position she had a lot of influence. However, even after ten years at sea my superiors did not feel sure of me. They seemed very concerned at the fact that I was 29 and still unmarried."

"On one occasion, an Estonian escaped from a Soviet herring ship in the North Sea and managed to get ashore in Scotland. When news of this got around, our *politruk*, Semyon Nikolaevitch Markov, called the crew together and told us that it must not happen on the Baltika. I wonder what Semyon Nikolaevitch is saying now."



"Unanimity and enthusiasm" at a Czechoslovak National Party Conference.

SVET V OBRAZECH (Prague), July 16, 1960

The Revolution Grows Cold

Problems of the Party

In the years following the Polish and Hungarian upheavals of 1956, the "fever" which Nikita Khrushchev described as infecting all the Parties of the Soviet bloc after Stalin's death has apparently died away. Today the Parties are quiescent but this very tranquillity is in itself a danger; lacking in dynamism, the Parties are facing a critical period in the sixties, and the "new men" who fill the lower echelons are increasingly apathetic before the exhortations of their elders.

THE COMMUNISTS who have grown to maturity since the end of World War II, like most second or third-generation revolutionists, are a tamer breed than their spiritual fathers. Even in Eastern Europe, where Communism was imposed from without, the Soviet puppets of 1945 were generally men who had fought in the underground or spent time in prison, experiences denied to young men and women now filling the lower echelons of Party officialdom. As inheritors of power, the "new men" are consoli-

dators rather than builders, and the way of the organization man rather than the rebel is the surest road to prestige and power. The highly-developed structure of the Party today can be compared to a metropolitan political machine on a vast scale, and the Party members, as David Granik¹ described them, "play the role of precinct captains, keeping in touch with the public throughout the year. Politics is not something far off in the Kremlin or even the city hall, but is represented by a neighbor who can fix

a summons, clear up red tape, or see that garbage is collected properly."

If the local Party hack fulfills a real function (for there is no one else to turn to but the hopefully sympathetic ear of the local Communist wardheeler), his role is strictly limited to carrying out the decisions of his boss. It is enough, Stalin once said, for a Party member to "know" the program—he need not understand it. But for the careerist, subservience to Party dictates is only one qualification for advancement. Other hurdles lie in the path of the *aparatchik* on the way up, most important of which are his social origin, his morale, his honesty and his ideological purity.

The embryo careerist can launch himself at an early age by joining a Communist Youth League. Indeed, he will probably be required to adhere to such an organization in order to qualify for scholarships or jobs. If he is eager for power, however, he will undoubtedly want to become a full-fledged member of the Party. In this way he can concentrate all his energies on working within the Party apparatus and making his way up through the district committee, which supervises the city and town basic organizations, regional committees, supervising all district committees, to the Central Committee, elected at a Party Congress and including regional committeemen, to the secretariat and finally to the inner councils of the Politburo itself. Government service or trade unionism are other roads to advancement which can lead the Party member to the corridors of power.

Since the convulsive events of 1956, the Parties in Eastern Europe have had to examine closely the kind of Partyman they are looking for. Sizeable membership—an early goal of the postwar Communist regimes seeking immediate, broad support of the masses—proved to be a liability when post-Stalin revolts and dissatisfaction made it necessary for Party stalwarts to stand up and be counted. "Verification campaigns" have been one method of eliminating opportunists as well as insuring loyalty to the policies of the ruling Politburos. Ideological purity, particularly in Poland and in Hungary, has been the hoped-for result of this refining process. Nevertheless, support from all areas of society, with the working class in the vanguard, continues to be the primary aim of Party membership drives. In East Europe the Communist rulers have been shored up by the presence or proximity of the Soviet Army. Yet Moscow's foreign policy may someday require the withdrawal of all its forces from East-Central Europe; unless the Party membership is reliable, representative and ideologically pure, the preservation of the Soviet empire without force would be a grave task, and a considerable risk.

Composition of the Party

AT THE ROMANIAN Party Congress last June, the First Secretary, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, revealed that during the five-year period since the last Congress, the number of full members had increased by 147,000, or 26 percent. Overall Party strength was put at 834,600 members, of whom 148,000 were candidates. At the 1955 gathering, there were 595,398 members, of whom 56,583 were

candidates. The slow rise was due in part to the ruling leaders' insistence that opportunists be purged from the ranks and members recruited who maintained "Party discipline and iron unity" and would reflect the "proper" social origin.² If such were the criteria for Party membership in Romania, recruiting must have proved no easy task. In 1956 the Bucharest correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), August 28, wrote: "Romania's [Communist] Party has an official membership of half a million, but it is said to have . . . no more than 10,000 hard-core convinced Communists in the whole country. This may be to some extent an understatement, but the point itself is valid."

In Bulgaria, as in Romania, the Party membership increased between the last two Congresses. The Sixth Congress in 1954 reported 455,251 full and candidate members (a decrease of 40,000 members since 1948); in 1958, membership had risen to 493,255. The slight growth was explained by Party officials as the result of more careful selection of those eligible for membership, with the most important emphasis placed on the "political standing" of a Party member. Once again, the experience immediately after the Communist takeover in 1944 was cited as requiring a closer check over the "alien and careerist elements" which had entered the Party: "After September 9, 1944, along with honest men, alien careerist and rotten, even hostile, elements, joined the Party. . . . This is why . . . the Central Committee decided to continue the cleaning up of the Party of such elements. . . . But the removal of opportunists from the Party must be constant." (*Bulgarian Communist Party Resolutions* [Sofia], Volume 4, 1955.)

Hungary, shaken by the 1956 upheaval, witnessed an immediate drop in membership in 1956. Party boss Janos Kadar at the Seventh Hungarian Party Congress in December 1958 announced that Party membership was only half of what it had been before the Revolt, i.e., 402,456 full members. The official view was that the Party was stronger than ever, due to the absence of "anti-Party" factions who had joined the Party prior to 1956, of the "revisionists" who had refused to enter the new organization, and of the "uncertain hundreds of thousands . . . of mere careerists." Such statements are, more than anything else, an attempt to make the best out of a bad situation, for in 1957 the Hungarian Party included only 100,000 members. The rapid increase in only two years of Kadar's rule resulted from the Party's need to overcome a shortage of trained cadres after the virtual collapse of the Party in 1956.

The shrinkage of Party ranks in Poland was most drastic during the 1958 "verification campaign," conducted by Polish Party chief Gomulka, and directed against both "revisionist" and "dogmatic" elements, as well as against criminals and economic abusers who had become entrenched in the Party. In remaking the organization to reflect the image of Gomulka's "middle way," over 200,000 persons were eliminated from the Party ranks. The next year, the number of persons leaving the Party actually exceeded those admitted by 5,111. Membership figures stood at 1,023,425 as of April 1959; this represents a drop of 30 percent in the ten years since the Communists seized power.

Stagnation rather than shrinkage characterized Party membership in Czechoslovakia. In 1960, full and candidate members totalled 1,559,082, an increase of 10 percent since 1958. As compared with the figures released at the Tenth Party Congress in 1954, however, this 1958 total represented a decline of approximately 5 percent. Thus, the growth in membership over the past six years has only been 4.6 percent.

PARTY MEMBERS AND THEIR SOCIAL ORIGIN

	Total Members	Workers	Peasants	Others
Bulgaria	493,255	36%	34%	30%
Czechoslovakia	1,422,199	60	5	35
Hungary	437,956	60	14	26
Poland	1,023,425	42	12	46
Romania	834,600	51	34	15

SOURCES: *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), June 3, 1958; *Zivot Strany* (Prague), No. 12, 1958; *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), December 1, 1959; *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), April 1959; *Scinteia* (Bucharest), June 21, 1960.


Peasant Reluctance

THE "DICTATORSHIP of the proletariat" has made it necessary for the Party to try to produce a majority of members originating in the urban working class, although this is admittedly impossible in countries with a highly agrarian society. As the East European nations have invested more heavily in industry, creating an ever-larger working class, the drive to reach the magic figure of 51 percent has also increased until the badge of success can be finally displayed. Most recently, at the Romanian Party Congress in June, Gheorghiu-Dej claimed that over 51 percent of the Party membership were workers, and the promise made at the last Congress in 1955 that the workers would soon be in the majority had been fulfilled.

But if finding enough workers to create a Party majority is difficult, recruiting peasants into the Party ranks is more so. The reluctance of the peasants to collectivize "voluntarily" is in no small degree due to the problem the Party has found in organizing effective Party cadres among the farmers. This is particularly true in Poland where only 1 percent of the land has been collectivized and approximately 14 percent is otherwise incorporated into the "Socialist sector" of agriculture. The Polish monthly *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), April 1960, reported that in 1959 "the growth of Party ranks in rural areas was still small and does not correspond with the needs of the countryside and the existing possibilities." In addition, many local organizations "noted a constant and rather considerable decline in the number of their peasant Party members." The primary reason for the unsatisfactory growth was termed "the inadequate effort on the part of many Party leaders, as well as of the rural organizations." A striking example of the failure of the Party movement in the countryside came to light during the elections of delegates to the last Party Congress in March 1959—only 46 delegates out of 1,411 were described as individual farmers.

Although the Hungarian collectivization campaign in the fall of 1959 and spring of 1960 reaped a high percentage of newly "Socialized" agriculture (from approximately 23 percent to 75 percent of the arable land by June 1960), coercive measures rather than Party propagandists played the greatest role in the success of the drive. In fact, so difficult did it prove to recruit Party members among the peasantry that in the fall of 1959, 1,300 trained "reliable worker cadres" were sent to the villages "to consolidate the cooperatives through the creation of Party organizations."²

In 1959, 2,371 peasants were admitted to the Hungarian Party, 5,337 peasants admitted as candidate-members; however, the new full members were given that status without the customary period of candidacy, a fact which the Party lamented, since "candidacy is a great educational school." As a result, "almost half of our Party organizations among the collectives . . . still lack experience."⁴ Even with such desperate methods only 14 percent of the Party members are peasants, although half of the country's population is engaged in agriculture. Over one third of



A gibe at the many statues of Stalin that disfigure the East European landscape: "And to think—once a guy like this was a god!"

Polityka (Warsaw), May 28, 1960

the collectives have no Party organization at all.

The press in Czechoslovakia has also betrayed the difficulties the Party was experiencing in building up a strong organization among the peasantry. In the spring of 1959, the official Party organ admitted that the number of collective farmers who were also Party members did not correspond "to the economic and political changes which have taken place in the villages in recent years." Examples cited were the Chotebor district where "there are 81 chairmen of collectives, only 20 of whom are Party members," the Hlinsko district containing 48 non-Party chairmen, and the Plzen region, with 80 non-Party chairmen.⁵ *Zivot Strany*, the Party bi-monthly magazine in its June 1959 issue, declared that "for years Party organizations . . . have not bothered to admit a single new candidate." Other noteworthy statistics in the August issue of *Zivot Strany* showed that in the Kromeriz district of Moravia, only 38 out of 7,700 collective farmers have been admitted in two and one-half years; more than half of the chairmen of the collectives were also outside the Party.*

Ideological Purity

IF THE SO-CALLED worker-peasant alliance is the ideal cornerstone of a strong Party, ideological purity is another quality demanded by the hierarchy in order to preserve the monolithic facade of unity. Satellite obedience to the prevailing Party line emanating from Moscow has often produced faceless leaders whose only ability (and by no means an unimportant one) is to have the ability to switch Party policies without blinking an eyelash. Since the period of Stalinist purges in 1949-1952 when Rudolf Stransky of Czechoslovakia, Ana Pauker of Romania and Traicho Kostov of Bulgaria fell from power, these three Satellites have faithfully parroted the Moscow *politruks*. For these Parties, ideological purity is not a major concern. Hungary and Poland, on the other hand, find themselves with Parties decimated by the 1956 upheavals, with Party chieftains who espouse a middle way between the dangers of "revisionism" on the right and "dogmatism" on the left. Both Kadar of Hungary and Gomulka of Poland have tried for the past three years to recruit Party members on the lower levels and appoint on the higher echelons those who seemed faithful to their policies; both men have to a great extent succeeded in this task. But frequent articles in the press give evidence that ideological purity is still eagerly sought.

In December 1959 the Hungarian Party held its first Congress since the Revolt. Significantly, the voting delegates contained a large number of prewar Communists—men who had been shunted aside during the repressive Stalinist era of Matyas Rakosi—and many of these men rallied to Kadar during and after October 1956. Except for this group, most of the middle-aged cadres were followers of Rakosi who now espouse Kadarism, but as long as

TOO MANY CHIEFS

"Today, 'function hoarding' is still a nationwide phenomenon. . . . In a number of villages a few persons fulfill all the social functions, some of them, seven or eight. Why? The usual reply is: 'Lack of suitable candidates.' Yet this is not true. The persons most suited for such social tasks are generally speaking modest and reserved and do not rush into the limelight of public life. Sometimes they have to be discovered. Those hoarding functions in the villages, instead of looking for these modest persons, accept further duties with the exclamation: 'One more or less doesn't matter.' One of the harmful results of such actions is that frequently social functions remain duties in name only, without being fulfilled in practice. A single person cannot be expected to work in a responsible manner in half a dozen 'responsible' jobs. . . . But let's not be over-hasty. Weigh the situation, consider the work to be done, and then, distribute your functions!" (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], October 5, 1960.)

they do not challenge the Kadar line, their past can be safely (or, at least, temporarily) forgotten. Thus, Kadar lauded those Communists who had supported "Rakosi in his useful actions" but also condemned "his grave mistakes."

Nevertheless, ideological danger to the Party was the dominant theme of Janos Kadar's speech to the Congress. The Party must avoid the dogmatic policies of the Rakosi epoch as well as the liberal or so-called "revisionist" drift toward independence from the Soviet orbit. In this respect he said, "Dogmatic and revisionist tendencies, manifest within the Party, constitute an attack on the ideological weapon of the working class, but of these, revisionism is the main danger, both in Hungary and on an international level. The Central Committee and the greatest part of the Party membership are today free of revisionist views. . . . Today the Central Committee and the broad masses of Party members are free of the harmful views of dogmatism and secretarianism."⁶

The Congress concluded with the election of a new Central Committee of 71 members. Of these, only 10 members held this position in the pre-Revolt 1954 Congress. The rest were all elected since Kadar became the Party chief.

The words of Nikita Khrushchev at the Budapest gathering also underlined the preoccupation with ideological purity. Admitting the difficulties experienced by Communist Parties throughout the world after the 20th Soviet Party Congress (February 1956) in which he denounced Stalin's cult of personality and seemed to encourage "revisionist" ideas, Khrushchev reaffirmed his belief that today the Party is stronger than ever: "Following the 20th Congress . . . something of a fever was experienced by some Parties," Khrushchev averred. "But everything depends on the strength of the organism, on its

* No information about the hardship of recruiting peasants for Party cadres was forthcoming from Bulgaria or Romania; the percentage of Party members listed as deriving from the peasantry is higher than in the other three countries under consideration (see table); these are the two most underdeveloped countries industrially.



Partyman with a Polish flag elicits the question: "Is it a holiday?"
"No, he always carries a flag to know how the wind is blowing."

Dziennik Zachodni (Katowice), April 14, 1960

resistance to disease. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the first to give the example of boldly and sharply denouncing the mistakes produced by the cult of personality. And it was right, even though some people have said that certain complications in the public life of the Socialist countries stem from the 20th Congress of our Party and that the question should not have been raised so sharply. No, Comrades, it had to be done. It had to be cleansed and to throw off all the accumulated extraneous matter. Just as an artist sometimes has to remove the grime on a painting to restore its colors to their original glory, so we had to clean up something in order to reveal the true face of creative Marxism-Leninism. I will repeat: all Parties have gone through this fever in various degrees, but our organism has become even stronger afterwards.²⁷

The main targets of the Hungarian rulers are the "revisionists" within the Party; until the Party is cleansed of these elements, ideological purity will remain a fiction. Just prior to the Seventh Congress, Kadar's deputy Georgy Marosan published a special study of this problem. "Let us strengthen the ideological and organizational unity of our Party," he wrote. "Revisionism in the Party has not been eliminated. It merely occupies a different strategic position while trying to spread its influence in the cultural fields with nationalistic and clerical ideas. We must concentrate our fire on revisionism, while taking into consideration the standpoint of the struggle on two fronts." (*Tavaldalmi Szemle* [Budapest], August-September 1959.) Even a show of unity might be deceptive, and members were

warned to beware of "those who still retain revisionist ideas in their way of thinking, even though they have stopped saying anything openly and lie flat." (*Partelet* [Budapest], November 1959.) Such statements presaged a long campaign against this particular heresy.

Sources of "dogmatism" in Hungary today are found in large part in a Party bureaucracy trained under Stalinism which, frightened during the 1956 Revolt, was quick to join the reconstructed Party under Kadar. The gradual hardening of the Kadarist regime since 1956, particularly in the drive toward forced collectivization which reached its peak in the fall of 1959 and the spring of 1960, tends to create a new "dogmatism." Then, too, one-time Party members who held high-ranking positions under Rakosi now find themselves in lower posts and constitute a passive but dangerous underground. The fight against "dogmatists," however, is seasoned with persuasion rather than vindictiveness. Many alleged "dogmatists" are termed misguided rather than hostile to the Party. The Hungarian journal *Bekes Megyei Nepujasag* (Budapest), November 19, 1959, described the dangers resulting from these "well-intentioned" but wrongheaded "dogmatists" in the following terms:

"Generally speaking, 'dogmatists' are people with good intentions but who do not understand and cannot deal with Marxist-Leninist theory. . . . The main feature of their attitude is underestimating the masses, neglect of national characteristics, the mechanical interpretation of the sharpening of class warfare, the overestimation of administrative measures, all of which is a retreat from the most difficult task—the winning over of the masses.

"We have not liquidated the remnants of sectarian working methods yet. Their danger still exists and will exist as long as there are people inclined to become dizzy from power. In some places, dogmatism and sectarianism have reappeared—in the belittling of political work, in misunderstanding our policy, in an anti-intellectual attitude and unfounded distrust of non-Party members.

"Our enemies would be happy if sectarianism would reappear in our ranks because this would ultimately lead to the spreading of revisionist thinking. Leftist deviations within our Party were already cleverly utilized by the counterrevolutionary revisionists for the furthering of their own aims."

The current Sino-Soviet dispute involving Soviet charges that the Chinese Communists are "left-wing dogmatists" may cause the Hungarians to put greater emphasis on combatting "dogmatism" than "revisionism." The recent détente in the Soviet bloc-Yugoslav "cold war" is still another reason for a possible ideological shift in the near future.

"Orthodox" Poland

ALTHOUGH IT is still impossible to describe Poland's First Party Secretary as an orthodox Communist leader, nevertheless the ironies of time have made Wladyslaw Gomulka, a man hailed as the savior of his country for standing up to Khrushchev in 1956, a reliable comrade of the Soviet leader. Gomulka's "way," however, is no mere imitation of Khrushchev's way, seized as the right thing to do to keep in Moscow's good graces; Gomulka was courageous

enough in 1956 to insist on a Polish brand of Communism, but in his own terms this meant avoiding the rigors of ideological conformity while eliminating any "revisionists" who believed that Polish intellectual and cultural freedom could reign unchecked.

Like Kadar, Gomulka supported the decisions of the 20th Soviet Party Congress in his speech to the last Polish Party Congress in March 1959: "The 20th Congress . . . condemned and eliminated from the practice of Soviet life the errors and perversions associated with the cult of the individual. Our Party associates with the 20th Congress . . . changes in its activity which were extremely important and positive in its effects. This found expression in the resolutions of the Eighth Plenum of the [Polish Party] Central Committee [in October 1956] which . . . would not have been possible without the 20th Congress. . . . The Eighth Plenum . . . introduced changes in the Party political line, aiming at the knitting of tighter bonds with the masses and facilitating a favorable solution of the basic tasks facing People's Poland in the given stage. . . . At the same time the Eighth Plenum finally and firmly overcame the errors of the earlier activities of the Party which restricted Socialist democracy and internal Party democracy and tolerated infringements of the Socialist rule of law."⁸

In the months following the Congress, Gomulka precipitated a sweeping administrative shakeup by bringing back into power many of the men closely identified with

the Stalinist regime he had supplanted. At the same time, "liberal Communists" were dismissed from their posts or forced to resign. The major changes were announced shortly after an October 1959 Plenum of the Central Committee. Eugeniusz Szyr was appointed Deputy Premier in charge of internal economy; it was Szyr who had confessed in the summer of 1956 that his work as deputy economic chief to the Stalinist Mine had been "characterized by an increase in bureaucracy, a distance from the masses and stress on administrative measures rather than consultation." Also made Deputy Premier was Julian Tokarski, who as Minister of the Motor Industry in the summer of 1956 had been the man most responsible for the Poznan riots, a prelude to the October 1956 upheaval. Even General Kazimierz Witaszewski, known as "General Gas Pipe" because of the weapon he advised using in 1956 to deal with dissident intellectuals, was reinstated as army intelligence chief.

Ousted from office were such men as Wladyslaw Bienkowski, Minister of Higher Education and once close friend of Gomulka; Julian Hochfeld, Director of the Institute of International Affairs; and, most significant, Jerzy Morawski, who reputedly "resigned" from the Central Committee Secretariat, in protest against the changing climate within the Party.

In moulding the Party to his image, by carrying on a two-pronged struggle against both the "revisionists" and the "dogmatists," Gomulka has strengthened his own position within the Party at the cost of increasing disenchantment among the people. What Gomulka desired in 1956 was not so much independence for the Polish nation as relative independence for the Polish Party. Now, with the inflow of old Stalinists into the higher echelons of the Party hierarchy, with Gomulka's repeated insistence that the Party will never abandon the goal of collectivization, with a return to forced investments in heavy industry, with the continued harassment of the Roman Catholic Church, the alienation of the masses from the Party may well increase. For this reason, the Party, while insisting on ideological purity, has tried to avoid the mistakes of the past by stressing frequent contacts between the administration and the people and between the higher Party echelons and the local organization, stronger measures to combat bureaucratic waste and economic inefficiency committed by Party functionaries and a less rigidly controlled press.

Party Morale

EVENTS THROUGHOUT the area since 1956 have demonstrated time and again that the lid is on as far as any relaxation of Party discipline is concerned. Verification campaigns stressing ideological purity, continued emphasis on social origin for Party membership produce one after another of those faceless bureaucrats who push ahead on their repressive policies in ideological and cultural matters and an unrelenting drive toward collectivization, tempering this with a certain degree of decentralization and a relative improvement in living standards and welfare programs. There seems little prospect of any liberalization of the Parties in the foreseeable future; short of some dra-

ODE TO A NIGHTINGALE

"My friend, the director of a medium-sized enterprise, talked over half an hour about the reconstruction of his apartment. . . . I disapproved of the fact that he devoted so much attention to the appraisal of the apartment, on which the enterprise spent considerable sums. I felt that the whole question . . . only served his own vanity. He also mentioned that so far he had been unable to exchange his official car, a Warszawa, for the more 'grand' and expensive Volga, although some of his colleagues drove in this make. . . . I believe that my friend, conscious of his achievements, indulges in unattractive and false illusions, according to which he has more rights and is differently judged than ordinary human beings. He fails to remember that the results attained by him are only attained with the help of his colleagues and with the force of cooperation and that he works for his people and not the other way round.

"No one talks about such things when matters are going well. Such situations give rise to complacency, conceit and exaggerated bureaucratism in the less strong comrades who lack the necessary degree of self-criticism. . . . When things are going well, there are always people who become conceited and do as the nightingales do: they are only able to hear their own song." (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], June 3, 1960.)

matic upheaval, any realistic hope for change seems to lie in the emergence of a new managerial class whose main interest is in getting things done, while paying mere lip-service to Party ideology. Although such men are the executors rather than the initiators of policy their indirect influence may one day affect the policy-makers themselves.

The fact that technocrats are most often nominal Party members rather than activists constitutes one of the main problems which besets the Party. Apathy rather than militancy has been the result. The Romanian Party organ *Scinteia* (Bucharest), September 5, 1959, examined the lax discipline often existing within a local organization which stunted the growth of "Communist initiative and moral character." Tasks assigned to Party members and candidate members consisted too often of academic or formal problems which do not relate to "the real problems of life." Such formalism, i.e., asking a candidate member to read "a book a month," reduced the "fighting capability of the Party basic organization and weakened the sense of responsibility."

"The basic Party organizations," the journal concluded, "are wrong in believing that candidate-members should be given small, simple tasks, for example, writing a slogan or an article for the wall newspaper, convening a meeting of workers, etc. . . . It is also necessary to distribute among all the candidates more important tasks, particularly tasks relating to production problems, to the efficient operation of the enterprise, thus giving them the possibility to develop the spirit of initiative and moral character of a Communist."

The Bulgarian Party spirit is an indication of the low morale which has grown up in a Party once noted for leaders of considerable ability, dedication and personal austerity. A speech of First Secretary Todor Zhivkov in January 1960 revealed the extent of self-indulgence in a group of men whose power has been consolidated. Speak-

ing before a Party conference, Zhivkov said:

"We can mention many many cases in which individual Party members . . . have taken advantage of their official position to improve their situation, to build houses and villas for themselves, and so forth. . . . We must take measures against the unscrupulous and careerist struggle of individual Party members for posts. Such persons are aspiring for leading posts without considering their potentialities, existing circumstances, thus violating Party morality and hindering work."


"To be arrogant, dizzy with success, and presumptuous is alien to our Communist morality, to the character of the Communist, and particularly to a Party activist. . . . Such men are forgetting that they come from the people, that they have been reared by the people, that the Party and the people have raised them to responsible posts to serve the cause of the Party and the people. . . ."

"Considering this state of affairs, [Party members'] possession of a certain amount of power, as well as the remnants of capitalism, have begun to influence the consciousness of such workers and Party members, thus forming in their minds now . . . desires for personal happiness, for a more comfortable life, and thus neglecting Party morality, Party discipline and public obligations. For such unstable Party cadres and members there is real danger of degeneration, a danger of turning from fighters and revolutionaries into common Philistines."⁹

Aware that many Party stalwarts may have begun to lament the failures of the present compared with past glories, the official organ of the Central Committee cautioned: "Perhaps some people think that after the deaths of Georgi Dimitrov and Vasil Kolarov, the Party will not find sufficient strength to put everyone in his place who attempts to undermine the Party unity or who whispers against the Party line and leadership. Such people are cruelly mistaken. They do not know the Party well. . . . Nevertheless, there are still people in high posts who continue to feel hesitations and lack of confidence in the Party line. Because of lack of contact with life they do not see the new requirements for our forward movement."¹⁰

Dishonesty

ONE MANIFESTATION of Party apathy is seen in the corruption of officials, totally without ideological commitment, who seize any occasion for self-aggrandizement. An extreme case of criminality was cited in 1959 in the Czechoslovak press. Antonin Jitersky, chief engineer and chairman of the Party organization in Hradec Kralove region, accused of making false reports on the state of procurement purchases in agriculture, was equally guilty of irresponsibility as a Party chairman: "He did not recognize Party organs. The statements in the monthly reports on the participation at membership meetings were invented, Party schooling was practically nonexistent. The Party organization worked without a plan or ignored it completely, meetings were called during working hours. . . . By his despotism, intrigues and craftiness, he dissuaded honest Party members from active work in the organization and [in the view of nonpartisan employees] he discredited the entire Party organization." For this "opportunism of the



A Polish political problem: how to get things done. The apparatchik asks: "What is the most important? The method or the result?"

Polityka (Warsaw), August 20, 1960

crudest type," he was expelled from the Party and sentenced to four years in prison.¹¹

The difficulty of exposing corruption among officials is evident if one considers the protection accorded one man by another when both belong to the same "club"—i.e., the Communist Party. A Hungarian paper revealed last year that in one village "11 Party members were punished . . . for suppressing criticism."¹² Favoritism also encourages corruption and irresponsibility: "As for spinelessness and flattery, consider the person who obtains advantages for himself through his official position, and the man who grants him special treatment because of the applicant's standing in the Party"—harsh words from the Hungarian Party press.¹³

Time and again the same complaints recur. An unchallenged Party, faced with a loss of dynamism, produces at best efficient but disinterested technocrats, at worst, self-seeking politicians who use the privileges of Party membership for personal gain. This is one of the crises which faces the Communists in Eastern Europe in the immediate future. And the problem cannot be solved by simply crossing off the names of apathetic members from a list, as Poland's Party admitted during its verification campaign of 1958. Party education is one answer, but its effect, if any, will be minimal on adherents whose passivity stems from having "lost their battle against bureaucrats whose only aim is to preserve the so-called 'harmonious atmosphere' which often conceals opportunism."¹⁴

In Poland, faced with a militant Catholic and nationalistic populace, to be a Party member is as much cause for shame as for pride. The journal *Polityka* (Warsaw), June 21, 1958, pointed out that "there are Party members who behave very timidly, as though they were ashamed to admit their Party membership." Naturally, such a situation induces passivity, when "even a devoted Party member cannot muster up enough courage to resist anti-Socialist demonstrations." What is needed—and this is crucial for all the Satellites—is "an atmosphere which will make every member proud of that fact that he belongs to the Party."

Conclusion

IN THIS all-pervading climate of hollow disenchantment, peopled by aging leaders whose dynamism too often springs from the distant past when they were outlaws struggling for power, only external threats can galvanize an apathetic membership into action. "Yugoslav revisionism," "West German revanchism," "imperialistic warmongering"—these are the catchwords the Party propagandists trumpet as a rallying call to militant solidarity. But if "peaceful coexistence" is to be the talisman of Soviet bloc foreign policy, even these time-honored slogans may fall into obsolescence. The new watchword—"peaceful coexistence does not mean ideological coexistence"—has not yet proved

SHAKE THIS APATHY!

Jerzy Olbrycht in the Polish weekly *Polityka* (Warsaw), January 25, 1958, tells the story of a little town called Rubaj where nothing happens. Where an unorthodox Party member and a rich "kulak" are the only persons with a sense of responsibility. Where the president of the council gets drunk with the rich and the secretary of the Party sells vodka illegally. Where the poor people do not cooperate with the Party. Where the membership verification program has excluded only one member from the Party in five years. This apathy, the author declares, must be shaken.

a catalyst of enthusiastic Party activity to combat the remnants of "bourgeois thinking."

Then, too, the winds of change in the wake of Stalin's death have dropped. Gomulka's "Socialism" is no longer at variance with the ideological holy city of Moscow; Imre Nagy, head of the 1956 Revolt government, and the other leading Hungarian "revisionists" are dead or in prison. Today, the contention that maintaining a small, disciplined Party is better than an indifferent, mass organization poorly masks the fact that the Parties are peopled primarily by technocrats who are forced to join to keep their jobs, or self-seeking *apparatchiks* whose will to power lacks militancy and breeds corruption. These are the new men, and the litany of Communism falls on deaf ears. It is not that the revolution has been betrayed; the trouble is, for these men, there was no revolution to begin with.

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- ² *SCINTEIA* (Bucharest), December 24-29, 1955
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- ⁴ *TARSADALMI SZEMLE* (Budapest), January 1960
- ⁵ *RUDE PRAVO* (Prague), April 3, 1959
- ⁶ *NEPSZABADSAG*, December 1, 1959
- ⁷ *NEPSZABADSAG*, December 2, 1959
- ⁸ *TRYBUNA LUDU* (Warsaw), March 11, 1959
- ⁹ *RABOTNICHESKO DELO* (Sofia), January 19, 1960
- ¹⁰ *NOVO VREME* (Sofia), June 1959
- ¹¹ *RUDE PRAVO*, August 21, 1959
- ¹² *NEPSZABADSAG*, October 17, 1959
- ¹³ *NEPSZABADSAG*, October 9, 1959
- ¹⁴ *TRYBUNA LUDU*, October 14, 1959

Eastern Europe at the UN

This new department will carry a running chronology of the more significant activities and statements of the Soviet bloc representatives at the United Nations.

October 13 At a conference of the General Assembly, 77 countries pledged \$86,200,000 for the 1961 Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the UN Special Fund. Of the total, the US pledged \$40 million. In contrast, the USSR promised only 12 million rubles. In 1960, the USSR pledged 8 million rubles. The Satellite governments kept their new pledges at about the same level as in 1960: Poland pledged the equivalent of \$225,000 in *zloty*, Hungary promised 1,125,000 *forint*, Czechoslovakia 1 million *koruny*, Romania about 200,000 *lei*, and Bulgaria, 200,000 *leva*.

October 17 In the Trusteeship (Fourth) Committee, which was nominally engaged in discussion of a report on non-self-governing territories still under UN Trusteeship, Ivan Rohal-Ilkiv of Czechoslovakia charged that the UN has thus far "contented itself with playing a spectator's role" in the liberation process in former colonial territories. In the course of the meeting, the Polish delegate Mieczyslaw Blusztajn said that the struggle for national liberation in Africa was sounding "the death knell of colonialism."

October 20 In a speech to the Political Committee, Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki declared that there could be no common point of departure for further disarmament negotiations owing to basic differences in the Soviet and Western view. Rapacki defined the Western position as a "concept of control over armament"; this was at odds, he said, with the Soviet draft resolution for total and general disarmament:

"Like other Socialist countries Poland wants in its vital interest a most thorough and efficient control over the implementation of disarmament measures jointly agreed upon. I repeat this once again, although I have little hope that my viewpoint will reach readers of, say, the American press in other than a garbled and inverted version. Such is the practice in this country of informing public opinion on matters which are embarrassing to US governing circles. We want control over disarmament. On the other hand, we regard it as impossible from the viewpoint of not only our peoples but of all nations to accept control over armament. This is not a doctrinaire viewpoint. . . . Control over existing and growing rocket-nuclear armament can only increase the influence of fear, which is a bad counsellor."

In attacking the Western outlook, Rapacki declared that "it seems incomprehensible that the Western powers apparently paid so little attention—it was ill-will in the US delegation—to Premier Khrushchev's declaration in which he expressed readiness to accept all Western proposals on

control if the West accepts all the Soviet proposals on disarmament."

Rapacki echoed Premier Khrushchev's demand for a reorganization of the structure of the UN Secretariat and Security Council and said that the setting up of an international police force was unacceptable to Socialist countries within the organization's present structure. "The recent experience in the Congo," he insisted, "fully corroborated fears" that such forces, within the present UN structure, "could easily become a potent factor of political pressure and intervention on the part of States which have overwhelming influence in those organs."

Rapacki also suggested that the recent General Assembly resolution calling on all powers to refrain from increasing international tension be reinforced with specific content. He urged that if an agreement on banning nuclear weapon tests is not signed by a specific date—say, April 1961—that an extraordinary UN session be convened. He also proposed that countries without atomic weapons should be asked not to produce them and that those States which do have them should not be allowed to supply or to help other States produce them.

Also speaking to the Political Committee, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Vaclav David declared that if the West used "the same tactics of obstruction and procrastination" as it had in the past and refused to work out concrete directives for further discussion of general and complete disarmament, Czechoslovakia would not find it possible to participate in the Committee's consideration of this question. In threatening a walkout, David reiterated the Soviet line that the Communist countries would not accept "controls without disarmament." Like his Soviet bloc colleagues, he claimed that such a program would lead to "the collection of data for preparation of a surprise attack." David, who spoke in Russian, also repeated a previous suggestion that a stage-by-stage realization of general and complete disarmament be started "on the territory of the two German States" and that this should be followed by the signing of a peace treaty and the creation of a free demilitarized Berlin.

The Polish Mission to the UN released a 12-page memorandum on West German "revanchist activities" in regard to the Oder-Neisse frontier. The document was offered as "background information" to all UN delegations and the press.

October 25 Hungary was the only Soviet-bloc country not to broadcast the annual UN Day concert. No official

reason was given for this omission, but observers pointed out that the UN holiday coincided with the 4th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolt.

October 26 The Soviet bloc abstained when the Trusteeship Committee approved a neutralist resolution calling for the participation of non-self-governing territories in the work of the UN and the Specialized Agencies. Soviet bloc speakers had previously expressed the fear that adoption of the resolution and subsequent discussion of it in the plenary might affect the outcome of the debate on the Soviet draft resolution calling for independence by 1961 of all countries still under colonial rule. The vote was 67 in favor, none against and 12 abstentions. Aside from the Communist countries, the abstainers included Guinea, Portugal, Spain and South Africa.

October 27 Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld reported to the General Assembly that the UN World Refugee Year campaign, which officially ended last June, had so far brought donations in excess of \$80 million. His announcement of contributions showed that none of the Soviet bloc countries had participated in the UN effort.

A six-power American-sponsored resolution calling for the distribution of surplus food through the Food and Agriculture Organization, a specialized agency operating in Rome, was unanimously approved by the General Assembly. Prior to approval, the Soviets had charged that the program was proposed in an effort to dispose of US surpluses under the UN flag, and wranglings and amendments preceded final acceptance of the resolution on the Food Bank. Although they voted in the affirmative, the Soviets and the Satellites did not indicate whether they planned to contribute to the program.

October 31 Bulgaria charged that the US and Great Britain were reserving the right to be the first to make a surprise nuclear attack and to unleash a nuclear war. Speaking to the UN Political Committee, Bulgarian spokesman Milko Tarabanov asserted that by refusing to "declare solemnly" that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, the two Western powers were, in fact, "preparing public opinion for this eventuality." Tarabanov dismissed all non-Communist arguments for controlled disarmament as verbal acrobatics and evidence of the West's reluctance to disarm. He also insisted that President Eisenhower's recent proposal that the US and the USSR set aside fissionable material now earmarked for weapons use had nothing to do with disarmament and would in no way decrease the threat of nuclear war.

November 1 The Soviet-bloc countries abstained from voting on the 11-power resolution adopted by the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee urging all countries to continue current efforts towards a progressive solution of the political refugee problem. During the debate in the Committee, the USSR and Bulgaria criticized the efforts of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees as "one-sided" and asked that the agency be abolished. In the case of the

200,000 Algerian refugees now in Tunisia and Morocco who are helped by the UN program, the USSR and the Satellites took the position that their material support is handled directly by their Red Cross societies.

November 2 Hungary added to Soviet bloc demands that the UN terminate its direct radio broadcasts to Hungary and Communist China. The Hungarian delegate maintained that nobody in Hungary listened to these broadcasts on UN activities and that the money spent could be used for opening new UN information centers in Africa and Asia. He protested that the UN's Office of Public Information division was not a sovereign body with its own information network and that its main function was to supplement the information activities of the member states. The fifteen-minute weekly roundups of UN activities that have been beamed to Hungary via Geneva since the 1956 Revolt, he said, only duplicated the work of Hungary's UN correspondents.

November 8 Italy and the Soviet bloc clashed in the Economic Committee over the question of living standards. The Italian delegates declared that while the Communist countries like to claim that their planned economy is the only cure for the world's problems, they had failed to give the UN data on consumer consumption in Eastern Europe and that at present the living standards there were very low. In reply, the Soviet delegate insisted that the UN had been supplied with "sufficient data" but the UN Secretariat did not utilize it. Basil Serban of Romania retorted that in the Italian kind of democracy, "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer," offering as an illustration the disparity between "rich northern Italy and poor southern Italy." Assen Georgiev of Bulgaria criticized the UN Secretariat's economic reports on various grounds. Georgiev suggested that "a sufficient number" of Communist economists be appointed to the UN economic organs in the UN Secretariat.

A Hungarian charge that Italy had labelled its "colonial administration" in Somalia as "technical assistance" was denied in the Economic Committee by the Somali delegate Abdurahman Herzi. Stating that for some time prior to its independence, Somalia had been under the trusteeship system and was not a colony, Herzi declared that Hungary was embarking on a new definition of colonialism. "In all sincerity," he added, "it would be wiser for the Hungarian representative to stick to the usual definition. If the definition of colonialism were to be extended, we would all find ourselves in difficulties."

The Soviet bloc countries demanded in the Economic and Financial Committee that they be referred to in official UN documents as "Socialist" countries. The UN has so far preferred to use the term "countries with centrally planned economies." Admitting that the UN terminology was not completely satisfactory, the UN Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs, Philippe de Seynes, replied that it was difficult to speak of "Socialist" countries "without including countries which had centrally planned economies but were not actually Socialist."

Letters to the Editor

Gomulka Not a "National Symbol"

DEAR SIR:

I have read the biography of Wladyslaw Gomulka in the October issue of your magazine. With all due respect for the literary merits of the article, I should like to voice my reservations as to some of the "facts" it contains.

I believe that the article erroneously evaluates: (1) Communism, (2) the Polish nation's attitude toward Communism and (3) the figure of Gomulka.

The first sentence maintains that Gomulka "reflects some of the national aspirations of his people." In the third sentence the author admits that Gomulka is a "devout Communist," a little later on he calls him a "national symbol," a "national myth" and a "Polish patriot," and finally we read that the First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party "regards himself as a follower of the master Lenin." To this he adds that Gomulka "has always believed in a 'broad' rule of national forces rather than the all-exclusive rule of the Party. He allows diverse non-Communist forces, such as the Peasant Party and the Catholics, to play a part in the government as long as they recognize the 'leading' role of the Party and its aims. He has revised the Parliament [Sejm] and given it more say if not much more power. In 1957 he had the courage to hold elections in which there were some real choice and and to persuade the population to vote the Party ticket which had the support of the Catholic hierarchy. He believes that the Party must be the ultimate ruling force, but that it must rule by sanction rather than by terror."

Communism is not a sport and the Communist Party is not a sports club in which every member can retain his own convictions and act accordingly. Communism and the Communist Party encompass all fields of life and demand that their line be followed unswervingly. Gomulka could be a "national symbol" or "myth" only if the Polish nation believed in Communism, but the author himself states that the Poles have only contempt for Communism. Does the author believe that we are so lacking in eminent personalities that we must reach all the way down to Gomulka for our "national symbol"? I think not. We have, not only

in past history but also in the present period, a host of courageous people who have given their lives to the cause of freedom and democracy, and it is they who are the "national myth" and "symbol"—not Gomulka.

Gomulka first ruled Poland between the years 1945 and 1948. It was a rule of bloody terror. Countless numbers of more or less prominent activists of democratic political parties were murdered. Gomulka is fully responsible for these things. It is not known exactly why Stalin attempted to liquidate Gomulka. Perhaps it was because the latter belonged to the so-called "national" group of Communists, or because—as Swiatlo maintains—Gomulka considered some of Stalin's strategies as a political line rather than a Communist Party tactic, or finally, maybe because Stalin—in the era of "Titoism"—wanted to introduce a process in Poland similar to that under way in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The years 1955 and 1956 brought the "thaw" and the Poznan riots. A revolutionary atmosphere invaded the entire country. The Party at that time presented a picture of imminent deterioration. Searching for salvation, the Communist Party found it in the person of Gomulka, who had these three important attributes: (1) he had not been among the ruling circles of the previous years; (2) he himself had been their victim; (3) his modest personal life sharply contrasted with that of the other Communist leaders. That is why the Communists chose Gomulka and entrusted him with the task of rebuilding the Party and saving Communism in Poland.

It is perfectly clear that in such a revolutionary atmosphere Gomulka did not dare risk a return to government by terror. He therefore decided to follow the road of concessions. But even this was not Gomulka's doing but that of the Polish people who, through their attitude, forced him and the Communist Party to make these concessions. The period of concessions, however, is now past. The Communists once again feel more firmly entrenched in their positions and Gomulka is making every attempt to wrest back from the nation all the con-

cessions the people forced him to make in 1956. He has again resorted to rule by terror, this time a bloodless terror. He is attempting to restore "order" in the factories with the aid of fear and the threat of unemployment. He wants to rule the writers through fear. He threatens the workers with financial measures. In other words, he has returned to the old method of Communist government based on intimidation and terror.

What is the truth about Gomulka?

Gomulka was and still is a loyal Communist. He is a faithful pupil of Lenin. He believes and practices Lenin's theories, and bases his rule on the dictatorship of the Communist Party—not the will of the people. That is why the elections conducted by him permitted the use of only one list of candidates. That is why he permits rule by only one party, notwithstanding the "existence" of the so-called Democratic and Peasant Parties which are actually directed by and subservient to the Communists.


The article also underestimates the role of the Polish people. It presents matters in such a way as to suggest that Gomulka introduced reforms only out of the goodness of his heart and in accordance with national sentiment. The author forgets that everything that was granted was given under pressure from the people. If Gomulka were the sort of man the author portrays, he would not be an obedient Communist. And if he is an obedient Communist, if he believes in and is trying to implement the Communist program, then he can be neither a "myth" nor a "national symbol." All these perfectly obvious contradictions are the result of an erroneous evaluation of Communism, of the Polish nation and of the man Gomulka.

One last remark. Writing of Poland in 1936, the author describes it as "Pilsudski's Poland." Despite Pilsudski's great importance in Poland, the country cannot be said to have belonged to him, and certainly not in 1936—a year after his death.

Sincerely yours,

Otto Pehr

Chairman of the Polish Council of Unity in the United States



From an article illustrating the perils of Polish building workers.
Kurier Polski (Warsaw), October 19, 1960

"Janek, Pass the Cement!"

The Warsaw weekly Polityka, generally considered an organ of the Gomulka centrists, has been a lively voice in Polish journalism. Recent reports indicate that it has been too lively for the comfort of some leading Party functionaries; its young editor, Mieczysław F. Rakowski, was, these reports say, recently fired and only representations at the highest level caused his dismissal to be retracted. Rakowski, to be sure, is no fiery revisionist on the model of E. Lasota and his demolished Po Prostu. Nevertheless, under Rakowski's guidance Polityka has published some trenchant criticisms of things-as-they-are, if not of the Communist model of what they should be. Below is an excellent example of such criticism, which has aroused widespread comment in Poland. It is by Janusz Roliecki, and appeared in the issue of October 8.

JULY 15. I report to one of the city enterprises and ask for work as an unskilled laborer. The office worker looks at my papers and sends me to the clinic, where, in turn, they direct me to get X-rays and lab tests done.

July 16. I lose half a day having X-rays made in a hospital on Kasprzak Street.

July 18. I go to have lab tests made and stand in line with a number of other beginners.

July 20. I get the medical test results and after a five-minute visit with the doctor, I return to where I started from, armed with a paper stamped "able to work." I get a lovely folder which quickly fills with the growing number of documents given me. From here I am sent to the BHP [Labor Safety and Hygiene] for training.

I go into the next room where four gentlemen sit behind four desks. I have just interrupted their after-breakfast siesta. They are clearly displeased. In a few minutes I tell them my life story. "You never worked in construction?"

"No." "The work is difficult, dirty and maybe you'd like to do something else?" I remain adamant. My informant explains between yawns: "Well, because you see, I don't know where you'll be working. Maybe in transport, or with machinery, or as a cement-man. That's why I can't give you any information how to behave to avoid a tragic accident at work. But remember to be extra careful when working near the elevator. If you see a brick coming down on your head—duck."

At the end of the interview I get instructions equipped with such slogans as: "Use hand tools that are in proper condition," and sign a form in which I state, black on white, that I am already "trained and informed about the threatening dangers to be encountered in the given profession." What is most interesting, however, is that neither I, nor even more so the BHP man, know what that profession will finally turn out to be.

I return again to the first office. I have almost been accepted. The only thing left is that my contract has to be signed by the director, but that's only a formality.

July 21. I arrive in the office at 6:30 in the morning and am assigned to one of the suburban construction sites. The engineer in charge measures me with his eyes from head to foot, evaluates my sickly looking biceps and nominates me a cement worker. I am given a slip of paper and sent to the warehouse where they give me a "uniform." I return to work with L., who has also just signed up. He's about 40 years old. He worked on private construction jobs before and even made pretty good money, but he was always laid off in the winter. Now he's had enough. He wants to get paid in the winter, too.

July 23. I get to work at 6:40 a.m. I was assigned to foreman G. The boss asks me where I come from, whether I worked before, etc., etc. I explain that I am a student and want to make some money. "All right," he says, "we'll find something for you to do." I look around my new place of work. I'll be on the construction of a large four-story building. Today the crew is just starting on the roof. The workers arrive at 7:00.

I am assigned to the cement-workers' group—they look at me suspiciously. One of them asks: "What are you doing here, couldn't you get a better job?"

I carry roof tiles to the construction elevator. The work is hard. Luckily, my co-worker, Bogdan, is a pleasant boy. I ask him about the job and the money that can be made. He answers—and we know each other barely four hours—that I can make money only if I find a buyer for the construction materials. "Working normally, you'll get no more than two grand."

Today's Saturday—pay day. Everyone's excited. At 11:30 they begin sneaking out for their money and at noon work stops altogether. Although on Saturday work is supposed to go on until 1:00 p.m., no one really bothers about it on such an important day. The foreman grumbles a little, but no one pays any attention.

July 25. I get up at 5:30. I rush to work. I get there before 7:00. Horrible weather, pouring rain, cold. I go to the warehouse with the foreman. I get—to my undoing, as it turned out later—a new shovel and wheelbarrow. With

this equipment I return to the construction site. We use the wheelbarrows to transport cement. They're just putting up the roof. Bogdan likes my shovel, he wants to buy it, he could use it at home. Being a greenhorn, I don't sell it to him. We talk about the foreman who, they say, is a dog, not a man. He's too conscientious to suit Bogdan. Takes off several hours pay for only a few minutes lateness. Can't be fooled and is constantly after everybody to get back to work. I am not lucky because the foreman on the next construction over is supposed to be a "regular guy." He permits everything, and says frequently: "you wanna drink all day, brother, go ahead, you wanna drink two or three days, okay—but afterwards, get to work."

It's still drizzling. It's awfully difficult to roll the wheelbarrow onto the elevator. I spill some of the cement. Bogdan helps me clean up the mess. It's twelve o'clock and time for so-called lunch. Every one sits down wherever there is room, to eat bread with kielbasa, bloodwurst or bacon. We tell each other "juicy" stories, highly seasoned with kitchen Latin. 12:30—end of lunch. Four of us carry roof tiles which are disgustingly heavy. Since 2:00 I've been wheeling sawdust mixed with earth. At 3:10 one of the masons tells me: "It's quitting time and you're still working?" Quitting time isn't actually until 3:30. A slight misunderstanding. The masons above want more sawdust. But the woman elevator-operator won't let me load it on the lift and yells: "That's it, quitting time! What're you idiots doing up there?" The masons give up. Work stops at 3:15, and at 3:30 the last worker is leaving the construction site.

July 26. I come to work at 6:40. The foreman is already there. They say that he shows up like that every day, no later than a few minutes after 6:00. He starts work the same time we do—seven. I am getting to know all my new friends better. All the cement workers and almost all the cement-worker assistants, the so-called unskilled laborers, come from the villages around Warsaw and only the fore-



"Haven't you heard about relaxation, boss?"

Szpilki (Warsaw), May 1, 1960

man, the group supervisor and the operator are from Warsaw itself. The elevator operator and one of the cement workers live nearby in a workers' hostel. Such craftsmen as plumbers, electricians and mechanics also live in Warsaw.

The unskilled laborers—there are, of course, more of them—are driven to work in company trucks. Sometimes they come from as far away as 70 and 80 kilometers. They don't have to pay for the transportation. But to get to work on time they have to get up in the morning around 4 a.m. They don't get back home until about six.

Today, like yesterday, I have been assigned to wheeling cement. For the time being I still haven't learned how to bum off. But I can see that all the smarter ones know how to arrange it so as to disappear from the foreman's range of vision.

July 27. I lost my shovel. I still can't understand why the wheelbarrows and shovels are entered in the workers' work papers. The company doesn't provide any place where these things could be safely stored. Seeing this, I asked the foreman where I could hide my shovel. His answer: "Hide it somewhere in the bushes when no one is looking." So I did it and today I haven't got anything to dig with. But by a stroke of luck I found another shovel in another place, an old one, but still usable.

Around eleven Bogdan says that he doesn't feel like working today. He goes to the foreman and explains he has a toothache. The man believes him. Bogdan winks at me and sets out to get pills. He comes back after an hour, sits down on the steps, holds his face and moans. He says to me with pride: "You see, that's the way to do it, without losing even an hour's pay I won't have to do any work."

July 28. One of the cement-workers's assistants didn't come to work today. Attendance isn't so good. Average daily absenteeism is between 10 and 30 percent. So I carry bricks and cement for my errant friend.

July 30. At last the weather has turned nice. Once again I am wheeling cement. The cement mixer is being operated by Czesiek, promoted to operator by force of unexpected circumstance. The real operator was drafted and has already been gone several days. The poor machine is probably dissatisfied with this state of affairs—it wheezes and groans. The new 'operator,' Czesiek—who doesn't have a permit to operate mechanical equipment—is abusing it mercilessly. When I ask, he tells me that if the mixer breaks down it'll be repaired by a special brigade—"isn't that what they're for?" And if it breaks down for good, I ask? They'll get us a new one, he says. And anyway, it's not ours, but the company's. Let it break.

August 1. I am still wheeling cement. Around noon I witness a funny scene. One of the workers comes to the construction site carrying a burlap bag. He walks over to the tin sheets lying on the ground, picks them up, calmly stuffs them in the bag and starts towards the exit. His colleagues, up to now only silent spectators, suddenly start yelling: "Hey, you! Don't take that tin! Police! Police!" There is no policeman around. The man, surprised, turns and, completely resigned, comes back to return the tin. Then they start yelling again: "Eh, Franek, it's a joke.



"Isn't today's youth awful? No respect for their elders. I send the boy to get me a pint, and he tells me he hasn't got time!"

Szpilki (Warsaw), June 12, 1960

A smart guy like you and you fall for it. Can't you tell a joke? Take that tin and scam!" A happy smile obliterates the woebegone expression of just a moment ago on the thief's face. He turns in the direction of the gate and soon disappears in the street crowds.

August 2. Czesio is still operating the cement-mixer. The machine is already dusty and dirty. It breaks down twice and, finally, at 9:30, stops for good. No one can fix it, so it just stands there. A repairman comes over from the next construction site and begins to work on it, cursing all the time. Together with several friends, I am absolutely delighted with this occurrence—it looks like a longer break. But no, the foreman won't be fooled. He makes us carry the roof tiles. Sourly, we set to, cursing the foreman all the way. Objectively, however, you have to admit that foreman R. really holds the whole project together. You have to be a really high-class operator to get away with doing nothing with him around.

The cement mixer returns to action after lunch. Finally we get a true-to-life operator. I am now working with Czes. I pour sand and cement into the machine drum. Czesio makes sure that I don't work any less than he, God forbid. A strange guy. Big and healthy looking as a bull, but always sleepy and never feels like working. A swell companion in food and sleep. He has five hectares of land with a stream, but he still comes here to work.

August 3. Today, since early morning, I've been toting rubble from the second floor. I'm working with Genio, a small, comical fellow. Within one hour I find out that he's an ex-landowner in great difficulties. "My dear sir," he

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"FRIENDSHIP"

The Bulgarian Muse

A particular, and rather peculiar, kind of short story is appearing with increasing frequency in the Bulgarian press. In these, a Communist functionary who, it is made clear, was once a valiant and selfless fighter for the Party, is now shown to have changed into something selfish, cruel, self-seeking and repellent. This is all good clean fun for writers in a country where the only criticism possible is of people who fail to live up to the official ideal, rather than of the ideal itself. Nevertheless, these stories go strikingly far in both content and tone toward a sweeping denunciation of the Communist bureaucracy which controls the whole spectrum of life in a Communist country. And there have indeed been complaints about such stories, and newspaper debates on whether they are healthy antiseptic or hypocritical poison.

The story below, "Friendship," is quite typical of its genre. It is by Bojana Borisova and appeared in the June 25 issue of *Literaturen Front* (Sofia), the organ of the Bulgarian Writers' Union. The story was promptly attacked in the columns of *Trud*, the labor union periodical, and was defended in *Literaturen Front*; extracts from both attack and defense are printed after the story.

Nina Petrova took out the files with the quarterly report. Things were under control. New sanatoriums, new rest homes, thousands of vacationers all year round. Once in a while some irregularity, theft, or negligence. But soon everything would be straightened out. Suddenly the door opened wide and a young girl rushed into the office, breathing fast. "Katia, what a surprise!" The girls embraced.

They had met a year ago on the way to a mountain rest home. Katia had been late and was loaded with a heavy suitcase, a knapsack and skis. There was neither a horse cart nor a truck. The village was still out of sight, and the rest home was far beyond. A car passed on the curve. It splashed the girl's new coat and suddenly stopped. The driver opened the door and called Katia in. That is how they got to know each other.

The director of the rest home bowed a great deal. Nina Petrova did not hide her irritation. She refused the apartment assigned for guests from abroad and took an ordinary room with two beds—for Katia and herself.

Now Nina Petrova was cheerfully arranging the program: "We will have lunch, then you will attend the meeting and tonight we will go to the theater."

Somebody timidly opened the door. The two friends turned. An old man with a cane was standing at the door. He asked, "Comrade Petrova?"

"Do come in, sit down," she invited him.

"I, Comrade Petrova," he seemed quite upset, "was until recently a teacher of literature and drawing. But I fell ill and they dismissed me, giving me a pension. All of a sudden old age came on me. I live alone. I just left the hospital for the second time this year. The doctors advised me to go to the Bankia mineral springs. So if you have a card which has been returned, I would be very grateful to you. . . ."

Nina Petrova sat, her elbows on the desk. Yes, she had a card in her desk drawer for Bankia mineral springs. A card which she kept for her cousin. Yes, Vasia was healthy, but she had done her so many favors. The old man obviously needed it. . . . But Vasia had not yet decided whether she would like to go to Bankia. . . .

Nina Petrova said with a slight effort, "I am sorry, but the cards were distributed long ago. You know, there is such a demand for Bankia mineral springs."

The old man listened with a bent head. "That is alright," he murmured bitterly, and got up. "I was told to inquire here."

"I will try to do something for you. I cannot promise. Come by at the end of the week."

"Thank you, Comrade Petrova. I will." The old man left, but his shadow was still felt in the office.

Katia became very sad. "Katia, my girl, what's wrong?" Katia was silent. "Katia, you wanted to go to the seashore in July. Shall I get a card for Nessebar? Or maybe for Varna?"

Katia lifted her eyes and quietly asked, "Can I have one for Bankia?"

"But, Katia, why didn't you tell me? Aren't we friends? I forgot that I have one here. . . ." Without hesitation Nina Petrova opened the desk drawer, looked in it for a moment, then took out the card and gave it to Katia. "Beginning Monday," Nina Petrova said.

Katia got up, thanked her, shook hands and left the office in a hurry. The old man hadn't quite got to the exit. Katia took him by the sleeve. "Comrade!" The old man started. "A card for Bankia mineral springs," Katia almost shouted. "It was just returned to Comrade Petrova. It starts this Monday."

* * *

An old friend was sitting in the heavy armchair of Nina Petrova's office. While she waited for some kind of certificate, they recalled their past years of youth. "I will never forget our first meeting," the friend told Nina Petrova. "You, Petar and Liliana had come to a meeting at my house ordered by the Party. Do you remember those war years? There was a blockade in the street, and when the policeman knocked on the door I was so frightened. It was impossible to get out by the window. But when the policeman and I walked into the room there were Petar and Liliana acting as if they were engaged and you were playing the piano and singing a German song."

Nina Petrova bent her head, much embarrassed. "Petar has changed. Surrounded himself with dishonest people.

Bought a house, a summer home, a car. Got married. His wife. . . ."

Nina Petrova took the mail. A post card from Bankia resort attracted her attention. From Katia? She turned it over—the writing was unfamiliar.

"Dear Comrade Petrova. With these few lines I would like to thank you for the card. I am already better—I am so grateful to you and to the nice girl, who reached me at the exit."

Nina Petrova could hardly swallow. She felt a lump in her throat. The old teacher was writing to her. Nina recalled the strange behavior of Katia, and then . . .

Criticism

IN RECENT ISSUES *Literature Front* printed a number of articles on the subject of the 'Communist image,' which had the following line: writers must describe the Communist not as an ideal but as a man of flesh and blood, with his weaknesses, sufferings and doubts. In order, however, to illustrate this with an artistic example, *Literature Front* has printed the short story "Friendship" by Bojana Borisova. I read the story and was stunned. Not because the writers' newspaper could print such a weak, unartistic work, but because of its content, of the author's stand.

"Are there Communists like the heroine in the story—Nina Petrova? Of course there are. There are some with even greater weaknesses. But what concerns me mostly is whether all Communists are like that. Whether hypocrisy, meanness, opportunism are symbolic of the Communist movement. According to the author, it would seem to be so. . . .

(Continued on page 49)



Rest house at the Anton Ivanov resort in the Rhodopes Mountains. Bulgaria Today (Sofia), July 1959

Eastern Europe Overseas

The East European Satellites have played a little-publicized but important part in the Communist drive to win friends and influence among countries that are not allied to the West. Trade missions, technicians and cultural delegations are in constant movement between the capitals of Eastern Europe and the "uncommitted countries." We give below a summary of the most important contacts made in the last month.

October 13 An agreement was signed on the formation of a joint Polish-Guinean fishing company. (Radio Warsaw.)

October 14 Visiting Poland was a 17-member parliamentary delegation from the Kingdom of Nepal. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw].)

A protocol on the mutual exchange of goods between Poland and India in 1961 was signed in Warsaw within the framework of the Polish-Indian three year trade and payments agreement. The protocol provides for a further increase in turnover. Poland will export to India mainly complete industrial units, machine tools, mining machines and other investment equipment, rails, wheel sets, chemicals, paper, and a number of other articles. The main products exported by India will be oil cakes, iron and manganese ores, mica, vegetable fibers, agricultural and food articles, and raw hides. (PAP [Warsaw].)

The Hungarian Presidential Council formally recognized the Nigerian Federation as an independent State; it also decided to establish diplomatic relations with the Somali Republic. (Radio Budapest.)

October 15 A five-man Polish delegation arrived in Cairo for trade talks with representatives of the Egyptian Region of the UAR. (Radio Warsaw.)

Czechoslovakia's Kovo Foreign Trade Enterprise concluded a contract for the delivery of 1,000 automatic looms to India. The first part of the delivery has already been shipped and a number of Indian technicians have finished technical training in Czechoslovak textile plants. A contract for an additional 150 automatic looms is being negotiated. (CTK [Prague].)

October 17 The second sugar refining plant delivered by Poland to Iran will soon undergo trial runs. It is expected to process from 1,000 to 1,500 tons of sugar beet daily. Poland, working jointly with Czechoslovakia, also recently built a sugar cane refining plant in Ceylon. (Radio Warsaw.)

October 19 At the invitation of Hungarian Minister of Foreign Trade Jenő Incze, the Egyptian Minister of Economy and Trade was in Budapest from October 12 to 18. The two ministers "had friendly talks on economic ques-

tions" affecting both countries. (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest].)

The Bulgarian government formally recognized the new Republic of Senegal and expressed its readiness to establish diplomatic relations with it. (BTA [Sofia].)

On a visit to Romania, the director of Jakarta University had talks with Minister of Education and Culture Ilie Murgulescu, visited schools in Bucharest, and met with Indonesian students studying at the Oil and Gas Institute. (Radio Bucharest.)

October 20 The Egyptian Sea Navigation Company signed a contract for three 1,400 ton cargo ships from Hungary, which will be built by the Gheorghiu-Dej shipyard and delivered before the end of 1961. The contract was described as the first important business transaction of the NIKEX export enterprise with a "capitalist customer for cargo ships." (Radio Budapest.)

October 22 Bulgaria's "economic collaboration" with the Arab countries has included the following projects: a 35,000 ton capacity giant silo in Syria; two dams still under construction in Syria, and a hydro-electric station on the Orontes River; unspecified "modern public institutions and housing units" in Syria; town-planning projects for several Syrian towns; expansion and development of the port and city of Latakia in Syria; equipment and machines for a huge onion drying plant in Egypt which, when it begins operations, will be run by Bulgarian experts. In addition, the USSR and Bulgaria plan to cooperate in providing technical assistance for the construction of a carbide factory and another plant in Egypt. (Radio Sofia.)

October 23 Iraq and Czechoslovakia signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement which provides for joint cooperation in establishing oil refining and petrochemical industries and in setting up hydraulic and thermal electric energy generators and other industries. Czechoslovakia is to prepare complete economic and technical studies on any one of the aforesaid schemes upon the request of Iraq. After receiving these studies Iraq will have the right to decide whether to implement them. (Radio Baghdad.)

October 25 A Polish trade delegation led by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Burakiewicz left for Tunisia for

talks on the signing of a long-term agreement under which Poland would export complete industrial plants as well as other investment goods in return for Tunisian products. (Radio Warsaw.)

October 26 The Czechoslovak Keramika plant will deliver asbestos-cement pressure pipes to the Sudan during the first half of 1961.

The Czechoslovak Foreign Trade Enterprise Ligna concluded its first contract with the Banco El Comercio Exterior de Cuba for the delivery of \$85,000 worth of paper. A large part of the order will be filled this year. (CTK [Prague].)

October 27 Czechoslovakia has received an order for 432 trucks from the Egyptian region of the UAR. They include the Praga S-5-T dump trucks, mobile cranes, tank trucks, sprayers, etc., which will be delivered by the Motokov Foreign Trade Enterprise next year. In 1961, Motokov will also deliver 60 7-ORT Skoda trucks to Guinea. (CTK [Prague].)

October 28 President of the Cuban National Bank Guevara was in Czechoslovakia as leader of a delegation to discuss cultural exchange and technical assistance. Guevara said that an agreement had been drawn up doubling the \$20 million credit extended to Cuba by Czechoslovakia in June. This will be used in the next five years for the development of Cuban production of trucks, tractors, motorcycles and farm machinery. Czechoslovakia is to provide Cuba with specialized technical aid which will help, for instance, in the development of Cuba's nickel resources. (Radio Prague.)

October 29 Hungarian Ikarus buses are in service in Conakry, and Budapest-made Pannonia motorcycles have been put on the Guinean market. Hungary has already sent 300,000 meters of textiles to Guinea, and a recent contract signed by the two countries provided for the delivery of \$500,000 worth of textiles to Guinea. (Radio Budapest.)

November 1 Czechoslovakia concluded a contract with the Iraqi central administration of oil refineries in Baghdad for the delivery of a plant for production of spare parts from refineries. The plant also will produce 60,000 steel cylinders for propane-butane. (CTK [Prague].)

November 2 After a two-week visit to Cuba, a Romanian government delegation led by Minister of Trade Radulescu left Havana for home. A communique was signed in regard to the establishment of diplomatic relations, a trade agreement, and a protocol on scientific and technical collaboration. Romania agreed to ship machinery and equipment—including tractors and railway rolling stock—chemical and pharmaceutical products, and light industrial

articles to Cuba. In return, Romania will import rubber, hides, coffee, cocoa, tropical fruits and other agricultural products. (Radio Bucharest.)

November 4 The Czechoslovak radio received a telegram from the Cuban Confederation of Labor, stating that a club of trade unionists, listeners to Radio Prague in Havana, had been set up. The telegram expressed the gratitude of "the Cuban working people" for the work of Radio Prague, "which strengthens friendly relations between the two countries." (Radio Prague.)

November 5 An official delegation left Prague to attend the opening of a Czechoslovak industrial exhibition in Addis Ababa. (Radio Prague.)

An agreement recently concluded between Hungary and Cuba envisages substantial Hungarian exports of telecommunications equipment to Cuba, including telephone switchboards for Havana and the provinces, and 16,000 telephone receivers from the Budavox factory. (Radio Budapest.)

November 6 A parliamentary delegation from the Republic of Guinea led by Vice-Chairman of the National Assembly Fontana Kefimba arrived in Prague. Consisting exclusively of members of the Guinean Democratic Party, "which consistently fights imperialism and struggles for the complete independence of Guinea," the delegation is supposed to become acquainted with the work and accomplishments of Czechoslovak State organs. (*Rude Pravo*, [Prague].)

A five-member delegation from India's textile industry arrived in Lodz to study production possibilities of the textile machine building industry and will define lines for expanding mutual relations. (Radio Warsaw.)

A government delegation from the Republic of Mali headed by Deputy Premier Jean Marie Kone arrived in Czechoslovakia to study conditions and establish cooperation. A group of 29 students from Mali also arrived to study at Czechoslovak universities. (*Rude Pravo*, [Prague].)

November 7 Czechoslovakia and the UAR have signed a plan for scientific and cultural cooperation. It provides for visits to the UAR by Czechoslovak research workers in the field of experimental physics, hydrology and hydro-engineering; UAR experts in the field of health care are to visit Czechoslovakia as well as members of the UAR atomic commission. Czechoslovak teachers will lecture in Czech at the language-college in Cairo, and university graduates of the UAR will study at Czechoslovak colleges and universities. (CTK [Prague].)

Czechoslovak leather experts visiting Cuba have concluded a contract for the purchase of 1,800 tons of cow hide. Regular purchases of Cuban hides are envisaged. (CTK [Prague].)



"What happened—a holy miracle?" "Yes, an agronomist has come."

Szpilki (Warsaw), December 6, 1959

Organizing the Polish Peasant

By sponsoring an old form of peasant cooperation, the Gomulka regime is attempting to modernize the countryside and to raise farm production—as well as to nudge the reluctant peasantry a step toward collective farming.

UNTIL A YEAR AND A HALF AGO, millions of Polish landowners were quietly tilling their land in what seemed to be peaceful coexistence with Communism. The Party, after trying for years to push the peasants into collective farms, had declared a tacit truce in October 1956, when Gomulka became First Secretary. The peasants were left alone and encouraged by various incentives to work and produce. Now, however, the Party's rural apparatus is out of mothballs and its agitators are on the move again. In the villages and fields the peasants are again being exhorted to think of their national responsibilities.

The Polish Communists are engaged in a new effort to overhaul and modernize the country's small-scale agriculture. But the strategy and tactics, if not the ultimate objective, differ greatly from those employed in the rest of the Soviet bloc. Gomulka's current policies are certainly the most

original approach to organizing agriculture that has yet appeared in the long Communist tug-of-war with the peasantry. Paying only lip service to the old Marxist dogmas of socialized agriculture, the new program is tailored to the here-and-now conditions in the Polish countryside.

In place of collective farms—the cornerstone of orthodox Marxist agrarian policies—Gomulka is stressing a much milder form of collective effort, the agricultural circles. These groups have deep roots in Poland's rural life, dating back to prewar years. In origin they were voluntary associations organized by the peasants to carry out various kinds of cooperative activities, including the joint purchase of machinery and fertilizers. During the Stalinist years the groups were suppressed, but after 1956 they enjoyed a brisk revival. The Communists are attempting to make use of them as a vehicle for their plan to mechanize agriculture

and (not necessarily the same thing) to make it more productive.

The New Program

While Communists are not noted for their concern with public opinion, the Gomulka regime evidently feels that peasant sentiment will have much to do with determining the success of another campaign to organize them. Taking advantage of the groups set up spontaneously by the peasants themselves, the Communists decided to expand them into "a mass organization embracing the overwhelming majority of the peasantry"—subject, of course, to regulation by the State and local governmental bodies. In the statute setting up the new program, the circles were defined as follows:

"The agricultural circle is a voluntary, universal, socio-economic peasant organization rallying the peasants for work on development and improvement of agricultural production through the coordination of individual efforts by mutual aid and collaboration. The agricultural circle operates on the basis of its own accumulated funds and funds of the Agricultural Development Fund which is social, indivisible property for the satisfaction of the production needs of members. . . .

"The agricultural circle has its own legal personality . . . [and it] may carry out public and legal functions in certain areas delegated to it by the State, with regard to all independent farms of the village, e.g., weed control . . . , livestock inspection, land improvement, etc."¹

Thus the Polish peasant is not threatened with the loss of his land and the collective brigade labor imposed on the peasantry in other Communist countries. Instead the peasants are to be "schooled" in a host of lesser "cooperative" activities. The primary purpose of the circles is to purchase and use collectively tractors and tractor-drawn machinery. In addition, they are to act as purchasing points for fertilizers, building material and pesticides for distribution among members and other farmers in their vicinity; construct public utility buildings in the villages, carry out irrigation and other land improvement projects; organize small-scale processing and drying plants; and serve as centers for dispersing agricultural knowledge.

The program also envisages that, as a "sideline," the circles may take over many of the functions of the State purchasing organizations in contracting with the farmers for their produce. Collective farming—in the true sense of the word—will take place only on land which may be leased by the circles from State properties, or on farms taken over by the State from farmers who are delinquent in their taxes or have neglected their land.

The Agricultural Development Fund

The most novel idea in the scheme is the way it is to be financed. Instead of abolishing the much-disliked compulsory deliveries (which are really taxes levied on the farmer's produce), the State is using the money it earns on these deliveries—i.e., the difference between what it pays for

the farmer's produce and the prices received on the free market—to underwrite the new program. Of the total revenue received from this source, estimated at 25 billion *zloty* by 1965, 88 percent will go to the Agricultural Development Fund. The remaining 12 percent will be devoted to expanding those industries indirectly connected with agriculture, namely, agricultural machinery, chemical fertilizers and building materials.

If the agricultural circles cooperate, the Fund will pay 75 percent (85 percent in the Western Territories) of the cost of new machinery, irrigation and other improvement projects. Thus if the members of a circle want a new tractor with its accompanying machines and equipment, they need raise only 25 percent of the cost from their own resources. Eighty percent of the Fund goes directly to the circles for these purposes. The other 20 percent is allocated to the provincial and district unions of agricultural circles, which are to supervise and coordinate the individual circles. The unions are to set up fuel stations and repair shops, and dispatch agricultural experts throughout the area under their jurisdiction. They will also purchase large irrigation and earth-moving equipment which is too expensive for individual circles. They are authorized to grant medium term loans to circles that are unable to raise sufficient funds of their own for purchasing machinery.

Organization and Control

Along with the money go rules and regulations to insure that the circles will carry out the government's program. No village can obtain its share of the funds—allotted according to the value of the produce it has delivered—until it has organized an agricultural circle. Any property acquired by the circle, such as tools or machinery, cannot be sold or divided by the members. Should the circle disband, its property will be administered by the district union of agricultural circles. The circles are surrounded by organizational controls. Above them are the district, provincial and national unions of agricultural circles. Locally, there are the municipal governments. Individual circles are required to "conform to the statutes, regulations, resolutions and instructions of [their respective] unions." At the same time, the district unions have "the right to nullify resolutions of circle meetings and decisions of the circle management if they are contrary to the circle or union statute. . . ." Thus, while the district and provincial unions of agricultural circles have at their disposal only 20 percent of the Agricultural Development Fund, they are an effective lever of political as well as economic control.

The regime has buttressed its control on the local level through the local governing organs or "people's councils." Party leader Gomulka stated in June 1959: "Social property worth many billions will be in the hands of the agricultural circles. . . . It is at the same time property of great significance for the entire national economy. That is why the people's councils must feel responsible for its protection, effective utilization for intensification of agricultural production, and also for the fact that it must serve the interests of the working peasantry. In fulfilling these tasks,

a key role will be played by the commune people's councils." Their role was described as follows:

"On the basis of views and recommendations of agricultural circles unions, the people's councils will determine the order of utilization of the Agricultural Development Fund's resources and the resources accrued from other investment outlays and State credits. They will also supervise and control the correct utilization of these resources, give expert assistance through correctly deploying agronomists, zootechnicians, and other specialists, and work out complex plans for the development of agriculture in their areas. . . .

"To facilitate the commune people's councils in carrying out a coordinating and supervisory role in their relations with agricultural circles, it is necessary to set up committees consisting of all chairmen of agricultural circles within the commune, the regional agronomist, and perhaps, a representative of the district people's council."²

The statutes governing the circles, as promulgated in Warsaw, contain still other provisions intended to assure ultimate control to the regime. Membership, for example, is open to all "owners and users of land," but the statute, in a controversial Article 12, also entitles "anyone concerned with rural areas by reason of his work" to membership. The "voluntary" principle is maintained by allowing members the right of withdrawal, and at the same time, if any member fails to make his contribution for a period of one year, he may be removed from the rolls. In the event of withdrawal, contributions are refunded and "may carry interest from the circles' income." However, the principles of the refund and the amount of interest it may carry are subject to regulation by the circle's general assembly.


Embryos of Socialism?

The political implications of the new program are not altogether clear. Have the Polish Communists abandoned the idea of collective farming? Gomulka himself has been hard put to square the program with old Marxist dogmas. He has argued that the agricultural circles are not competing with collective farms. "Socialized" agriculture is the ultimate objective; the agricultural circles are "embryos of Socialism" and "should be regarded as a school shaping the consciousness and practical habits of collective farming."

"We do not intend to disguise it, though hostile propaganda endeavors to exploit the circumstance for its own purposes by telling the peasants, 'There you are, the Party wants to deceive you. It is talking about agricultural circles and thinking about collective farms.' It is not the Party that is deceiving the peasants. . . .

"We are saying what we are thinking. The peasants will become convinced of what they can learn from the mechanization of farms, with the use of machines which constitute collective social property. We are only anticipating the result of that work. The assertion that Communists want to set up collective farms for the sole purpose of satisfying Socialist doctrine is utter nonsense.

"The choice is not between agricultural circles and collective farms. Both demand the concentration of effort by the Party for their development. . . . The Socialist



A Polish tractor factory. The 25-horsepower C-325, on the assembly line, makes up about two thirds of the country's production, *Nowa Wies (Warsaw)*, June 5, 1960

transformation of rural areas is dependent on the realization by peasants that it will result in better productivity, and that joint economy in agriculture is a superior system."³

But this still leaves the Polish Communists some distance from the straightforward tactics applied in the other countries of the Soviet bloc. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe collectivization of the peasants is far advanced (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania) or virtually complete (East Germany and Bulgaria). While most of the Satellite leaders have preserved a studied silence about Poland's agricultural circles, Soviet Premier Khrushchev gave them ambiguous approval when he visited Poland in the summer of 1959. Speaking to an audience of peasants he said: "The [Soviet] reform of agriculture did not begin everywhere with the collectives. We had associations for the joint cultivation of land, resembling to some extent your agricultural circles. . . . Maybe some of you would say I am enticing you into collective farms. I do not, of course, entice anybody, but I know that you will come to collective forms of farming sooner or later. I should like to meet you again in a few years and look you straight in the eyes.

You will recall then that Khrushchev visited you, that he spoke of collective farms—and proved to be right.”⁴

The program does contain certain institutional features which the Communists may hope will lead toward ultimate collectivism: common ownership of machinery which cannot be distributed, collective farming of land leased from the State, more direct control by the Party, etc. Yet, there is a basic difference in priorities. In contrast to the rest of the Soviet bloc where first importance is given to collectivization over other measures to improve agriculture, the Polish scheme proposes to raise the technical level and productivity of the country's farming first, and to attempt to collectivize it later.

“As the circles develop, the possibilities of State intervention in individual peasant farming will increase. The peasant is the owner of his land, but how he manages his land is not a matter of indifference to the entire nation.

“Such intervention exists everywhere and, for instance, is much greater in certain capitalist countries than here. . . .

“The aim—and we must not forget that—is, after all, to obtain the highest possible production from every farm—and this is of national importance.”⁵

Problems of the Soil

BUT WHY, AFTER THREE YEARS of leaving them alone, did the Polish Communists again seek to organize the peasants? Most of the growth in agricultural production that had taken place since the Communists came to power had occurred after 1956 when the peasants were given a comparatively free hand in managing their affairs. The reasons are two, and closely linked. In the first place, Poland needs heavy investment in the techniques of agricultural production. Second, the economic planners need an instrument with which to control this investment and to manage the results.

When First Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka first outlined the program to the plenary session of the Party Central Committee in June 1959, he did so in a lengthy report remarkable for the discomforting detail with which he depicted the laggard state of Polish farming. Three months

later at the Congress of Agricultural Circles which set the new scheme into motion, he added:

“But do you realize that one American farmer, professionally employed in American agriculture, produces enough to feed about 30 other people? And what about us, comrades? About 40 percent of all employed workers are in agriculture. And the result? There is not enough bread and food produced at home. We have to import it. . . . Therefore, I say, we must produce more from our soil, we must gradually transform production relations in the countryside.”⁶

However beside-the-mark Gomulka's comparison may be (Polish agriculture more closely resembles the situation in Western Europe where there is a large population relative to available farmland than it does US farming where land is still cheap), his observation was symbolic of the times. The West has experienced a revolution in agricultural technology, a revolution which is still largely a dream in Poland as it is in other Communist countries. Less than 7 million American farmers produce more than enough food and fiber for the country's 170 million inhabitants, while in Poland nearly half that many farmers are unable to support at a lower standard of living a population less than one sixth that of the US. Today American farmers are producing roughly 50 percent more than they did before World War II, and they are doing it with 30 percent fewer man-hours of work and the smallest planted acreage in forty years.⁷ The bulk of Poland's 3.5 million peasants—40 percent of them farming less than 7.5 acres⁸—are still using techniques and tools abandoned long ago in the more advanced Western countries. The horse, instead of the tractor, is still the chief form of traction in Poland. Grain yields per hectare are at about their prewar levels, and those of potatoes and sugar beets are lower. The contrast is underlined by American aid valued at \$426 million—representing mainly overflows from the grain elevators of the Mid-West—which has been extended to Poland in the last four years.

History of a Failure

The agricultural circles, it is hoped, will serve as channels of more advanced agricultural techniques. But the regime also wants to make sure that the investment does not result chiefly in strengthening and enriching a class of free peasants. The Communists have always preferred collective farms as a means of controlling the peasants both economically and politically. However, nowhere in the Soviet bloc have the architects of rural Communism suffered greater defeat than in the Polish countryside. Despite fifteen years under the “Socialist banner,” collective farming is in about the same position that it was a decade ago with only about 1.2 percent of the agricultural land under the common plow. The old Stalinist leadership was never able to press even 10 percent of the arable land into collective farms, although a battery of political and economic pressures were employed.

When Gomulka came to power in October 1956 he called a halt to collectivization. His words were: “Collective farms with no possibility for development, which

YIELDS IN AGRICULTURE
(quintals per hectare)

	Four Grains ¹	Potatoes	Sugar Beets
1934-38 ²	13.7	138	265
1950-55	12.7	117	187
1955 (Plan)	16.1	150	240
1955	14.3	100	186
1957	15.0	127	225
1959	15.7	128	159
1960 (Plan)	15.3	140	220
1965 (Plan)	17.5	155	250

¹ Wheat, rye, barley and oats. ² Present boundaries.

SOURCES: *Maly Rocznik Statystyczny*, 1960 (Warsaw); and 1959; *Nowe Rolnictwo* (Warsaw), No. 8, April, 1959 and *Gospodarka Planowa* (Warsaw), May, 1960.

lose money instead of making profits, should be given no loans. The members of such farms ought to be allowed to decide whether to dissolve them or not. . . .⁹ The collective farms crumbled; of 10,600 in mid-1956, there remained only 2,200 by the spring of 1957. Since that time, the collective sector has failed to grow.* The average size of the farms, as well as their average membership, is about one third less than it was in September 1956. Of those which remain, some 30 percent of their membership owned no land before joining the farms, and 38 percent of the land worked by these collectives belongs to the State land fund.

During the period prior to the launching of the new program, loose cooperative groups, including the voluntary agricultural circles, were again allowed to organize. The number of agricultural circles jumped from 383 at the end of 1956 to 11,660 by the end of 1957, and membership rose from 8,584 to 327,273 in the same period. By mid-1959, their numbers had grown to 18,891 and their membership to 513,143.¹⁰ In February 1958, the Ministry of Agriculture issued a decree defining the legal limits of the agricultural circles and their unions (district and provincial), but State interference in their activities remained at a minimum.

The New Way

In the fall of 1959, a Warsaw paper expressed the following opinion about the state of Polish agriculture: "The situation is such that Poland's countryside has arrived—the present organization of production being as it is—at the limit of its production possibilities."¹¹ How were the possibilities to be increased? The Research Institute of Public Opinion in Warsaw during the early part of 1959 had conducted a poll among over a thousand peasants throughout the country and asked them this question. Not surprisingly, only 4 percent of the sample spoke out for collective farming. While about 61 percent favored continued complete independence, 36 percent believed that the agricultural circles could help raise output. The leading Polish economic weekly *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), August 2, 1959, analyzed the results as follows: "The nine-fold advantage of agricultural circles over collective farms should remove all doubt as to the opinions prevailing in that part of the countryside which advocates some sort of cooperative farming in the future economy."

OUTPUT OF PRINCIPAL CROPS

(millions of tons)

	Four Grains ¹	Wheat	Potatoes	Sugar Beets
1934-38 ²	13.3	2.0	38.0	6.0
1950-55	11.3	2.0	30.8	6.5
1957	13.5	2.3	35.1	7.6
1958	13.6	2.4	34.8	8.4
1959	14.1	2.5	35.7	6.0
1965 (Plan)	15.8		41.9	11.0

¹ Wheat, rye, barley and oats. ² Present boundaries.

SOURCES: *Maly Rocznik Statystyczny*, 1960 (Warsaw); and 1959; *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), June 24, 1960.

* The number of collective farms fell to 1,803 by the end of 1957, according to *Rocznik Statystyczny* (Warsaw), 1959. Since then, the number has edged up to slightly under the 2,200 mark.


Economists who have analyzed the bases for economic development in both the East and the West—however much they may dispute over ways and means—agree that it takes more than industry to industrialize. Agriculture has a pivotal role, especially in the early periods. While industry is coming into its own, it is necessary to feed an expanding population (and Poland has one of the highest rates of natural population increase in Europe) and the swelling towns and cities (which means fewer workers in the rural areas). At the same time, sufficient quantities of agricultural supplies must be available to help meet the larger foreign exchange bill for the imported machinery required for industrialization. In short, fewer and fewer people must produce more and more food and cheap raw materials in the countryside.

The alternative, in case of a sagging agricultural economy, is to increase imports. The Poles are facing one of their most serious problems precisely in this area. Grain imports have soared since 1956, costing the country \$274.6 million in foreign exchange in the period 1956-58 and another \$112 million in 1959. Total imports of food and fodder rose 80 percent in 1959, and the share of agricultural purchases abroad increased from 11 to 17 percent of total imports. Attempts have been made to expand agricultural exports, but there are inadequate supplies; at the same time, prices for these products in Western Europe, Poland's best customer for meat and eggs, are dropping. The total value of agricultural imports last year, \$241 million, exceeded that of all such exports by \$32 million. The government is trying to increase the export of machines and equipment, which go largely to the Soviet bloc, but so far these have not closed the gap. For example, the value of the grain Poland was forced to import from the Soviet Union during 1959 surpassed the income it received from the sale of machines and equipment to that country. For several years, Poland has relied upon foreign credits to cover the deficit in its trade, but this aid is running out and there is still no indication that the books will tally in the future.

A Question of Investment

One of the basic reasons for the stagnation of agricultural production in Poland (and in other Communist countries) has been underinvestment. Capital funds went largely to the favored sector of heavy industry. A leading Polish journal has described the situation in agricultural investment in the 1950-55 period as follows:

"It was characteristic of the development of agriculture until recently, that it was done with the aid of the smallest investments. In the years 1950-55 investments in agriculture were negligible and could play no part in raising farm production above its prewar level. At that time the part of the government funds invested in agriculture was 9.6 percent of all State investments. And most of that investment was spent on building up and equipping State farms, building up State machine shops and amelioration [land improvement]. The peasants' own investments were greatly limited by the excessive charges levied on the countryside and investment credits were rarely granted them. Later, since 1955, a certain increase could be observed."¹²



"I'm from the agricultural circle."

Zarzewie (Warsaw), October 25, 1959

The countryside received more favorable treatment after 1956, but the increase hardly amounted to a revolutionary farm investment program. By 1959, the strains on the economy stemming from low agricultural productivity were evident enough to dictate a major turn. Under the Five Year Plan for 1961-1965, introduced in 1959, the number of tractors operating on the farms are to increase to 135,000 (as compared with 65,000 in mid-1960); the country's three million horses (said to have eaten up more grain in 1958 than the entire urban population) are to diminish by 400,000; the use of chemical fertilizers will increase 63 percent; and 25 percent more money will be earmarked for irrigation, drainage and other land improvement purposes.

In June 1960, the investment plan was revised and the amount earmarked for agriculture raised by about 26 percent. The table below summarizes the trend in agricultural investment since 1950.*

	Actual 1950-55	Plan 1956-60	Actual 1958	Plan 1961-65
Percent going to				
Industry	44.8	39.0	38	38.7
Agriculture and forestry..	12.2	13.7	13	16.3

Much of the investment under the new plan is expected to come from the peasants' own pockets. In his address to the Congress of Agricultural Circles in September 1959, Gomulka remarked that this was an assumption which could not be taken for granted. "The sum is in the hands of 3.5

million peasant farms. . . . It is difficult to get at them. I should even say in many cases it is impossible. . . . We have no means efficiently to enforce a planned management of investment in the rural areas so as to insure that they spend the planned resources for the development of agricultural production."¹³ To provide this insurance is one of the primary functions of the agricultural circles, which are to be in Gomulka's words, "the instruments of the planned economy in agriculture."

The following table shows the sources from which total agricultural investment will be derived during the coming years and the purposes for which the funds have been earmarked (as compared with the current Five Year Plan).*

	1956-60	1961-65
Total (in billion zloty).....	68.6	116.8
Source:		
State	29.3	43.2
Agricultural Development Fund...	2.5	20.5
Peasants' own funds.....	36.8	53.1
Percent going for:		
Farm building and housing.....	56.1	49.0
Mechanization	27.9	30.3
Land improvement	8.3	14.0
Electrification	4.2	3.3
Other	3.5	3.4

Peasants and the Party

IF THE AGRICULTURAL CIRCLES represent a Polish attempt to adapt the imperatives of Leninist doctrine to certain political and social realities, the results so far are not encouraging. Circles exist in about 54 percent of the villages throughout the country, but less than one fifth of the peasants belong to them. In the villages where circles exist, the average membership is between 15 and 30, or less than a third of the farmers in those villages. Ironically, the growth of the circles began to slow down precisely at the time when the government adopted them as an instrument of policy. In the 14 months prior to September 1959 the number of circles increased by 54 percent and their membership by 36 percent. But in the period from mid-1959 to August 1960, the respective figures were only 18 and 14 percent. The geographic distribution of the circles is very uneven. They are most popular in the western and northern parts of the country. In Katowice province, over 90 percent of the villages have circles, and in four other provinces the figures range from 72 to 79 percent. Other sections of the country, however, are far behind, and in many places, according to Party leader Gomulka's admission, the circles exist mainly on paper.

Consequently, a large portion of the Agricultural Devel-

* United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1959* (Geneva), 1960, Chapter II, p. 22; *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), June 24, 1960 and March 22, 1959; and *Dziennik Ustaw* (Warsaw), 1957, No. 40, p. 476.

* *Gospodarka Planowa* (Warsaw), May 1960. The final figures for 1961-1965, as approved by the Central Committee in June 1960, totalled 113.8 billion zloty. The percentages allotted to different purposes were not significantly changed.



Poland plans to import a total of 19,000 tractors from Czechoslovakia by 1965, like the half-track Zetor Model 25 A shown above.

Nova Wies (Warsaw), May 15, 1960

opment Fund, the government's chief lever in the scheme, has not been utilized. In Poznan province, for example, during the four months of the Fund's operation in 1959, less than 7 percent of the available money was drawn upon. According to Gomulka's report at the sixth plenum of the CC in September 1960, a total of 2.6 billion *zloty* had been pumped into the Agricultural Development Fund so far, but less than 25 percent of it had been exploited. The process of transferring land from the State land fund to the circles, which is the basis for the only collective cultivation that takes place under the program, is also lagging. Out of the more than 800,000 hectares owned by the State, only about 100,000 had been taken over by the agricultural circles (usually under eight-year leases) by September of this year.

TRACTORS IN USE
(hectares per tractor)¹

	1949	1957	Plan 1965
Poland	711	291	117
Czechoslovakia	230	102	36
East Germany	—	150 ²	—
Hungary	453	219	93
USSR	—	257	123
Bulgaria	688	262	—
Romania	1001	413	100
West Germany	78	14	—
United Kingdom	24	16 ³	—
Denmark	223	36	—
United States	52	40	—
France	174	45	—
Italy	329	84	—
Greece	696	360 ⁴	—
Yugoslavia	—	404	—

¹ Of arable land including orchards. ² Tractors in Machine Tractor Stations only. ³ Figure for 1948. ⁴ Figures for 1956.

SOURCES: *Maly Rocznik Statystyczny, 1960*, (Warsaw); Plan figures from United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1959* (Geneva), 1960, Chapter III, p. 37; and *Scinteia* (Bucharest), May 19, 1960.

"Why Do They Drag Us?"

One reason the campaign has lagged is the peasant's suspicion of any program bearing a Communist label. "I will not join a circle," insisted a poor peasant from Rawa Mazowiecka who had to supplement his meager income by working in a sawmill. "Because if those circles are so good for the peasants—why do they drag us by the ears? No one has to be persuaded to go to paradise."⁸ The Party organizers are also embarrassed by their commitment to the ultimate Marxist goal of a collectivized agriculture. The rural agitators were warned at the outset of the drive, by the official organ dealing with Party problems, that theirs would be a difficult task. "Comrades must be prepared in advance for sneaky questions like: 'Is it true that at first there will be circles and then collectives?' It is easy to swallow the bait; a comrade who answers 'no' will be in disagreement with the Party line, but if he limits himself to a simple 'yes,' he will be shouted down."¹⁴

The press and radio have been busy for the last year mustering arguments that will somehow get around this dilemma and answer such comments from the peasants as: "this year, common machinery, next year, common land." The chief answer is that the circles are voluntary: "What kind of a trap is it if you can get in and out of it voluntarily?"

Aside from the general distrust—which is naturally worse in villages where once a collective farm existed—the peasants are unhappy about some of the program's specific features, especially machinery—which is to form the bulk of the common property owned by the agricultural circle. "Until now it was like this—the circles put 30 percent down for the machines, the rest was on credit, and we knew that the machines were ours. Now the State gives the money for everything. This whole Agricultural Development Fund belongs to the State, so everything will belong to the State. Let's not be had!" Lamenting such remarks, the daily organ of the United Peasant Party (rural allies of the Communists) sneered: "the backward saviors of the peasants are whispering in the farmyard."¹⁵ One of the leading cultural and political weeklies described the peasants' attitude toward the mechanization policy as follows:

"One often hears the following from the peasants: 'The Party says it is trying to mechanize agriculture so as to ease our work and increase the yield of the soil. Alright! The peasants are for mechanization. But give us those machines to be our own. We shall buy them ourselves. But the Party will not agree to that. That means that the Circles and the Fund are just a lure and a new trap to get us into collectives, but then, we do not want that.'"¹⁶

The Party's argument is, of course, that individual ownership would serve the interests of the rich peasants to the disadvantage of the poor, and thus sharpen the "class conflict in the villages." But the peasants have bitter memories

* *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), August 22, 1959. Soviet Premier Khrushchev, in his best vernacular style, had remarked a month earlier during his visit to Poland, apropos of collective farms: "You cannot, as the saying goes, drive someone with a stick into paradise." (*Trybuna Ludu*, July 21, 1959.)

of mechanized farming as it was practiced by the Machine Tractor Stations in earlier years—much of which, even the Communists admit, could hardly be taken as exemplary. For the peasant, the horse is the symbol of his independence. "What happens when I get rid of the horse and the machines break down or I am unable to use them?"

Weakness in the Party

Other difficulties lie within the Party itself. For one thing the rural apparatus is weak in both organization and numbers. In January 1960 there were 130,000 rural members and candidate members in the Party, amounting to only four or five percent of all peasant farmers. Basic rural Party organizations numbered 18,000, embracing less than half of all the villages. Supplementing the Communists is the United Peasant Party, which had 165,000 peasant members and 17,000 organizations, but the two parties overlap in such a way that 37 percent of the villages had organizations of neither.¹⁷ Relations between the two parties, moreover, have often resolved themselves into conflicts of personal ambitions.

The slogan "Each Communist and United Peasant Party member farmer is a member of an agricultural circle," has also not been implemented. For example, in the province of Lodz in January, 50 percent of the UPP members and 56 percent of the Communist Party members still did not belong to circles. By June, 68,000 Communist Party members had joined the circles (as compared with 46,000 in June 1959), but over 34,000 members and candidates who had not joined circles lived in villages where circles existed. At the same time, basic Party organizations were functioning in 6,500 villages where agricultural circles had still not been created.¹⁸

There has also been disagreement among the Communists as to how far and how fast the peasant can be pushed. In some cases, trouble has been created by over-zealous

and ambitious agitators. One report stated that "things went so far that the regional agronomists of the District Agricultural Circle Boards were given deadlines by which they had to create new agricultural circles or present their resignations."¹⁹ The regime knows that it must tread lightly among the suspicious peasantry. For example, at the inception of the campaign, the official Party daily gave the following advice on peasant psychology.

"Whoever knows the situation in the countryside will have no illusions. The universality of the circles is not a task of two or three months' action. Every attempt at organizing the circles which is too hasty and not thought out to the end may bring results which will be contrary to those intended. Experience teaches us that he who speeds up the peasants at any price delays only their conscious decision."²⁰

Some elements of the press have continued to urge that freedom of decision should be left "where possible" to the agricultural circle members and the independent peasants.

But as evidence mounts that the program is not catching on, the regime has become more and more adamant on the use of so-called "administrative pressures" to force the rural areas into line. There has never been any doubt that economic and political pressures would be employed. Even at the Third Party Congress, when Gomulka first hinted that a new blueprint for the countryside might be in the making, he added: "... unlike collective farms, where we exclude administrative pressures in their creation, the State should not renounce various administrative measures which would favor the development and universalization of agricultural circles and shape their activities in the desired direction."²¹ In June 1959, when outlining the new scheme, he gave examples of measures which might be taken: higher taxes if the peasants invest too little, seizure of a farmer's land if he fails to pay taxes, new taxes on horses, and refusal to permit agricultural school graduates to work in non-agricultural occupations.

By September of this year, the tone had become sharper. In his speech to the Warsaw Harvest Festival, and in more detail at the sixth plenary session of the CC, Gomulka asked for a host of legal measures "permitting the use of sanctions against those who, owing to negligence or backwardness, harm the development of production." The object was to improve Poland's agricultural technology by spurring the use of pesticides and better seeds, a more rational use of land, and the location of more agricultural experts in the countryside. He argued that State authorities must be given the power to see that these measures are put into effect regardless of the independent peasants' predilections. (See *East Europe*, November, p. 39.)

The Cult of the Machine

THE PROGRAM HAS BEEN characterized from the outset by economic shortcomings and miscalculations. For one thing, it implied that Poland's lack of mechanization was the result of peasant backwardness. Gomulka claimed in his speech of June 1959 that the agricultural machinery industry was able to operate only at 50 percent of its ca-



"You guys want everything at once!"

Polityka (Warsaw), June 4, 1960

capacity for lack of customers in the rural areas. But the evidence shows that the machinery industry is incapable of producing the tractors, plows and combines called for in the new program, and that this is one reason why the Agricultural Development Fund has not been fully exploited. According to one report, 7,960 tractors were ordered for the middle of May 1960, but only 1,000 were delivered.²² By August, deliveries had reached only 2,704.²³ The original target for 1960 was that the circles should acquire 8,000 tractors with complete sets of accompanying machinery. The total amount of funds available to the circles and their unions during 1960 was estimated in excess of 3.5 billion *zloty*, while the value of agricultural machinery scheduled for production was only 1.7 billion.

Judging from the targets for tractor production under the new Five Year Plan, most of the mechanization of the Polish countryside will have to wait until 1964, 1965 and after. The production figures for tractors are as follows.*

1959 (Actual) . . .	4,662	1965	32,000
1960 (Plan)	7,900	1960-65	99,500
1963	16,600	1967	40,000

Imports of tractors during 1961 and 1962 are slated at 19,500.

Tractors Eat Gasoline

If the peasants are skeptical about buying tractors, there are good economic reasons for their hesitation. In the past, production had concentrated on heavy tractors which, for the most part, were designed for collective farms rather than small private farms. There was a general shortage of attendant machinery, fuel and spare parts. The cost of repairs—if and when repairs can be arranged—often amounts to half the price of a new machine. According to a specialized agricultural journal,²⁴ mechanical farming has been expensive per unit of work performed, and as a result, not only have peasants hesitated to purchase the machines but they have even neglected to take care of them.

"He who proclaims that the Polish peasant is against machinery does not understand at all the situation in the countryside. It would be very difficult today to find such a farmer. But many peasants have doubts as regards the practice.

"They want to have guarantees that they will get the spare parts and fuel, and that repairs will be ensured. Also the great problem of finding tractor drivers is a source of justified worry.

"There are people," said somebody at the Congress, "who say that we do not want mechanization. However, we are wondering who will drive and take care of the tractors, where we shall put them, etc. This is where we start. We want relief in our hard work—not propaganda."²⁵

* One abetting difficulty, according to the economic weekly *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), August 21, 1960, is that output of the 8 h.p. single-axle model, an experiment which got underway in 1959 to produce a tractor especially suited to the small individual farmsteads, was halted, allegedly due to the high costs of production and operation.

* *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), June 23, 1959 and February 9, 1960; and *Dziennik Ludowy* (Warsaw), March 29, 1960.

The government is attempting to unclog the channels of distribution and provide those small day-to-day needs such as fuel and spare parts which mean the difference between success and failure in mechanized farming. Recently it announced that it will concentrate machinery deliveries in selected villages in certain areas. Out of the 8,500 tractors which will go to the circles in 1961, 2,000 of them are to be allocated to about 250 villages. The favored communities, which are to be selected on the basis of their financial status, proximity to good rural roads, degree of electrification, etc., will construct fuel and repair stations of their own; and if they are unable to raise the necessary funds the district union of agricultural circles will grant them ten-year, interest-free loans. This is calculated to eliminate some of the inadequacies in the channels of supply and distribution.

CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS

(kilograms per hectare)¹

	1938	1957/58 ²	1960	Plan
			as planned in 1955	1965
Poland	6.7 ³	35.6 ³	63	77.9
East Germany	142.8	173.8	200	212.0
Czechoslovakia	—	61.8	95	183.2
Hungary	2.2	19.5	35	60.0
USSR	3.8	11.6	—	—
Romania	—	2.5 ⁴	6.3	—
West Germany	154.5	246.4	—	—
United Kingdom	83.5	143.5	—	—
Denmark	61.0	129.1	—	—
France	38.4	89.7	—	—
Italy	31.5	45.7	—	—
Yugoslavia	0.6	36.2	—	—
Greece	8.6	33.5	—	—
United States	11.9	30.3	—	—

A Shift in Policy?

These economic difficulties have evidently led the regime to reconsider some of its premises. At the sixth plenary session of the Central Committee this fall, Gomulka shifted the focus of his attention from mechanization, which had held the spotlight in the past, to the improvement of agricultural techniques. The Party leader called for a better balance in the structure of crop cultivation (a shift from rye and oats to more wheat and corn), better seeds, a stronger fight against weeds and insects, and more and better use of fertilizers. He also announced that the Party would begin a campaign to get more agricultural techni-

¹ Nitrogenous, phosphatic and potassium fertilizers (pure content) per hectare of arable land including orchards, except for 1965 Plan figures for East Germany (per hectare of all land under cultivation and permanent pasture) and Hungary (per hectare of all land under crops, including gardens, orchards and vineyards).

² Economic year: July 1, 1957-June 30, 1958. ³ Less orchards.

⁴ Figure for 1955.

SOURCES: *Maly Rocznik Statystyczny, 1960* (Warsaw); planned figures from United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1956* (Geneva), 1957, Chapter II, Table 6; and *Economic Survey of Europe in 1959, 1960*, Chapter III, p. 37.

cians down to the village level (armed with the right to take legal action against those peasants who do not follow their instructions). So-called "agrocenters" will be constructed by the local governments in cooperation with the agricultural circles to provide housing and land for demonstration purposes (1,000 of them, he said, in 1961).


Such improvements are just as important to agricultural progress as more machinery. Better crop yields, rather than labor-saving devices, seem to be the principal need in Poland. When Gomulka announced the mechanization program in June 1959, he claimed that 75,000 tractors on Polish farms would replace 300,000 horses and reduce the number of persons employed by 75,000. He failed to explain where these people would go. The authorities are already concerned at the heavy emigration of young people from the countryside to the cities, and wondering how they are to be employed. While the value of mechanization cannot be disputed, the Polish experience so far has demonstrated that it can be a wasteful process if the groundwork is not properly prepared.

Conclusion

SHORTCOMINGS NOTWITHSTANDING, the Polish Communists have devised a scheme for the countryside which is characterized by that pragmatism which has set them slightly apart from the rest of the Soviet bloc in recent years. While others drove onward toward collectivization as prescribed in Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Poles have sought to use organizations invented by the peasants themselves. Through the spirit of cooperation born of the agricultural circles' activities, the peasants are to come gradually to the idea of collective farming.

Whatever may be the political result—and the regime has made it clear that it certainly expects something more typically Communist to evolve in the future—the essential feature of the program is that it aims, first of all, at maximum production and efficiency. The Gomulka regime plainly has something more important in mind than proving the superiority of collective forms of agriculture. Most of the growth of agricultural production that occurred after 1956 (and this was not small in comparison with the other dogma-ridden countries of Eastern Europe) was a windfall from improved peasant incentives; it was not enough. The time had come for better tools and techniques.

Tractors and experts are not a panacea for the problems of rural production. For proof of this the Poles need only look to their southern neighbor, which is far ahead of Poland in tractors and chemical fertilizers. In Czechoslo-



"So darned many horses, you can't even get to the food."

Szpilki (Warsaw), November 8, 1959

vakia, where nearly all the farmers are now in collective farms, agricultural production has been stagnating—a fact of which Moscow is painfully aware as each year it ships more and more carloads of grain into that model Satellite. The success of the agricultural circles will hinge, in final analysis, on whether the peasants are given incentives to work and use effectively the new technology which the State proposes to place in their hands.

SOURCES FOR THIS ARTICLE

- ¹ TRYBUNA LUDU (Warsaw), August 2, 1959.
- ² Ibid, June 23, 1959.
- ³ Ibid.
- ⁴ Ibid, July 21, 1959.
- ⁵ NOWA KULTURA (Warsaw), March 1, 1960.
- ⁶ TRYBUNA LUDU, September 9, 1959.
- ⁷ United Nations, Food and Agricultural Organization, YEAR-BOOK OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS, 1958 (Rome), Vol. XII, Part 1, 1959.
- ⁸ ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE (Warsaw), July 17, 1960.
- ⁹ TRYBUNA LUDU, October 21, 1956.
- ¹⁰ NOWE DROGI (Warsaw), September, 1959.
- ¹¹ EXPRESS WIECZORNY (Warsaw), September 8, 1959.
- ¹² POLITYKA (Warsaw), September 5, 1959.
- ¹³ TRYBUNA LUDU, September 9, 1959.
- ¹⁴ ZYCIE PARTII (Warsaw), September, 1959.
- ¹⁵ ZIELONY SZTANDAR (Warsaw), August 2, 1959.
- ¹⁶ NOWA KULTURA, June 26, 1960.
- ¹⁷ NOWE DROGI, January, 1960.
- ¹⁸ Ibid, June, 1960.
- ¹⁹ Ibid, May, 1960.
- ²⁰ TRYBUNA LUDU, September 24, 1959.
- ²¹ NOWE DROGI, May, 1960.
- ²² ZIELONY SZTANDAR, May 15, 1960.
- ²³ TRYBUNA LUDU, August 11, 1960.
- ²⁴ NOWE ROLNICTWO (Warsaw), No. 1, January, 1959.
- ²⁵ TRYBUNA LUDU, September 22, 1959.

Current Developments

- INTERNATIONAL:** *Communist summit meeting opens in Moscow on the eve of the 43rd anniversary of the Russian Revolution (p. 35).*
Soviet bloc press views election of John F. Kennedy to the American presidency as a rejection of the policy of the "cold war" (p. 34).
- POLITICAL:** *Two Polish religious holidays cancelled (p. 38).*
Monument to Kadar's "freedom fighters" unveiled on 4th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolt (p. 41).
Soviet bloc commission on atomic energy holds its first meeting in Moscow (p. 37).
- ECONOMIC:** *Measures aimed at solving Czechoslovakia's housing problems during the Third Five Year Plan to be aired in nationwide discussion (p. 40).*
Romania signs financial agreement compensating British subjects for property confiscated after the postwar Communist takeover (p. 44).
Romanian Party Central Committee sets economic targets for 1961 (p. 43).

AREAWIDE

The US Election

Before the election the Soviet bloc lumped together Vice President Richard M. Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy as both in opposition to peace. As Radio Prague, October 19, put it: "It is not of great moment whether Kennedy or Nixon sits in the White House. A decisive turn in US policy can be brought about only by the American people's successful struggle against US monopolies." The "peace issue" as characterized by the candidates' speeches was called "mere decoration" since both men "believe in the same creed—the intensification of international tension." (Radio Sofia, October 17.)

After the Ballots Were Cast

Despite this, Radio Moscow, November 9, viewed the victory of Senator Kennedy as a repudiation of "the policy of the cold war and the arms race." The Satellite press was more restrained. Sofia's Party organ *Rabotnichesko Delo*, November 10, explaining that Kennedy was elected "because there was no third candidate, a candidate who would stand firmly . . . for peace, disarmament, and improving the economic conditions of the masses." Radio Prague's New York correspondent, November 10, warned his listeners not to expect any significant change in Kennedy's policy toward Czechoslovakia, or, for that matter, "the Socialist camp" in general. He concluded that Kennedy was expected to step up production of armaments, a move supported by US financial circles, at the same time

concentrating his foreign policy on Latin America, Africa and Asia—"we may therefore expect an appearance of so-called modern colonialism on a large scale."

The Polish comment was more hopeful, terming the Kennedy victory a mandate to re-open negotiations with the USSR "without the burden which a Republican President would have had to bear after Dulles and Herter." (Radio Warsaw, November 9.)

After the UN Session

All the Satellite Party chiefs gave reports on their activities in New York attending the General Assembly session of the United Nations in September. For the most part the speeches recapitulated the foreign policy positions of the Soviet Union, with special emphasis on disarmament and attacks on West German "militarism." Polish Party leader Wladyslaw Gomułka told the deputies of the Polish parliament that "the arms control proposed by the West would not lead to disarmament and relaxation of world tension, but on the contrary, constitute only a stimulus toward re-activating the mechanism of war." He also criticized the British proposal to set up a commission of experts on disarmament as a "proposition aimed at misinforming public opinion." Attempting to justify Soviet Premier Khrushchev's flamboyant behavior at the Assembly, Gomułka characterized the Soviet leader's speeches as "filled both with the fire of peace and vehement protest against its destroyers." Much of the address was devoted to Poland's attitude toward West Germany which he justified in the following terms:

"We have never conducted and are not now conducting a campaign against the German people. We want to live in harmony and friendship with the whole German nation, just as we are now living with that part of it which in-



A standard Communist comment on the situation in the Congo, where the United States is accused of supporting Tshombe and Mobutu for imperialistic reasons.

SZPILKI (Warsaw), November 6, 1960

habits the German Democratic Republic. However, we have unmasked and will continue to unmask only those forces within the German nation which propagate aggressive militarism, fan the fires of the cold war and nurture insane hopes for a new *Drang nach Osten*, this time together with their allies in the Atlantic bloc." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], October 22.)

Novotny Speaks

In his address to a large Prague rally, Czechoslovak President Antonin Novotny echoed Gomulka's sentiments, but also stressed Western "slanders" directed against Communist China. Communist bloc support for the emerging Asian and African nations, and American "economic imperialism" in Latin America. Speaking of his impressions of New York City, Novotny evoked the "contradictions within US capitalism." On the one side, "luxurious skyscrapers and the palaces of the nabobs, department stores and nightclubs," he said, "but on the other hand, derelict huts and wooden hovels of poor people and Negroes, the dirty shops of small shopkeepers, backstreet bars and noisy cinemas. . . . The streets are stony, made of asphalt and rarely lined with trees, most of them full of dust, soot and rubbish. . . . One need not go outside New York to see proof of racism. . . . Literally in the shadow of the Statue of Liberty, people are living in the Negro quarter of Harlem [and] a number of delegates, including Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, had in the end to find refuge in this quarter. . . . We spent only three weeks in New York, but after all

we have seen, heard and experienced there, we realize . . . in what a selfish society people are living, a society indifferent to the fate of the individual and which enables only the rich and those who are growing still richer to advance." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], October 15.)

The other speeches by Soviet bloc Party heads followed the same pattern. Before a large gathering in the Budapest sports palace, Hungarian Party chief Janos Kadar dealt briefly with the issue of the 1956 Revolt, admitting that issue was put on the UN agenda, but that this was of little importance and even those who voted in favor of this move were "not very interested in it." He lauded Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, terming him "a true, brave and ardent revolutionary, ready to live and die for the independence of his people." (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], October 16.) Romanian Party leader Gheorghiu-Dej and Bulgarian Party boss Todor Zhivkov added nothing to these positions.

Russian Revolution Feted

The 43rd anniversary of the Russian Revolution was celebrated on November 7 with receptions at Soviet embassies throughout the world and a large party for foreign diplomats at the Kremlin. In Moscow for the celebration, as well as for a top-level, closed-door conference, were Party chiefs Enver Hoxha of Albania, Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria, Antonin Novotny of Czechoslovakia, Janos Kadar of Hungary, Wladyslaw Gomulka of Poland, and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej of Romania, as well as the Communist Chinese chief of State Liu Shao-chi, Communist Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh and other prominent Communist leaders.

The main address at the Soviet bloc summit was delivered by Frol Kozlov, member of the Soviet Party Secretariat and of the Presidium, November 6. (See Texts and Documents.) Opening with praise of industrial progress in the Soviet Union, Kozlov claimed that even the revised targets of the Seven Year Plan (1959-65) were being surpassed: instead of growing by 17 percent in the two year period, 1959-60, industrial output is expected to be "almost 23 percent" more than in 1958. His discussion of foreign policy was a familiar recapitulation of the USSR's current posture in international affairs. Significantly, Kozlov showed that Moscow was not prepared to concede any ground to Peiping regarding local wars, which Communist China has stated are inevitable as long as "imperialism" exists. From the Soviet point of view, the "Socialist camp has in recent years more than once cut short attempts by imperialist aggressors to launch local wars, by which the imperialists threaten mankind with a new world war." Such actions "prove that with the establishment of a world Socialist system and the success of Socialism, the international balance of forces has radically altered in favor of Socialism and the forces of peace." Conceding that "imperialism has been and remains aggressive, its wolfish nature has not changed and will not change," he said that the solution to this situation is for the "Socialist countries . . . to be prepared to deal a crushing retaliatory blow, should the imperialists risk bringing matters close to war."

In other respects, his speech was a routine reiteration

of Khrushchev's well-worn themes, including the need for peace in order to make the economic competition with the West a success, a call for "general and total disarmament," and mention of the current reduction of armed forces. He insisted on the need for a "creative approach" to Marxism-Leninism which would resist the lures of either "revisionist teachings or dogmatic deadness." (Radio Moscow, November 6.)

Yugoslav-Soviet Bloc Relations

In the wake of the UN General Assembly session attended by Marshal Tito and the Soviet bloc leaders, Albania alone has kept up a barrage of anti-Yugoslav propaganda. Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu, reporting to the parliament on his activities at the United Nations, seized the occasion to castigate Tito for his alleged opposition to the admission of Communist China into the world body. He said that the American delegate, James Wadsworth, quoted a description by Tito of Communist China as a regime which attacked Belgrade "in regard to the direction of [Belgrade's] foreign policy which is a policy of peaceful coexistence between nations and peoples of different regimes. . . . [The Communist Chinese] do not like our peaceful policy, our policy of peaceful coexistence." According to Shehu, "the revisionist Marshal [Tito] was shocked to death to hear what he had said in Yugoslavia in 1958 against the Chinese People's Republic repeated in 1960 in the United Nations through the mouth of his master—the American Wadsworth. On the other hand, this must have been a very strong argument for requesting more dollars from the American imperialists in order to build up his own brand of Socialism against international Communism."

He went on to characterize the efforts of Tito to organize "a so-called third camp" as an attempt to "draw the neutral countries away from their sympathy for the Socialist countries and to put them in the service of imperialism, as he himself is." The Albanian Premier concluded that Tito's "attitude in New York convinced us that the fight against imperialism . . . cannot be fully successful if at the same time modern revisionism is not fought ideologically and persistently in order to unmask it before the eyes of the people as a very dangerous agency in the service of imperialism." (Radio Tirana, October 25.)

A similar attack on Tito's behavior in New York in the Party organ *Zeri i Popullit* (Tirana), October 18, reviled Tito's "shameless vanity and boundless megalomania" for daring to speak in the name of "India, Indonesia, Iraq and other countries."

Bulgaria Seeks Middle Way

Radio Sofia, October 25, also criticized "Yugoslav revisionism" (as well as "dogmatism," presumably Chinese), but from an ideological standpoint, eschewing Albanian-style epithets. While calling for a policy of peaceful coexistence, according to Sofia, the Yugoslavs have betrayed "proletarian internationalism," because peaceful coexistence does not mean "the destruction of capitalism," whereas the "triumph of proletarian internationalism calls for the struggle for the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat through-

out the world." On the other hand, "some dogmatists . . . assert that in our time war is inevitable and thus overestimate the forces of imperialism and underestimate the forces of Socialism and peace, condemning people to waiting passively for a nuclear catastrophe."

Yugoslav Diplomats Harassed

One aspect of the Yugoslav-Albanian "cold war" has been the difficult conditions under which members of the Yugoslav legation in Tirana must live. A broadcast by Radio Belgrade, October 16, beamed to Poland (which recently expelled the Albanian envoy to Warsaw) gave the following account of diplomatic life in the Albanian capital:

"Yugoslavs arriving in Albania on a diplomatic passport must submit to border control procedure which applies to no one else. All the way from the frontier to Tirana they are tailed by agents of Albania's security forces. In the city, every employee of the Yugoslav legation is shadowed. They are under constant observation, whether entering stores, hospitals, cafes or movie theaters, attending official functions or going to the beach. All this is done openly. . . . The legation's telephone is frequently out of order, electric power is disrupted and the entire building may be without light all night. Agreements concerning medical treatment for the officials and their families are not lived up to. . . . Letters sent from the mission are regularly returned, marked 'Addressee unknown.' Yugoslav diplomats also have difficulties when leaving Albania. They receive border-crossing permits valid only for one day. If they do not utilize it on that date, they must reapply for a permit."

"Such are the conditions under which the Yugoslav mission must operate in Tirana. . . . Probably no other legation in the world has to operate under such conditions, which, in essence, constitute persecution and psychological torture. And this ten-year-old system of torture is still being enriched with new methods, each of which is worse than the preceding one."

Vice President Edvard Kardelj, author of the book "Socialism and War" which has come under severe attack by all the Soviet-bloc nations, accused the Albanians of making their anti-Yugoslav campaign "irresponsible adventurism." In a speech to the Fifth Congress of the Socialist Alliance of Macedonia in Skopje, October 5, he questioned the possibility of an atom-free zone in the Balkans—an idea put forward by the Romanian government—as long as the Albanians continue their "anti-Yugoslav witchhunt." (*Politika* [Belgrade], October 6.)

Exchanges Continue

With the other countries of the "Socialist camp," Belgrade enjoyed good relations. Delegations were exchanged, trade and cultural agreements signed. The Bulgarian Party chief Todor Zhivkov, in an interview with *The New York Times* reporter Harrison Salisbury, clarified the bloc's latest general position vis-à-vis the Yugoslavs: "As far as ideological questions are concerned, there is a difference between us on the basic points of Marxism-Leninism, but we are a Socialist country and we strive to maintain economic and cultural relations with all countries, including Yugoslavia. There is no reason why State and economic coopera-

A National Disease

One of the most powerful forces at work under the smooth surface of the Soviet bloc is that of nationalism. It is particularly strong in Poland, where anything associated with the country's past awakes an emotional response that makes Communism seem only a transitory phenomenon. This was demonstrated recently by the public interest shown in a Polish film called "Teutonic Knights," based on the famous Sienkiewicz novel about the battle of Grunwald in the fifteenth century. By mid-October two million people had seen the picture, which was showing to capacity audiences all over the country. Similar enthusiasm was shown when part of the "Wawel Treasures," relics of the Polish kings, were returned from Canada where they had been taken during the war. On October 15, the Party weekly *Polityka* had this to say about the phenomenon:

"So much has already been written on the subject of the greatest of all national diseases, so-called 'patriotic bigotry' (a feeling which, as is well known, is a millstone to the modern, cultural man) and what has come of it? When the National Museum placed on display the recovered portion of the Wawel Treasures, the corridors, courtyard and surrounding streets were packed with a solid mass of people. The crowd waited patiently in the cold rain for hours just to look for a moment at an insignificant hunk of iron



Photo from SWIAT (Warsaw), September 18, 1960

known as the 'Szczerbiec' [the sword of the famous Polish king, Boleslaw Chrobry]. Even more astounding is the manifestation over the motion picture 'Teutonic Knights.' Not only are our theaters surrounded by hordes of people waiting for already-sold tickets, but we also see closely-packed columns of school children and workers from factories and offices waiting from sundown to almost midnight. Practically all of Poland is thronging to see the film, despite numerous warnings that it's a waste of money, that it's steeped in nationalistic vapors, etc."

tion between our two countries should not improve." (Radio Sofia, October 23.)

The following list indicates the extent to which State and economic relations have improved: A Yugoslav trade delegation arrived in Poland in order to make preparations for a new three-year accord between the two countries (Radio Warsaw, October 7). A Polish mutual cooperation accord was signed with the Union of Yugoslav Journalists, October 26 (Radio Belgrade, October 27). A Polish-Yugoslav agreement in the field of veterinary medicine was ratified (Radio Warsaw, October 24). A delegation of Yugoslav miners and metallurgical workers visited Budapest for 10 days (*Tanjug*, November 2). An agreement on legal assistance in civil and criminal law was signed between Belgrade and Bucharest (*Tanjug*, October 18). A delegation of the people's council of Belgrade visited Bulgaria (Radio Belgrade, October 24). A two-week tour of Bulgaria was made by the Yugoslav Journalists' Union, beginning October 7 (Radio Belgrade, October 22).

Comecon's New Atomic Commission Meets

The first meeting of the new permanent commission on peaceful uses of atomic energy, set up recently by the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, was held in Moscow, October 11-13. According to Tass (Moscow), October 14, the new body considered organizational matters, outlined the main lines of its activities and endorsed a plan for 1961.

The Polish representative, upon his return to Warsaw, said that the chief emphasis of the commission's activity during the coming year will be on collaboration in the

design and building of equipment and instruments used in atomic energy. However, actual specialization in the construction of this equipment, he said, would be postponed until a later stage. Two other fields of cooperation in the immediate future are the use of radioactive isotope techniques and safety measures for personnel working in atomic energy materials. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], October 20.)

Agricultural Conference in Sofia

The second Comecon agricultural conference within a month was held in Sofia, October 17-23. (See *East Europe*, November, p. 38.) Under discussion were problems of construction in agriculture: building requirements in livestock breeding, mechanization of building, adequate provision of building materials, etc. There were exhibitions of agricultural construction methods applied in the various member countries—as well as an exhibit from Communist China—according to Radio Sofia, October 24.

POLAND

Polish Broadcasts to US to Cease

By a decision of the Party Central Committee, Poland was to end all programs beamed at the North American continent on December 1, according to Western sources. (*Le Monde* [Paris], November 11.) No official announcement was forthcoming to explain why the propaganda

campaign was to be suddenly curtailed, although some observers believed that this unilateral action was to be taken as a gesture in favor of better relations with the USA after Poland was apparently accorded most-favored-nation status in economic dealings with Washington (See *East Europe*, November, p. 43).

Church-State Relations

Polish bishops have now been accused of refusing to "unmask the pro-German policies of the Vatican." *Głos Pracy* (Warsaw), October 25, organ of the trade unions, declared that the Polish bishops must have realized during their recent *ad liminae apostolorum* visit to Rome that the Vatican is "staffed with many German priests." In fact, it said, the Polish clergymen were treated "coolly as soon as it appeared that they had certain reservations regarding the Germans." Considering that in the past the Polish clergy has frequently made statements about the [former German] Western territories, describing them as

"historically Polish," the journal found it irritating that the clergy has criticized the Vatican German influence "only in its own circles," while the masses are kept in ignorance.

Other pot-shots leveled at the clergy by the regime press concerned the church's attitude toward family life. *Fakty i Myśli* (Warsaw), October 20, official publication of Polish atheism, accused the church of advising parishioners to boycott weddings of couples married only by civil authorities. Also under fire was the church's attempt "to negate the State's right to regulate family affairs and to encourage unlimited population growth."

Religious Holidays Curtailed

Legal holidays for the Feasts of the Assumption, August 15, and the Epiphany, January 6, have been abolished by the Polish parliament, according to Western sources. *Trybuna Ludu*, the official Party organ, justified the move by citing the economic situation of the country "which is far below the European average."

Radio Under Fire

Wladzimir Sokorski, chairman of the State Committee for Radio and Television, stated four chief shortcomings in Polish broadcasting frequently criticized by the public. He cited: bad programming (times of broadcasts switched too often); lack of variety (Warsaw I and II do not possess their own clearly defined characteristics); bad synchronization (radio and TV news are often scheduled for the same hour); lack of broadcasts devoted to contemporary problems. (Radio Warsaw, October 18.)

Youth Group Meets

The Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Union of Socialist Youth [ZMS], convening in Warsaw, October 24-25, announced plans for an exhaustive recruitment campaign among the country's teen-agers. (Present membership is about 500,000.) Representatives of the Ministry of Education complained that there was "a lack of contact between school-age youth and national life." Other speakers warned teachers against excessive intrusion into purely organizational work of the Union and against "sugar-coating" the aims of the organization.

Directives were also issued calling for closer cooperation between the ZMS and the Scouting Movement. This latter regime-controlled organization now comprises only 7 percent of grammar school-age youth. Since the Scouts' Second Congress, in 1959, the movement has had no room for those who would avoid political and ideological education. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], October 26.)

New Finance Minister

Jerzy Albrecht was named Finance Minister, replacing Tadeusz Dietrich who died last June. *The New York Times*, November 17, commented on the news of the appointment that "Albrecht's new job will be a difficult one. The government's finances are under serious strain. It was



The annual celebration of Warsaw Days (September 17-25) was held in the Old Town Square. In the foreground is a statue of a mermaid, Warsaw's symbol.

STOLICA (Warsaw), October 2, 1960



One of Poland's private tradesmen in the marketplace of a Warsaw suburb.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY, October 30, 1960

disclosed . . . that tax revenues during 1960 had fallen below expectation, while the government's spending estimates had been exceeded." To take the job, Albrecht, former partisan leader and Mayor of Warsaw, also resigned from the Council of State, the collective head of State under the Polish Communist regime. He had been previously reported as having resigned from the Party Central Committee Secretariat in protest against the "retreat" from the liberal gains of October 1956 (see *East Europe*, June, p. 29), but this was erroneous; although he will undoubtedly resign from this position when he assumes full ministerial responsibility, there is no evidence that he is at serious odds with the regime. (Radio Warsaw, November 17.)

Investments and Construction Lag

Investment expenditures during the first seven months of 1960 increased only 2.4 percent over the corresponding period in 1959, as compared with a planned increase of 9.1 percent, according to the economic weekly *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), October 9. The most serious state of affairs, the paper said, is in construction. The industry is hampered by bottlenecks in materials, but the main trouble is "inadequate production capabilities of construction firms."

In line with the austerity program aimed at combatting inflation, introduced in the latter part of 1959, the government tightened controls on the construction industry, the most noted offender against financial discipline. By the beginning of 1960 employment in construction was at the lowest level since 1955, according to the economic weekly, and the average wage of construction workers had taken

a similar dip. In consequence, during August of this year the industry could not handle 440 million *zloty* worth of construction which the government had on the boards.

"In light of the above facts, it must be admitted that the strict regulations introduced at the end of last year . . . have gone too far. The rapid fall of employment at the end of 1959 and at the beginning of 1960 resulted in a temporary decline in the production capability of construction enterprises and was followed by delays in the implementation of construction plans, delays which will be difficult to remedy now."

Housing

Even worse is the situation in housing—one of the country's most distressing social and economic problems. In the first seven months of this year, 4.7 percent less housing was given over for occupancy than in the corresponding period last year. The government is now allocating a smaller share of total investment to this sector as part of its policy of strict financial discipline; and it intends to continue to do so during the Third Five Year Plan. (See *East Europe*, August, p. 39.)

The same economic weekly published on October 23 a survey of dwelling construction which indicated that, as a result of this government policy, more and more of the burden of construction is being passed to private individuals and groups. The State's share in total housing construction fell from 52 percent in 1958 to 47 percent in 1959; cooperative housing increased its share from 2 to 7 percent; and private individuals, despite the tight credit policy, continued to build 46 percent of all new housing. In rural areas, where people are more sensitive to tight credits, dwelling construction dropped 16.5 percent during 1959.

Butter Shortage

Difficulties in supplying the consumer market with butter have arisen, according to *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), October 23. The shortage is blamed on a lower compulsory milk delivery quota during the third quarter of this year, as well as the necessity of fulfilling export obligations. "Rumors alleging an increase in butter prices," the paper said, "are completely groundless." Nevertheless, the paper thought the situation serious enough to tell its readers not to believe such rumors and urge them to limit their butter purchases to only the necessary quantities.

Newspaper Folds

The government-sponsored commission for press publications, created in 1959, was responsible for closing down *Tygodnik Zachodni*, a Poznan weekly chiefly concerned with "opposing and refuting falsehoods spread by West German revanchists about the Western Territories." *Tygodnik Zachodni's* demise was lamented by the Wroclaw weekly *Tygodnik Katolikow*, No. 41, October. The Wroclaw journal praised its Poznan rival for being "a good newspaper with important tasks to perform in the [Western] Territories." In its own announcement, *Tygodnik Zachodni* gave no reason for the government action.

LEARN FROM THE CAPITALISTS

"It is true that capitalism reigns across the ocean, and in many powerful countries of Europe too. And if we compare our system with theirs we find that the old system works in a more practical way and much more cheaply than does our socially more advanced system which is not yet entirely practical. . . .

"We are not talking about slogans; it is necessary to look at the plain facts and figures, which show that the working day in most of our industries is utilized only about 75 percent. This is the fault of our organization, our distribution of materials, and our management, as well as of the workers manning the machines. For example, in a factory which was built at a cost of several million *forint*, one section was forced to halt work because of some mechanical fault, and then it was found that the plant could get along very well without that section. Whose fault is it that part of our industry lies idle, that millions are spent unnecessarily?"

From an editorial in *Nepszava* (Budapest), October 18, 1960

Many Workers Uninsured

In a population of 29.5 million, of which 17 million are between the ages of 18 and 60, only 7.5 million people, i.e., those working in the "Socialist sector" of the economy, are insured. In agriculture there are 365,000 so employed, in industry slightly less than 3 million, and in non-industrial enterprises such as construction, education, welfare, etc., about 4.5 million. A cause for concern in this respect is the number of uninsured workers—9.5 million. (*Slowo Powszechne* [Warsaw], October 25.)

Birth Control Activity Expanded

At a press conference in Warsaw, October 7, the Planned Parenthood Society announced that the last six months had witnessed an increase in membership, which now totalled approximately 40,000. The organization is still plagued with the difficulty of obtaining a sufficient number and variety of contraceptives. For this reason, the Society will start production of "effective" and "easily applied" contraceptives in the amount of 15 million annually. Films acquainting women with methods for preventing pregnancy were being prepared for distribution to local health centers. (Radio Warsaw, October 8.)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

National Discussion on Housing Opened

A meeting in Prague on October 19, devoted to housing construction, launched a nationwide discussion, extending through November and December, on ways and means

of solving the country's housing problems during the Third Five Year Plan (1961-65). The discussions are being held throughout the country in order to gather "different views, experiences and suggestions on the development of housing standards from the people living in new housing projects and from the workers of the planning organizations and of building enterprises."

According to planning chief Otakar Simunek, who opened the Prague session, the results will provide a basis for future trends in the construction of dwellings. He admitted shortcomings in the Party's residential building program: sterile building design and unattractive surroundings, lack of planning in the selection of building sites, inadequate provision for normal household needs, etc. Moreover, the problems of construction have been aggravated by the shortage of building materials. During the next two years, he said, it will be necessary to maintain the present average living space per dwelling unit of 37 square meters (not including baths and kitchens), or roughly the equivalent of two rooms 12 feet by 16 feet, in order to meet current housing needs. By 1963, however, it will be possible to raise the average living space to 40 square meters and the average overall apartment space to 58 square meters. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], October 20.)

Conference on Internal Trade

The Ministry of Internal Trade called a three-day national conference on October 17 devoted to the tasks of this sector during the coming Third Five Year Plan. Minister Ladislav Brabec, in his introductory report, said that personal consumption and retail trade turnover would increase by 30 percent during the Plan. While sales of such staple foodstuffs as milk, eggs, butter, fruits and vegetables would increase, the most important job for internal trade is to expand the turnover of industrial consumer goods.

Czechoslovakia already occupies one of the leading places in Europe, the Minister asserted, in the use of self-service retail trade outlets, but they must be expanded to a predominant role in the next five years. He emphasized the necessity of enlarging the variety of goods available and the need for organizing market research to determine how much of what kinds of goods the consumers want. About 3 billion *koruny* will be allocated for improving trade facilities over the five-year period.

New Role for Slovak Trade Unions

At a plenary session of the Slovak Trade Union Council, Secretary Jozef Opavsky explained that in the future the Council will act as a mere territorial organ, stripped of any autonomy, under the direct control of the Slovak Party Central Committee and the Central Trade Union Council in Prague. This decision implements the measures taken last August when the then autonomous Central Committees of all trade union branches in Slovakia were dissolved. Such a step was taken in connection with the provisions of the new Czechoslovak Constitution which provides for tight



Poland's new picture magazine for students, *ITD* (translated *Etcetera*), went to a party in its issue of October 23. The



place was Jelonki, a suburban campus of Warsaw University. Admission 20 zloty, but "you can see it in *ITD* for only 1.50."



centralized leadership and greatly limits Slovakia's self-government. (*Praca* [Bratislava], October 14-15.)

HUNGARY

Anniversary of Hungarian Uprising

All Hungarian dailies published on October 22, the eve of the fourth anniversary of the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolt, an interview accorded by Party chief Janos Kadar to the Paris Party organ *l'Humanité*. Kadar repeated his views on the "counterrevolution" which came about as a result of the "international reactionary underground," although caused in part "by previously committed errors." He justified Soviet intervention on the grounds that the US government had wanted to give a loan of 20 million dollars to the "counterrevolutionaries"; therefore, the Hungarian workers "in their plight turned to their brother, the USSR." He predicted that the Red Army would withdraw from Hungary only if foreign troops everywhere would return "to the country of their origin."

He referred to the phenomenon of so-called "internal emigration," i.e., writers who have refused to work with the regime and have maintained their silence. Denying this, Kadar declared: "All Hungarian writers—Peter Veres, Pal Szabo, Laszlo Nemeth, Aron Tamasi, just to mention a few—are working. You may have heard about Gyula Illyes. A couple of months ago he disclosed in a Hungarian weekly that he desires to contribute to the Socialist building of the country as directed by the government. (See *East Europe*, October, p. 48.) Incidentally, I also happen to know the attitude of Tibor Dery who has just returned to everyday life [released from prison in the spring of 1960 for his role in the Revolt—Ed.]. I know that he disapproves of everything that has been said—falsely—about him in the West, and that so much ado has

been raised around his person. As a writer he wants to work for Socialism." (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], October 22.)

Monument to Kadar's "Freedom-Fighters"

A monument to commemorate those "heroes who died for the freedom of the Hungarian working people and for the victory of the worker and peasant regimes" in 1919 and 1956 was unveiled, October 30, in Budapest's Square of the Republic, according to Radio Budapest of the same date.

Crowds Visit Cemeteries

All Saints' Day, November 1, traditionally a day of remembrance of the dead, produced great crowds in the Budapest cemeteries and necessitated extra police for these areas. The tomb of Laszlo Rajk, regime Foreign Minister condemned and hanged for Titoism in 1949 but rehabilitated on the eve of the 1956 Revolt, was decorated with candles and small bunches of flowers, according to a Reuters report of November 2. Every grave in Pest's small Kerepesi cemetery, where many of those killed in 1956 are buried, was also decked with flowers.

Central Committee Meets on Agriculture

The Party Central Committee held a two-day session, October 28-29, in Budapest devoted to agriculture and the problems and future tasks of collectivization. The only comment made by the official Party daily *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), October 30, in its report on the meeting, was that the reports delivered by Party leader Janos Kadar and Lajos Feher, CC member in charge of the rural area, had been "thoroughly debated." The lack of publicity surrounding this important meeting of the Party's ruling body suggests that another major step in the agricultural sector may be imminent. It was at this time last year that a CC meeting touched off the second wave in the collectivization campaign which brought another 40 percent of the country's

arable land into the collective farms. The "Socialist sector," including collective farms and State farms, now comprises about 76 percent of the arable land.

Disciplinary Decrees for Collectives

Two new decrees have been issued which are directed against apathy and lack of discipline among the members of the new collective farms. (See *East Europe*, November, p. 46.) The first amounts to the setting up of a rural equivalent to the "comrades' courts" which have existed in industry for some time. The second regulates questions of responsibility for communal property on collective farms.

Under the first measure, infringements of discipline on the part of collective members are to be dealt with by citizens instead of the police. Each collective farm will set up a committee empowered to investigate violations, hold hearings and pronounce punishments. The maximum penalty which the groups are authorized to impose is expulsion from the collective farm; or, if the infringement of discipline does not warrant this final measure, the area of the member's private plot may be reduced. Police are to be summoned only in cases involving major crimes.

The second decree requires that members entrusted with common property must be made liable for damage or loss. If, for example, the "control commission" discovers gaps in the storekeeper's stock of goods, the storekeeper is held responsible for the missing items unless he can provide an acceptable alibi. A member may be required to pay damages out of his own pocket up to his income for one month, calculated on the basis of his average earnings during the previous year. In cases of outright theft and embezzlement, more severe punishment can be applied. (Radio Budapest, November 3.)

Difficulties in Industry

The Hungarian press has been increasingly critical of the performance of the country's State-run industry. As the Three Year Plan (1958-1960) draws to a close, the economy is said to be suffering from lagging productivity, low quality goods, foreign exchange problems, and disproportions in the output of various sectors. The Three Year Plan was fairly conservative in its original draft, but it was revised at the beginning of 1959 with the announced objective of fulfilling its major provisions in two years rather than three. The aims of the Plan are reportedly being achieved and surpassed, but *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest) complained on October 19, "we could have attained our results with fewer knocks and bumps had the Plan been drawn up with more foresight, had the Party's economic decisions been more systematically adhered to, and had some managers relied more on the workers and been more thrifty."

The chief complaint is low labor productivity. For some time, the press has been campaigning against slack discipline and has charged that the workers are resisting the current efforts to rationalize their norms. But the workers are not held responsible alone. According to *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), October 16, management is also to blame for

its failure to encourage innovation and its reluctance to employ up-to-date production methods. Many enterprises were overfulfilling their plan, the paper said, but this was not to the country's advantage if "it is not justified by demand, investment or export." While the country is facing increasing demands for imports—intensified by agricultural collectivization which necessitated huge imports of machinery and fertilizers—most enterprises are said not to be fulfilling their export plans and to be producing goods which do not meet the standards of the international market. Enterprises under the Ministry of Foundry and Machine Industry lagged 6 percent in their exports despite having overfulfilled their total plans by 3 percent during the first half of this year.

The most delinquent sector in industry is said to be building, particularly for its misuse of investments. According to Radio Budapest, October 15, the Ministry of Building called in all of its special research institutes for a special conference in an effort to cope with the technical backwardness of the industry. On the same day, the radio cited another example of the general waste of investment funds. After the completion of a 35-million-forint prefabricated block factory, it operated for several months at only half capacity, and then for another two months its expensive machinery stood completely idle. At the same time, marketing difficulties were encountered so that, since March, half of its output has been piling up in the factory yard without a buyer.

The trade union daily *Nepszava* (Budapest), October 12, summarized the difficulties as follows:

"Even this [the industrial speed-up] would not have mattered if in all the branches of the economy the plan overfulfillment would have attained the same proportions as in industrial production. Yet when, parallel with industrial production, only the number of workers increased instead of productivity, when purchasing power increased to a greater extent than the goods, and when raw material imports tried to keep abreast of increased production, yet the export through which foreign currency is obtained lagged far behind, difficulties and hitches arose in the development."

There has been, however, no indication that the regime intends to slow the pace of its industrial drive.

Brawling Spectators

Anti-government and anti-Semitic slogans which led to a near-riot at a soccer game between the Ferencvaros and MTK teams were reported by the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), October 15. No specific information about the nature of the demonstrations appeared in the Hungarian press; however, the brawling was castigated in the official Party organ *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), September 20, and a resolution of the Hungarian Soccer League was printed which spoke of the "grave breach of rules, unsportsmanlike behavior and brutality which came from the spectators behaving disgracefully in the arena." *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), September 20, accused "hooligans who were among the 60,000 spectators" of using "every opportunity to vent their base feeling."

MILK FOR HOTTENTOTS

Czechoslovakia has been in the vanguard of the Soviet bloc's drive for influence among the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. Prague has granted credits and technical assistance to some of these countries, and has frequently underbid Western firms in the competition for industrial building contracts. The cost of this drive is naturally borne by the Czechoslovak public—which has not been given an opportunity to express any opinion on the matter.

"Today, small children who obviously cannot know what it is all about talk quite naturally of Comrade Khrushchev, and also of Fidel Castro. . . . The little daughters of my friends say: 'Daddy, he is nice, isn't he?' Children twelve years old listen to the speeches delivered by Comrade Khrushchev and Comrade Novotny at the United Nations and understand the most important points when they hear them discussed at home.

"Never fear, our children are capable of understanding that disarmament is a good thing and that the struggle of nations against colonialism is just. They know why the world needs peace and at whose side they should stand. That is, provided we grownups do not spoil their clear ideas. What good does it do if the parents keep repeating words like 'I am for peace' and 'Shame on the imperialists' when immediately afterward they say to their children as a reason for not giving them this or that: 'Where am I to find the money? I don't earn enough. As long as we give money to all sorts of backward countries, and feed every Negro or Korean who comes, there isn't enough left for you. . . .'"

From an article in *Vlasta* (Prague), October 19, 1960

ROMANIA

Economic Targets for 1961

An enlarged plenary session of the Central Committee convened in Bucharest, October 31. Participants in the meeting included not only members of the Party CC, but government Ministers and section heads, regional and local governmental officials, Trade Union leaders, enterprise directors, academicians, scientists and "other high-ranking personalities." The main item considered was the draft economic plan for 1961. November 2, the regular CC heard Party leader Gheorghiu-Dej report on his recent sojourn at the General Assembly session in New York. (See above.)

Gheorghiu-Dej prefaced his summation of next year's goals—the second year of the Six Year Plan (1960-1965)—with glowing praise for the achievements made during 1960. Preliminary data indicates, he said, that industrial production would be 15.5 percent more than in 1959, as against 14 percent envisaged by the Plan. However, the Party leader was less precise when referring to agriculture,



Cuba's economic boss, Ernesto Guevara, shown during his recent visit to Prague. On the left is the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Trade, Frantisek Krajcir.

SVET V OBRAZECH (Prague), October 29, 1960

stating only that "production in 1960 assures all the consumer needs of the national economy and the increase of State reserves, even though in certain regions weather conditions were not favorable."

The sights for industrial production are set slightly lower for 1961, a 13.5 percent increase over 1960, and the output of consumer goods is slated to expand almost as fast (13 percent) as that of capital goods (13.8 percent)—an infrequent phenomenon in a Communist country. Production in the electric and thermal power industry will increase 22 percent, iron and steel 16.6, machine-building 16, the chemical, cellulose and paper industries 18, light industry 16 and the food industry 11 percent.

Output targets for specific key items were given as follows (percentage increases over 1960, when given, are in parentheses): electric power, 8.8 billion kwh; iron ore (20); coke (22); pig iron, 1,080,000 tons; steel, 2,100,000 tons; rolled products (20); lathes, 2,400 units; complete drilling installations, 130 units; tractors, 20,000; trucks and buses, 10,000; equipment and oil processing industry (60); iron and steelmaking equipment (30); light and food industry equipment (40); calcined and caustic soda (37); chemical fertilizers (30); cellulose and semicellulose (30); synthetic yarn and fiber, 1,700 tons; electrical appliances (230); radio sets, 220,000; television sets, 20,000; electric refrigerators, 30,000; bicycles, 300,000; knitwear (30); garments (17); meat (26); meat products (16); milk (40); canned meat products (18); canned vegetables (35).

Industrial production in 1961, said Gheorghiu-Dej, is to expand chiefly as a result of increased labor productivity, reequipping of industry and better utilization of existing capacity. Labor productivity will rise by about 9 percent (as compared with an expected 10.5 percent during 1960). Capital investment will amount to 27.9 billion lei, a 24 percent increase over 1960. Roughly 15.6 billion of this is to go to industry, or 26 percent more than in 1960; one third of this will go to the fuel and power industry,

TOO MUCH FEASTING

The Hungarian authorities have begun a campaign against the celebrations which take place throughout the country at the slightest excuse—most of them, apparently, at the expense of the State.

"It is typical of our Socialist life that many things which were once strictly private matters have now become the concern of the community, the factory, the collective, the enterprise. It is a good thing when the youth organization and the factory and the office help a family to celebrate a wedding. . . .

"However, the most important thing is that we should never forget to be modest and restrained. These community celebrations must remain worthy of the working class. It is not pomp and excess which make such family feasts memorable, but community feeling, friendship, comradeship and thoughtfulness.

"There are, however, some who forget all this and make a debauchery of these family feasts. They contend that nothing is expensive or good enough for such an occasion. Some, who are very niggardly when it comes to opening their own pockets, spend the public money like mad. . . .

"There was the Hajduszoboszlo Spa, which gave a dinner for 124 people to celebrate its receiving the 'Outstanding' award. It must be pointed out that the enterprise had at that time only 80 employees, and never more than 100 at the height of its season. All the others who attended had nothing at all to do with the enterprise. A Csongrad County enterprise celebrated a double wedding, the expenses of which, down to the last cent, were paid by the enterprise. . . .

"Nobody will object if a collective farm celebrates its tenth anniversary, but why in such a way as did the Kamut Peace Collective? There are 680 members, of whom at least 80 were unable to attend, and yet the banquet was for 1,200! Half of the guests came only because they wanted a revel. Thirty cooks made three different kinds of dishes in 19 cauldrons; several cartloads of bread and a couple of barrels of pickles were consumed; and this was drowned in 20 hektoliters [about 528 gallons—Ed.] of beer and a great deal of wine. . . .

"This expensive abuse has a variety of types. Some people cannot imagine an office meeting without free coffee and a couple of drinks. And how many times do we see two or three guests accompanied by a coterie of friends who eat and drink at the public expense. It also happens that some managers send the products of their plant to a carefully prepared list of people, evidently to curry favor. . . .

"It is high time that we put an end to this rampant abuse which is carried on at the expense of the community. . . ."

Nepszabadsag (Budapest), September 29, 1960

24 percent to metallurgy and machine-building; and 20 percent to the chemical industry. According to Gheorghiu-Dej, 26 new plants are to be opened during the coming year, 34 sections added to existing installations, and 96 plants remodelled.

The most startling production increase is expected in agriculture—the real basis of the Romanian economy. If climatic conditions are favorable, said the Party leader, output from the countryside should rise by about 19 percent over 1960. By way of explaining his reasons for believing that agriculture could accomplish this feat, he pointed to the "Socialization" of the countryside and increased investments. However, the funds allotted to the rural areas amount to only 4 billion lei, i.e., less of an increase over 1960 (20 percent) than industry received. The number of tractors are to increase by 12,000, and the volume of chemical fertilizers (450,000 tons) going to the farms will grow by 14 percent. (*Rominia Libera* (Bucharest), November 1.)

Economic Agreements With Britain

A financial accord settling part of the large British claims against the Romanian government, which have hindered commerce between the two countries since the war, has finally been negotiated, according to Reuters, November 10. As a result of this agreement, the British government signed a three-year trade pact with Bucharest providing for an annual turnover of goods valued at roughly 8 million pounds (as compared with about 6.75 million in 1959).

The British-Romanian dispute over claims arising out of postwar nationalization in Romania, as well as from prewar debts, has been the most protracted of all the financial issues which East European countries have had to settle in order to put their trade with Western countries on a normal footing. Britain is the last Western country with which a compensation settlement remained for Romania, but the sum involved in this dispute is also the largest (five times greater than the US claims which were settled in March).

The agreement, however, actually settled only a small part of the total claims. Romania agreed to pay 1,250,000 pounds (\$3.5 million) for property lost by British subjects in consequence of postwar nationalization and expropriation measures (the British originally asked 13 million pounds). But on the more important questions of property in the Romanian oil industry—a large part of which was British-owned before the war—and bonded and contractual debts dating back to prewar years, it was agreed to postpone negotiations until 1966. British claims total 60-70 million pounds in the first of these categories and 20 million in the second.

The Bucharest regime has been interested in coming to some sort of agreement with London on this issue for some time in order to obtain greater access to British machinery and equipment, especially for the rapidly expanding Romanian chemical industry. The list of goods to be imported includes complete plants, machinery, textiles, chemicals and

cars, in return for which Romania will ship a variety of products consisting largely of agricultural produce, wood pulp and furniture.

Trade Union Congress

The Fourth Congress of the Romanian Trade Unions convened in Bucharest, October 26-29. Premier Chivu Stoica in his speech of welcome to the delegates spoke briefly on the economic plan for 1961 which was to be discussed in fuller detail at a meeting of the Party Central Committee a few days later (see above). Stoica stated that Romania's industrial production had increased this year by 15.5 percent compared with last year's level and that with the plan for the 1960-65 period, the nation would enter a new stage of "Socialist" development. He also predicted that during the next half decade, real wages will rise by 40 to 45 percent over the level attained during the last six months of 1959.

The main address to the Congress was delivered by Gheorghe Apostol, chairman of the Central Council. He assailed the "aggressive policy of the imperialist States headed by the United States," supported the Romanian proposals at the United Nations for a Balkan "zone of peace." Stressing the current Soviet doctrine that war with "imperialist States" is not inevitable, Apostol declared: "The entire development of contemporary society

is taking place under the decisive influence of the change in the balance of power on a world plane, which is continually turning in favor of Socialism and peace. It is precisely on this basis that the prevention of a new war is wholly possible and realistic in our day." He concluded his speech with an exhortation to the trade unionists to carry out the Six Year Plan to the fullest measure. (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], October 27.)

Elections

Re-elected chief of the trade unions was Gheorghe Apostol. Two Vice Presidents were elected: Elena Lascu and Vasile Musat. Anton Moisesu was dropped from the Vice Presidency which had been limited to him alone; however, since he was first elected to the Party Central Committee last June, his removal from the trade union hierarchy does not necessarily involve any demotion. Neither of the two new Vice Presidents have held leading trade union positions before.

The election of the new Secretaries showed that the Central Council Secretariat has been reduced from six to four members. Elected to these posts: Costica Alecu, Awrel Ardeleanu, Ion Cotot, and Mihail Marin. Alecu and Ardeleanu are new appointments. No reasons were given for dropping four former Secretaries, Ion Dobre, Petre Despot, Mihail Mujic, and Gheorghe Palos. The Presidium



Polish actress Teresa Tusynska poses for a cheesecake photo in Budapest.

ORSZAG VILAG (Budapest), October 19, 1960

MONSTERS LIVE THERE

An Albanian ship, caught in a storm in the Adriatic, took refuge in the Yugoslav port of Gurda and was immediately boarded by the usual group of customs and police officials. While checking the boat, they stopped in front of the ship's bulletin board, which displayed material on the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Workers' Party and Albanian-Soviet Friendship Month. Two hours later another group of officials appeared and called the captain's attention to the materials on the bulletin board, which contained the usual Albanian diatribes against Yugoslav "revisionism." The Albanian captain claimed afterward that the officials asked him to remove the anti-Yugoslav material, "or leave the port immediately and sail out to open sea, which was very stormy and not safe for navigation."

According to broadcasts from Tirana, the ship's Party organization met and "rejected this inhuman ultimatum." The boat left port in stormy weather, risking death on the rocks, and headed for home. "They preferred to die honorably rather than give in to the enemies and thus violate the correct Marxist-Leninist line of the beloved Party. The barbarous and inhumane attitude of the Yugoslav revisionists once again shows the true face of the inveterate enemies of our people. This action has evoked profound aversion among people throughout the world, as well as among the Albanian people."

Radio Tirana, October 23, 1960

of the Central Council was enlarged from 15 to 19 members with no dramatic changes. (Radio Bucharest, October 30.)

BULGARIA

Meddling With Private Plots Continues

Local officials and collective farm chairmen are again being warned to leave the private plots alone. These small strips of land allotted to each member of a collective farm are so important in providing food for the economy (especially meat, since animal breeding on the collectives has so far proved completely unsuccessful) that the State, contrary to theory, has been obliged to defend them against encroachment by the managements of the collective farms. The latter, in the interest of fulfilling their own high obligations to the State, find the private plots a tempting way of supplementing production on the collective land.

An article in the October 20 issue of *Kooperativno Selo* (Sofia) claimed that some collective farm chairmen, because of their own failures, have been insisting that members plant wheat on their private plots. In other cases, it said, "the private plots will certainly be sown with wheat because the private plots are being tilled in common."

Warnings against this kind of interference have been increasing in strength. *Izvestia* (Sofia), October 21, published a decree forcing District Councils to give collective farms and individual peasants written permission to sell their extra produce on the free market (i.e., the co-operative stores in the towns and cities) after satisfying their obligations to the State. It seems that not only are the private plots being farmed collectively in some instances, but members are being forced to contribute more than their share to the collectives and local districts which are in danger of not meeting their quotas to the State.

International Youth Group Meets

The Communist-backed World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) bureau met in Sofia, October 28-31, to make plans for its activities during 1961. Christian Echard, Secretary-General, announced that during the next year the youth organized in the WFDY "will continue to struggle for the consolidation of the world movement for peace, will support colonial peoples struggling for independence and the struggle for complete and general disarmament throughout the world." New organizations from 17 countries were admitted to the Federation, including the 100,000-strong youth group of Cuba, and organizations from Cyprus, Morocco and others. Total membership in the WFDY was put at 101 million. (Radio Sofia, October 31.)

An Open Letter to All African Governments

On September 21, 1960, the following "open letter" was released by three African students representing the Executive Committee of the African Students Union in the USSR. The authors, who left Moscow University in disgust, said that the decision to present to the world their "case against Communism" was taken in a secret executive session in Moscow by representatives from Algeria, the Cameroons, the Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, the Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, the UAR and Uganda. They also told reporters in West Germany that some 150 students left the Soviet Union during the past year because of the USSR's treatment of African students, and that many students still in the USSR wanted to leave.

IN THE NAME of all loyal Africans, the Executive Committee of the African Student Union in Moscow wishes respectfully to call the attention of all African governments to the deceptions, the threats, the pressures, the brutality and the discrimination with which the Soviet administrators and strategists have so often handled African and other foreign students in the USSR. We further wish to stress the great danger Communism is to true Africanism. We hate colonialism and racial discrimination in any form

wherever it may appear. New and dangerous forms of colonialism and discrimination are being fostered by the Communist system and by Soviet strategists and are a grave threat to the future of Africa. For Soviet leaders to pose before the world as champions of oppressed Africa while they oppress millions in their own country and their Satellites is hypocrisy at its worst.

During the past year, there have been a series of conflicts between Soviet authorities and African students following

which Soviet propagandists have presented their own perverted story to the world through their tremendous propaganda apparatus. In their effort to obtain credence for their falsehoods and to mislead African leadership, they tried to buy the endorsement of African students. . . .

Communist Tactics of Deceit and Vilification

The story of Mr. S. Omor Okullo of Uganda has been written in some detail by his friends who remained behind in the Soviet Union and who saw the great lengths to which the Soviet administrators would go to vilify anyone who tried to tell the truth about the Soviet Union. In the first place, Mr. Okullo and other African students have made statements to the Western press not because they had joined the imperialist camp as the Soviet propagandists claim, but instead because free opinion is muzzled in the Soviet Union, because the servile Soviet press cannot publish any dissenting point of view, and because the mockery of democracy that operates in this totalitarian dictatorship does not recognize the individual.

When Mr. Okullo was expelled from the Soviet Union, African students who remained demanded an explanation from Soviet authorities who claimed that Mr. Okullo was expelled for stubbornness, reaction, spying, and for association with Western diplomats. The Soviet authorities could not substantiate these charges—nevertheless, they wanted Mr. Okullo out of their country. Mr. Okullo left the Soviet Union and told the world what he saw there.

The Soviet press then came up with the fantasy that Mr. Okullo was expelled for failing his exams and for immorality. The charge of immorality in whiskey drinking is simply not true. As all of Mr. Okullo's friends know, he never drinks anything but an occasional glass of beer. Furthermore, Mr. Okullo passed all exams he took last year, and this year had no exams before he was expelled. It is true that Mr. Okullo, along with many other Afro-Asiatic students, appealed to African and Western embassies for help to leave the Soviet Union. This could scarcely be otherwise, considering the threats, denial of freedom and insults to which they were subjected. Out of respect for the Soviets, however, no Western representative has granted scholarships directly to Afro-Asiatic students in Moscow—instead they advised them to apply from their own countries. Yet the Soviets have illegally brought many people to the Soviet Union in the name of help to Africa. Many of these people cannot leave now that they want to and Soviet propagandists exploit them against their wishes.

The Soviet propaganda machinery followed up their false charges against Mr. Okullo with several letters to African leaders and organizations in an effort to cover up the truth. Radio Moscow officials came to the university offering large sums of money to buy the consciences of African students against Okullo. . . . The propagandists finally found a fellow traveler in Abdel Halim of the Sudan who hardly knew Mr. Okullo, and who was pressured into making false accusations against him. Then the so-called Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, an in-



"Freedom and Independence"

New Times (Moscow), No. 33, 1960

strument of Soviet propaganda, came up with a vilifying "press conference" after bribing a few Arab students. . . .

There are many cases we could cite of Communist deceitful exploitation of African students without their knowledge or consent. We choose one that occurred recently to Mr. Theophilus Okonkwo, who has just gotten out of the Soviet Union to tell this story. In early July he was exercising in the Moscow University gym and a Russian student took a picture of him in a boxing pose. Perfectly innocent so far. But then a few weeks later a friend put the August issue of *The New Times* in front of him and said, "Look what they've done to you." There in a full-page picture was Mr. Okonkwo in the boxing pose. But now the Soviet propagandists had blatantly dubbed in broken chains on his wrists and a white man with a whip falling back in terror. Without Mr. Okonkwo's knowledge or consent, the Communists had spread this propaganda construction in a number of Communist magazines through the world. Mr. Okonkwo's protests to the Soviet authorities were, of course, of no avail. . . .

Communist Discrimination

On arrival, many of us were lavishly welcomed and feted, as a result of which some of us were impressed and made statements and broadcasts favorable to the Soviet Union that we came to rue. . . . We saw how the attitudes of the Soviet administration changed toward us if we said "No" to anything, or suggested that everything in the land of Marxism-Leninism was not perfect.

More important to Africa, we saw many and deep forms of discrimination under the Soviet system. Foreign students, especially Afro-Asians, have encountered shocking humiliations. Hundreds of fine Soviet students have been punished for their association with foreigners. At Moscow University, chemistry faculty member Irina Alexandrevna told Soviet students they should be ashamed of themselves for intimacy with African people who are "low down in the West" and who had been brought to the Soviet Union to be impressed with the Soviet way of life. It was unthinkable that the Soviet students should allow themselves to be influenced by such people. At the First Medical Institute, Dekan Kuzin and the head of the Russian language department told foreign students that they could not study in the Soviet Union as in capitalist countries where students study at their own expense and therefore do things on their own initiative. The Soviet Union finances its students to do what they are told to do. . . . Soviet wives of nearly all Asian students, and even those of some students from Czechoslovakia and Poland, were refused certificates on graduation and were not given employment. Those who applied to leave the Soviet Union were subject to many pressures, including penalties on relatives.

There is hardly any foreign student who has not come to grips with the intransigence of the Soviet administration, especially in his relations toward Soviet citizens. . . . An African student and a Soviet girl in love applied for a marriage license—the Ministry of Higher Education ordered him to leave the Soviet Union within three days and the girl disappeared.

Students from Ghana and the Cameroons received threatening and insulting letters from Russian students. When consulted, the University authorities did nothing about it. . . .

We have also observed that the Soviets have not accepted the Chinese, and vice versa, except as "political brothers." The many thousands of Chinese here seldom go in the company of the Soviets—they hardly fraternize except in anti-Western gatherings. . . .

Soviet writers on Africa paint false pictures of the African situation to the Soviet people in an attempt to strengthen their faith in their system. . . . Soviet correspondents freely toured in Senegal, and Mr. Volovich, in *Vechernaya Moskva* of 10 August, compared Senegalese Africans to chimpanzees he saw at the zoo in Darak and described the masses as poor and diseased. Yet the Soviet authorities do not allow visitors into the stinking slums in their country, where poverty, disease, and ignorance are rampant. . . . The Soviets export propaganda sheets to every country in the world but refuse free import of foreign literature. . . . "coexistence" indeed.

The height of discrimination was reached when the Soviet authorities announced their "Friendship University" plans. To build a separate university for Africans, Asians and Latin Americans is an insult to these people—it violates the traditional concept of a university as an open institution for learning, irrespective of race, religion or origin. We not only see this as an attempt to segregate these students and offer them lower standards of education, but we also see in this a further attempt to insulate

Soviet people from contact with foreigners. . . .

The Communist Danger to Africa

Look around the world today—wherever Communist guns have thundered, they have stayed and exploited. Communism has never been voted freely into office in a single country. The new Communist brand of "colonialism" is well-marked in its European Satellites. East German and Hungarian courage against Soviet tanks is well-remembered. The Communists' hand in the Congo chaos, and exploitation of it, has been clear.

We consider it our duty to warn African leadership against Communism and its dangers. Communism is subtly trying to penetrate Africa—the infiltration is going on vigorously, and it must be countered now. . . .

African students who have studied Soviet strategy have seen how it looks only to its own profit and power interests, and that their "Friendship for Africa" slogans are pure propaganda lacking sincerity and genuineness. To substantiate this, we refer to what happened between President Nasser of the UAR and Premier Khrushchev when the former refused to toe the Communist line. We refer to the Communist reaction against African students when they refused to sign Moscow's Afro-Asian "Solidarity" protest condemning President Nasser. We refer to the refusal of Soviet authorities to allow African students to demonstrate against the French atom bomb tests in the Sahara. . . . because at the time Khrushchev was preparing to visit France to try to split the Western line. . . . In all of our home countries and many other countries of the world there were protest demonstrations—we could make none in the land of Marxist-Leninist justice—"The Land of Africa's Greatest Friends."

There is little doubt that the Communists cherish the disastrous ambition of world conquest. . . . We cannot compromise with colonialism or imperialism in any way or form, and we cannot accept force, deceit, subversion and terrorism as a means of spreading ideologies. We do not want cultural exchanges which permit Communists to make propaganda and cause confusion in other countries while insulating their people from contact and free information. We strongly oppose staffing African embassies in the Soviet Union with Soviet agents, whereas Soviet embassies do not employ foreigners; the Soviets must not be allowed to handle our secret transactions. This calls for immediate coordination and collaboration among African peoples in matters of diplomacy and foreign relations. . . .

We are committed to the fight against imperialism and colonialism but are we going to do it by allowing the Communists to confuse the issue, create more trouble, and cause us more bloodshed? Are we winning our freedom to sell it to the strategists in the Kremlin? God forbid. . . .

For the Executive Committee of the African Students Union in the USSR

signed: M. Ayih of Togo
A. R. Amar of Uganda
T.U.C. Okonkwo, Secretary of the Executive Committee

"JANEK, PASS THE CEMENT!" (continued from page 19)

an ex-landowner in great difficulties. "My dear sir," he says seriously, "one of my brothers is a doctor and the other an engineer and I have to suffer here, not even able to see God's green world. Before the war," here his eyes light up, "I had me a tavern in Zakrocym and money, boy! More than enough of everything." After that he allegedly worked for the Evert Publishing House, walking around in a dark suit and giving 5 *zloty* tips. The women were crazy about him. We go on chattering until lunch. Afterwards Genio takes his shovel and goes to look for matches. He's supposed to return in a few minutes. Unfortunately, however, the ex-landowner didn't show again that day. He just disappeared. So, I have to go on alone until 3:15. Doing my work and that of the charming Genio.

August 4. I'm working with Genio again today. We talk about the construction. "But, watch it, the foreman's coming." He can feel him coming even at a distance. He grabs my wheelbarrow, full of rubble, and—wonder of wonders!—gallops off to the balcony to throw the load down to the ground. "Man, the deals they make here," he says, "but they never give me anything. You see those dilapidated shacks? But the bricks are good. And they, the management, that is, tear them down and sell the bricks on the side, 'cause, of course, only a few are used in the construction. The engineer gets about three grand, the mechanic, too, and the workers who raze 'em—anyway, even during working hours they make anywhere from 500 to 1,000 *zloty*. . . ." Suddenly he sees the foreman looking

our way, grabs the shovel and goes after the bricks so the whole joint shakes. "Work" is going on full steam.

After quitting time I see Czesiek sealing a bargain with the carpenter. The man will give two kilos of nails in return for pears from Czesiek's farm. The carpenter is from Warsaw. His parting words are: "Remember, they have to be good."

August 5. I've been wheeling cement since morning. We're finishing the roof over the main wing. Czesiek brought the pears. He must've had a hard time parting with them because he keeps running to the store for sausage, which he eats with French bread. While munching on it, he estimates he'll make at least 1,800 to 2,000 *zloty*. If they give me less, I quit, he says, I won't work for nothing. His pay is not bad at all. Besides that he has the land which he certainly doesn't farm just for the heck of it, and yet his income tax isn't any higher than that of his Warsaw co-workers. He wants to buy a baby carriage—he talks about it with some embarrassment. His friends laugh at him and Mr. D. says: "A motorcycle, or a bicycle, that's something else, I can understand that, but a baby carriage? Have you gone crazy, man?"

August 6. Saturday. My pals are excited by the prospect of the weekly village shindig. At least half of all the construction workers always go. Bogdan urges me to go with him. "You'll drink your fill and have some fun with the broads," followed by a knowing wink.

In the afternoon I learn our foreman is going on a week's vacation. For six days we'll be "orphans."

"FRIENDSHIP" (continued from page 21)

"The mistake of the Communist Nina Petrova is shown. . . . But the author is not satisfied with this. . . . Into the office of Nina Petrova comes an old friend of hers. They recall romance of the past and a blockade. In connection with this Nina says that Petar has changed. Has surrounded himself with dishonest people, has bought a house, a summer home, a car, but his wife. . . ."

"What does the author mean to say by such an end? That not only Nina Petrova has weaknesses, but look, the others, all the Communists, are like that. Otherwise, why was this last part necessary. . . . From beginning to end this story breathes coolness. The coolness of the enemy is strongly felt. Bojana Borisova criticizes the Communists from hostile positions.

"Why is the name of the heroine Russian? So the author can show that Nina Petrova probably grew up in Russia, was the daughter of a Communist who had emigrated in 1923. Probably to show the heroine's ties with the heroic old generation, the fighters of the illegal period. In order to blacken in a most refined way Communists in general.

"This dirt should not have been allowed to appear in *Literaturen Front*." (*Trud* [Sofia], June 29.)

Defense

THE MAIN subject of criticism is one of the heroines, the trade union worker Nina Petrova, who refuses a vaca-

tion card to an old teacher and gives it to her friend Katia. The behavior of Nina Petrova has painfully disturbed [the *Trud* correspondent]. . . . What does she dislike in the relationship between Nina Petrova and Katia? That Nina Petrova does not act correctly. Hasn't the author of the story stressed this? I allow myself to remind you that not the author of the story, but [the correspondent] says that if not all Communists are like Nina Petrova, many of them are. . . .

"On the contrary, the author has depicted the positive heroine in her story—Katia, with bright and true colors, and most probably Katia is also a Communist. Amazing, how [the correspondent] has not noticed this. What is the conclusion? It is not the author but [the correspondent] who blackens Communists, and I would have directed this criticism to her in a much sharper form if I had used her logic. . . ."

"The other criticism in the note is not drawn from the story, but comes from mere suspicion. The correspondent suspects that the name of the heroine is Russian in order that another, more incredible conclusion can be drawn, about which there is not a mention in the story. I know good and bad citizens who bear the name 'Nina' who were born, brought up and live in Bulgaria. Further, the name 'Petrova' is very popular in Bulgaria, and there are pages and pages with this name in the telephone directory. . . ." (*Literaturen Front*, July 21.)

Men in the News

Frol Romanovich Kozlov

PERHAPS THE BEST THING that has ever happened to Frol Romanovich Kozlov is Nikita Khrushchev. In politics, as elsewhere, one man's meat often makes another man's poison, but if the past seven years have spelled disaster for such former Soviet bigwigs as Malenkov and Bulganin, Frol Kozlov has fattened enormously on the Khrushchev diet. When Stalin died in 1953, Kozlov held a relatively secondary post as chief of the Leningrad city Party organization; now, at 52, he is a member of the Party Presidium and of the all-important Party Secretariat, and the presumptive successor to Nikita Khrushchev as king of the Soviet Empire.

In bearing, Kozlov is more sophisticated and sedate than the elder Russian statesman. Western reporters, long accustomed to dowdiness in Soviet politicians, have remarked on his liking for good jewelry and his choice of shirts with button-down collars. Possibly this is because he belongs to another generation. One of the youngest Soviet leaders, Kozlov was not forged in the fire of Revolution but climbed the ladder to power through the new and more comfortable technocracy. In method, however, Kozlov seems to have taken a page from the book of his model and master.

This was apparent during his visit to the US in June 1959, for the ostensible purpose of opening the Soviet Exhibition at the New York Coliseum. Among other adventures, Kozlov took a brief tour of the subway system. He sat down near a young Negro woman and remarked through an interpreter: "Your skin is colored, just like that of Mme. Nasriddinova—and she is president of the Uzbek Republic." It might have been Khrushchev talking.

The rest of the visit, which took him to such cities as Washington, San Francisco, Detroit, Chicago and Pittsburgh (and was aimed mainly at penetrating financial and official circles) brought other comments and comparisons from those who saw him. Some seasoned journalists held the opinion that Kozlov's approach was stereotyped and lacking in wit; that he was uncertain in the presence of foreigners and less bold under direct questioning than Mikoyan, who had visited the US earlier in the year. He seemed adroit, however, at grass-roots politicking, energetically shaking hands and patting babies, and one American businessman was impressed enough by his personality to call him "a hell of a salesman."

On his home ground, Kozlov may very well have a less imitative manner. In the opinion of one Western diplomat, he speaks with lucidity and forcefulness, and is one of the few Soviet leaders who commands attention rather than sleep. He is known as an administrator rather than an "intellectual," and currently is regarded as the functioning chief of the USSR's domestic affairs.



Kozlov (right) with President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon during his 1959 visit to the United States.

Przyjazd (Warsaw), July 19, 1959

A stocky five feet nine or ten, Kozlov came up the hard way. Born to a poor peasant family in Ryazan province southeast of Moscow on August 17, 1908, he was working in a textile factory at the age of 15. In 1926 he joined the Party, and through his contacts entered a Party school and later the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute from which he graduated as a metallurgical engineer in 1936. After that he took the post of foreman in a steel plant in the Urals, and there entered the Party apparatus. In 1939 he became Party secretary of the plant, and in 1940 head of the entire Party organization in Izhevsk. Between 1944 and 1947, Kozlov worked in the Party's central apparatus in Moscow; he emerged to become head of the Party organization in Kuibyshev Province. Two years later he was appointed the Central Committee's special representative at the Kirov heavy machine plant in Leningrad, and in January 1950 he assumed leadership of the Leningrad city Party organization.

Kozlov first attracted Western notice in January 1953, at the height of the "doctor's plot." At that time, obviously under orders, he published an article describing how Leningrad Communists had frustrated the "schemes of Jewish bourgeois nationalists." In the period that followed he became far more prominent. With Khrushchev at the helm, Kozlov became head of the Leningrad provincial Party organization in September 1953 after the ouster from that post of a Malenkov supporter. In February 1957 Kozlov was made an alternate member of the Party's Presidium, and four months later, with the purge of Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich, he advanced to full membership. In March 1958 he was named a first Deputy Premier, a post he resigned this year when he became a member of the all-powerful Party Secretariat.

Texts and Documents

KOZLOV'S ANNIVERSARY SPEECH

The celebration in November of the forty-third anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution brought to Moscow top-ranking Communists from all over the world—with the conspicuous exception of China's Mao Tse-tung and, of course, Yugoslavia's Tito. One reason for the gathering was the much-publicized cleavage between Moscow and Peiping on questions of foreign policy. The welcoming speech, delivered by Party secretary Frol Kozlov, was both a summary and a defense of the program sponsored by Khrushchev. Major excerpts follow.

DEAR COMRADES, esteemed foreign guests: We are ushering in a glorious and joyous holiday—the 43rd anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Together with the Soviet people it is being observed by our brothers—the peoples of the mighty camp of Socialism, the working people of all countries, all progressive mankind. Allow me, comrades, on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee, the Soviet Government, and the entire Soviet people, on behalf of the participants in our celebration meeting, to warmly welcome the leaders of the fraternal Communist and Workers' Parties, and all the guests, present here, who have come to Moscow to join us in the celebrations of the 43rd anniversary of the Great October Revolution.

Permit me through our dear foreign friends to convey hearty greetings to all fraternal Communist and Workers' Parties carrying high the invincible banner of Marxism-Leninism and continuing the great cause of the October Revolution, to convey warm greetings to all working people, to all ordinary men and women in the world, all fighters for peace and democracy, for national liberation and for Socialism.

Comrades, every time we celebrate the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, each of us is seized by a feeling of pride in the unmatched exploits accomplished by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party, as well as a feeling of joy caused by the impressive victories marking another year of our purposeful advance. The lofty feeling of pride in our great people, in our splendid homeland, in the Leninist Communist Party, is especially pronounced now when the entire world is witnessing the successful implementation of our magnificent program of build-

ing Communism outlined by the 21st CPSU Congress.

Communism, whose inevitable triumph was foreseen by mankind's finest minds, once a glorious dream of the working people, is coming true in our country. Therein lies the principal result of the 43-year path of development of the Soviet Union, the heroic labor of the Soviet people—the master of their country and the free and conscious creator of their destiny.

The October Revolution marked the beginning of a new historic era—the era of the collapse of capitalism and the triumph of Socialism and Communism on a worldwide scale. The lofty ideas of the Great October Revolution are inspiring the working people and the exploited in all parts of the world to struggle against their sworn enemies — the oppressors; these ideas have shaken to the foundation the wage slavery system—the capitalist system.

Born in October 1917, the Soviet State for many years had to build Socialism while faced with capitalist encirclement; at the same time it had to beat back the furious onslaught of the imperialists. After the victorious conclusion of World War II when the most reactionary forces of imperialism were smashed, events of tremendous historic importance occurred in the world. Following the Soviet Union, a number of countries of Europe and Asia adopted the road of Socialism. The mighty camp of Socialism now embraces more than a billion people—more than a third of mankind. The disgraceful colonial system is finally crumbling under the blows of the national liberation movement! The peoples of many colonial countries and dependencies have risen to national independence. Imperialism's sphere has narrowed considerably. The ideas of the October Revolution already

have brought freedom and happiness to hundreds of millions of people. They will bring freedom and happiness to all mankind.

The transition from capitalism to Socialism begun by the Great October Socialist Revolution represents the essence of our era. Millions of people in all parts of our planet are pinning upon the Soviet Union, upon the entire Socialist camp, upon the ideas of Communism, their hope for the possible solution of such vital social and political problems as the insurance of an enduring peace, universal and complete disarmament, and the abolition of colonialism. Our Soviet country stands out as the champion and defender of peace, expresses the hopes of all peoples, and firmly and confidently carries the banner of progress. In the minds of the people the conviction is growing that Socialism and Communism represent the only correct way of social development which will relieve the workers of devastating wars and bring them a higher standard of life and genuine freedom.

"A Fresh Wind" in the UN

The Soviet Union is honorably discharging its lofty international duty as the staunch, consistent defender of the vital interests of the working people and all peace-loving peoples. A striking testimony of this was the remarkable activity of the Soviet delegation and its leader Comrade Nikita Khrushchev at the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly. The active participation in the work of the session of Comrade Nikita Khrushchev, as well as outstanding statesmen of a number of Socialist countries, made the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly an international event of exceptional importance.

The Soviet proposals on the necessity of discussing in the United Nations such questions as general and complete disarmament, the abolition of colonialism and the granting of independence to all peoples and countries, as well as our other proposals, had the enthusiastic support of the delegations of the Socialist and a number of neutral countries. This is quite understandable; the USSR raised for discussion the burning problems of contemporary international life which are of tremendous importance for the destinies of present and future generations. A fresh wind blew through the halls of the United Nations, cleansing its halls of mustiness and stagnation. Nikita Khrushchev, by his speeches filled with revolutionary passion and great faith in the justice of our cause, tore the mask from the imperialist deceivers of the

peoples, exposed their position hostile to the cause of peace.

Let the imperialists and their servants yell and toss about, having experienced at home, so to say, the irresistible logic and truth of Communism. The Soviet Union, the forces of Socialism and progress, have scored another important moral and political victory over the forces of imperialism and have won millions of new friends. This is a natural result of our Leninist foreign policy permeated by the life-giving ideas of October, the policy which since Lenin's times has never been as active and purposeful as it is now.

The activity of the Soviet delegation and its head, Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, at the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly has been warmly supported by all Soviet people, by the peoples of Socialist countries, by all progressive mankind.

The Soviet people, our Party, see it as their international duty to the workers of all countries to further strengthen the might of the USSR, the unity and power of the Socialist camp, and the international labor and Communist movement. Our people and its vanguard—the glorious Party of Communists — tested in battles and labor, will as before give all their strength to the great cause of Communism, to the struggle for world peace.

"We Need Nothing . . . Except Friendship"

In the mighty tread of Communism, comrades, one more year of our life illuminated by the ideas of the Great October has passed. This was a year of new, outstanding achievements of the Soviet people. We all can say now with satisfaction that our internal situation never has been as strong and promising as it is now. A brief but thorough description of our country's life has been given by N. S. Khrushchev. He said: "In the Soviet Union we have everything we need. Ours is a rich country, a flourishing economy. We are striving to raise the living standard of our people to a high level. Our prospects are exceptionally good. We need nothing from other peoples except friendship. We have everything necessary to satisfy the requirements of the people."

From the vantage point achieved during the 43 years which have elapsed since the victory of the proletarian revolution, we see well the difficult road traversed by our country during these decades and the greatness of our victories. When the young Soviet Republic first started peaceful Socialist construction, the great leader and founder of the Communist Party and our State, V. I. Lenin spoke bitterly of

the backward economy of the country, about the archaic mode of life, the semi-savagery and real savagery which reigned on its vast expanses. And he, our beloved Ilich, prophetically said that Soviet Russia would inevitably turn into a truly mighty and bountiful Russia.

Lenin's prophecy came true. The wisdom and vision of the Communist Party, its correct leadership, year upon year of persistent labor, and the selfless struggle of the heroic working class, the glorious collective farm peasantry and the people's intelligentsia have made our country a mighty Socialist State. The 43d year of the Great October Revolution has generously multiplied the successes of our country. We are steadily and consistently following the Leninist policy of utilizing the inexhaustible possibilities of the Socialist system to speed up the rate of advance toward Communism.

The Seven Year Plan

This policy found a concentrated expression in the historic decisions of the 21st CPSU Congress, in the seven-year plan of economic development of the USSR, and in a number of important measures taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government designed to insure a further rise of industry and agriculture, improve management methods, accelerate technical progress, and promote the people's welfare.

Now that the second year of the Seven Year Plan is coming to a close, we can sum up some of the results of the nationwide effort for the fulfillment of this great plan. The Seven Year Plan envisaged an annual average increase of production of 8.6 percent. In fact, it exceeded 11 percent in 1959. The agriculture workers also coped well with their tasks last year. This extended and strengthened the material-technical basis of Soviet society and made it possible considerably to increase our material resources. Higher target figures than those outlined in the Seven Year Plan were set for the second year of the plan. Although the year is not yet over, there is every reason to state that these higher targets will be overfulfilled.

The gross industrial output plan was fulfilled 103 percent in the first nine months of the year. In 1959-60, industrial output, according to the target figures of the Seven Year Plan, was to have increased 17 percent. In fact, the increase is almost 23 percent. In the first two years of the plan we shall produce some 120 billion rubles worth of industrial products in excess of the plan figure. Over 1,000 new large industrial enter-

prises will be commissioned in 1960. Thus, we shall also approach the third year of the Seven Year Plan with big additional reserves in hand.

The successes of our agricultural workers are well known to all of us. In the last six years gross agricultural output increased 50 percent in our country. Striving for a further expansion of production, the collective farms and State farms enlarged the area under cultivation for the 1960 harvest by 7 million hectares. It is a pleasure to note that the country now receives from the collective farms and State farms not only the entire marketable production of grain and industrial crops but also the bulk of marketable animal products.

Collective farms and State farm workers have also been working stubbornly this year. It must be said that the weather has been extremely capricious. In the south, part of the winter crop perished as a result of frost and strong winds. In Kazakhstan and Siberia the long spring and cold summer did some harm. In spite of this, State purchases of grain will be no less than last year and those of sugar beet, sunflowers, and vegetables will be bigger. Six to seven years ago bad weather seriously affected our grain balance and food supplies for the population. Now this no longer holds true.

We are now much less dependent on nature than we were several years ago. This is convincing evidence of the great efficacy of the measures taken by the Party to bring about a sharp advance of agriculture and the further consolidation of the collective farm system.

The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government will continue tirelessly to insure a steady and ever-increasing volume of food and agricultural raw materials for industry. The next CPSU Central Committee plenum, to convene in December, will discuss all aspects of the advance of agriculture and will chart the road of struggle for further expanding agricultural production. . . .

"Successes of Soviet Science"

The year 1960 witnessed new scientific and technological achievements and discoveries. The most outstanding of them was the flight into outer space and the safe return to earth of a heavy spaceship with living beings on board. This great exploit of Soviet scientists, engineers, and workers has reaffirmed the superiority of Soviet science in numerous fields of knowledge.

The successes of Soviet science in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are widely known. Big successes have also been

achieved in the theory of superconductivity, in acoustics, and in the physics of solid bodies and superhigh pressures. The work of chemists in creating new substances and materials, above all plastics, capable of replacing steel and other metals, has been highly effective. The achievements of science and technology are now enabling us to accomplish important economic tasks at an unprecedented pace. The building of large open hearth furnaces in five to six months and blast furnaces in eight to nine months has become a standard occurrence. Builders of cement mills are installing technological lines with powerful revolving ovens in six to eight months.

Now we are building our electric power stations at a much faster pace. On Nov. 4, the country learned of an outstanding victory on the Dnieper. The Kremenchug hydroelectric power station was commissioned at its full capacity of 625,000 kilowatts two years ahead of schedule. This was another contribution to the implementation of the mandates of the great Lenin for the electrification of our country.

How confidently our engineering industry is advancing! Let me cite only one instance. Several years ago we took great pride in the manufacture of 115,000 kilowatt variable pitch turbines for hydroelectric power stations on the Volga. Now engineers have designed for the Bratsk hydroelectric power station a 225,000 kilowatt radial axis turbine, unequalled in the world, and are working on a 500,000 kilowatt hydroturbine. Over 3,000 new types of machines, machine tools, mechanisms, and instruments have been designed and manufactured in the past 18 months of the Seven Year Plan.

The unchallenged successes of science, technology, and industrial construction have made the rapid expansion of production capacities possible, and thus an increase in the annual absolute increase of industrial production.

This is a natural process, a reflection of one of the laws governing the construction of Communism, which, as N. S. Khrushchev said at the 21st CPSU Congress, is that "the gradual transition to Communism should not be regarded as some kind of a slowed-down movement," that we "cannot linger on our achievements because that would lead to stagnation." The rate of creating the material-technical base of Communism is increasing, thus resulting in the rapid rise of the cultural and technical level of the people, in their greater Communist awareness.

The Soviet people are approaching

their work with a bigger yardstick than before. They refuse to accept the fact that some sections of production are lagging behind, working below their capacity. This is why many pioneers of new production methods, experienced organizers, voluntarily secure transfers to lagging backward sections to bring them up to the level of the best. The Communist work movement is growing in scope. Now already many factories, plants, mines, and oil fields have already joined the competition for the honorable title of Communist work collectives. What do these facts indicate? What conclusions do they warrant?

"We Shall Outstrip the Capitalist Countries"

First, we may say with confidence that the Soviet people will prefulfill the Seven Year Plan. Second, the Soviet Union is increasing its time gain in the peaceful economic competition with capitalism, and we are fully confident that we shall catch up with and outstrip the most highly developed capitalist countries within a short time, historically speaking. The Soviet Union has long since emerged as the world's second largest industrial producer after the United States. But we are advancing at a rate which is beyond American ability. During the 16 postwar years Soviet industrial production has been increasing at the average rate of 10.7 percent, compared with 1.8 percent for the United States.

It is not only the percentage of increase that matters. We are confidently catching up with the United States both in the annual absolute increase of industrial production and in its total volume. Prerevolutionary Russia produced eight times less than the United States. Now Soviet industrial production amounts approximately to 60 percent and the output of farm products to 75 to 80 percent of the American level. The Soviet Union is already ahead of the United States in the output of iron ore and coal, coke, passenger cars for trunk railways, grain harvester combines, lumber, woolen fabrics, butter and sugar.

We realize, of course, that the United States is still leading in a number of industrial fields. But the "assortment" of products in absolute production in which we are leaving America behind will increase every year in favor of Socialism.

Our rate of progress, and the successes we have attained in all fields of national economy leave no doubt whatsoever that the advantage in the economic competition with capitalism lies with us. It also

is becoming increasingly obvious to all reasonable people in the world who make a sober appraisal of the balance of forces in the world arena of the boundless opportunities of the Socialist order.

There are still some diehards among the advocates of capitalism who are trying to cast doubt upon that which is indisputable. Recently presidential candidate Richard Nixon said, for instance, that a comparison of the Soviet development rate with the American is tantamount to comparing the growth of a child with the rate of growth of an adult. Bile always leaves a bitter taste in the mouth, as the saying goes, but in searching for picturesque yet unconvincing comparisons, Mr. Nixon is like the child who is so intent on catching a butterfly that he cannot see anything else. Mr. Nixon refuses to reckon with the fact that these healthy, strong children have long since grown into men and are achieving exploits which are still beyond people with allegedly adult minds.

Exposing the vain attempts of the henchmen of imperialism to turn black into white, we say: The capitalist economy is decrepit and old. No remedies or pills can cure its incurable ailments. Communism represents the true youth of the world; capitalism, its past. Such is the objective truth; such is the law of history.

True, the skippers of the capitalist ship of State refuse to recognize this objective reality, refuse to face facts. Moreover, they still try to put up a brave front, but life is giving them hard knocks. President Eisenhower asserted in his January message to Congress that 1960 would be a year of unprecedented prosperity for the United States. As early as August, however, the journal of American business circles, *Business Week*, was compelled to admit that there had been a noticeable recession in a number of branches of the American economy and wrote gloomily that business activity was not following Eisenhower's script. Americans are alarmed particularly that the USSR is fast overtaking the United States in steel production. We must say that they have adequate grounds for anxiety. In 1945 steel production in the USSR was only 17 percent of American production; and in 1959 we produced an amount of steel equal to 71 percent of that produced in the United States. Everyone knows that the volume of steel production is one of the basic indexes of a country's strength.

Our party and all Soviet people are firmly convinced that in the near future our country will win in the peaceful economic competition with capitalism. This

is as inevitable as the coming of dawn after night.

"We Are Going On to New Victories"

The Soviet people are never content with what has been achieved, never carried away by their successes. We have the good habit of concentrating our attention on the urgent and important tasks before us. At present the Communist Party gives priority to improving quality indexes in industry and construction, on collective farms and State farms, in transportation, and in all branches of the national economy. Involved here is not only the quality of production. Naturally, the trade mark of a Soviet enterprise must be a reliable guarantee for any machine, any commodity. I mean quality in the broadest sense of the word. Now, when plans for gross production are, as a rule, fulfilled and overfulfilled, all Party, administrative, trade union, and economic organs must concentrate on questions of increasing labor productivity, reducing production and construction costs, increasing accumulations, speeding up technical progress, automation, and complex mechanization of production, and making the most rational use of funds allocated for capital investment. In agriculture we will continue to strive for better field harvest, for greater productivity of livestock breeding, for more effective use of machines, and for a constant reduction of labor costs per quintal of grain, cotton, vegetables, meat, and milk.

Comrades, in inspiring the people for the October Revolution our Party said: Only the victory of Socialism and Communism will insure the complete and fullest satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of the working people. With this aim in mind we have been building and continue to build plants and power stations. We are increasing the rate of economic construction, developing all branches of culture. This is yielding abundant fruits. Life in the Soviet Union is becoming more and more joyous and happy.

The 43rd year since the victory of the Socialist revolution in Russia is highly significant in this respect. Following the expansion of the national economy, the real incomes of Soviet people increased more than 50 percent in the 1953-1960 period. The transfer of all workers and employees to a seven and six-hour workday is being completed. By Nov. 1 the benefits of a shorter workday were being enjoyed by about 50 million people.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government devote special attention to the development of social service funds.

It is the most important Communist way of increasing the well-being of Soviet people. By the end of the Seven Year Plan period State expenditures for public education, medical service, social security, and other social services will total about 3,800 rubles a year per worker, or over 300 rubles a month. This is a fairly substantial addition to the wages of workers and employees and to the earning of collective farm workers. By the end of the Seven Year Plan period the State will spend over 800 rubles a year per worker on the construction of homes and schools and cultural, welfare, and medical facilities.

The daily concern of the Party and government for improving the living conditions of Soviet people is also demonstrated by the fact that from 1957 to 1960 houses with a total area of almost 300 million square meters were built in towns and workers settlements.

By way of comparison let us note that in all towns and workers settlements of prerevolutionary Russia there were only 180 million square meters in housing.

Comrades, we are justifiably proud of the great achievements in the economy, culture, science, and technology, but we take still greater pride in the creator of everything that is beautiful and majestic in our land—Soviet man. His bright spiritual outlook, his supreme devotion to the cause of Communism, his love and respect for work, and his collectivism could be only developed under conditions of a Socialist order and of genuine freedom for the flourishing of creative ability and talent.

As a result of a cultural revolution, which occurred in our country in complete unity with gigantic economic transformations, generations of literate and educated people have grown up and matured in the USSR. In graduating experts in many fields, particularly engineering, we have been first in the world for a long time. The Party policy—supported by all the people—which is aimed at combining education and productive work and at achieving a mass entry of people with secondary and higher education into the field of material production is yielding tangible results in liquidating the basic difference between manual and mental work. An outstanding result of the enormous educational work of the Party among the masses is that our people have accepted Marxism-Leninism as their own philosophy. The Soviet people have accepted the Party line aimed at the construction of Socialism and Communism heart and soul and are implementing this construction with complete awareness.

Where, in what bourgeois country, is there such majesty of the people's will and spirit as evidenced by the volunteering of hundreds of thousands of young patriots to take part in the reclamation of virgin lands and to participate in construction projects in the east?

Where else can one find selfless help to one's comrade in work, which has become our rule? Where else can one find the unrewarded fulfillment of various important public tasks, often requiring quite some time? Only in a Socialist society can such practices fully enter into the everyday life of our people!

All of you comrades, of course, have read the warm greeting from Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev to Mikhail Andreyevich Lukashkin, a former major in the Soviet Army. Comrade Lukashkin did not seek a high official position. He voluntarily joined the glorious ranks of those who create material values, and he has achieved excellent results.

This and many other similar facts demonstrate the spiritual beauty of Soviet man, his high sense of responsibility to society. To continue to educate the people in the spirit of Communism, persistently to eradicate the vestiges of the past, which still affect an insignificant proportion of Soviet people, is the main task of our ideological work.

The creation of the material-technical base of Communism, the development on this basis of Communist social relations, the formation and education of a new man—these are the main and closely interwoven tasks of Communist construction, and we are successfully solving them. More and more majestic prospects are opening before us, and we are assuredly going on to new victories.

"War Can Be Averted"

Comrades, Socialism, ushered into our country by the Great October Revolution, has now become a worldwide system. Under the victorious banner of Marxism-Leninism, marching ahead to a new life, along with the USSR, are the great Chinese people, the people of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the DRV, the GDR, the DPRK, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia. The expansion of Socialism beyond the limits of one country is a very great victory in the age-old struggle between capital and labor. It has entailed radical changes in the political, economic, and ideological life of all mankind. The time of the universal rule of imperialism is irrevocably gone.

The formation of the world Socialist system was the most important event

since the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution; it is now becoming the decisive factor in the development of human society. Furthermore, a group of States has emerged on the world stage which refuses to follow blindly the lead of the imperialist powers—people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America who, in a tenacious struggle against the colonialists, have won their independence or are now fighting for it are taking an increasingly active part in international life and are making their contribution to the weakening of the position of imperialism. In monopoly capitalist countries the positions of the working class have been strengthened and the influence of Marxist-Leninist parties—which now number 87 and have 36 million Communists members—has increased. The working class has considerably increased its opportunities to rally the vast majority of people in the struggle to isolate the reactionary, aggressive, monopolist circles for fresh victories in the fight for peace, democracy, and Socialism.

Under these conditions the policy of peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems which Lenin proposed and which proved effective acquires even greater and more vital force. This policy corresponds to the needs of modern social development and to the actual balance of forces in the world. It serves the interests of all peoples.

Creatively developing Marxism-Leninism, the CPSU arrived at a most important conclusion at its 20th Congress: Now there is no fatal inevitability of war—war can be averted. This conclusion received the unanimous support of fraternal Communist and Workers' Parties in a programmatic document—the declaration of the Moscow conference of representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist countries in 1957. The principles of the Moscow declaration were reaffirmed in the communique of the Bucharest conference of Marxist-Leninist parties.

A further development of Marxist-Leninist theory was the conclusion arrived at by the 21st CPSU Congress: "Even prior to the full victory of Socialism on earth, given the preservation of capitalism in part of the world, there is a real possibility of excluding world war from human society." In arriving at this conclusion our Party proceeded from the premise that new successes of the Socialist camp would lead to a further growth of peace-loving forces throughout the world and that the number of countries advocating the consolidation of peace would increase. It took into considera-

tion the fact that the idea of the impermissibility of war would penetrate more and more deeply in the consciousness of people and that they, with the help of the Socialist camp, would succeed in compelling the militant imperialist circles to abandon their plans for unleashing new wars.

The whole course of events confirms the analysis made by the Communists. The Socialist camp, supported by all peace-loving forces, in recent years has time and again stopped attempts by the imperialist aggressors to launch local wars, by which the imperialists threaten mankind with a new world war. This is clear proof that with the establishment of a world Socialist system and the success of Socialism the international balance of forces has radically altered in favor of Socialism and the forces of peace. Real forces have now formed in the world capable of curbing the imperialist aggressors. Imperialism cannot now decide at will whether there is to be war. In fighting for peace, Marxist-Leninists of course bear in mind that as long as imperialism exists the causes of war also remain.

The reactionary forces which represent the interests of monopoly capital may attempt to launch a war. Imperialism has been and remains aggressive. Its wolfish nature has not changed and will not change. Therefore, the Socialist countries, all peace-loving forces, must maintain the greatest vigilance and be prepared to deal a crushing retaliatory blow should the imperialists risk bringing matters close to war.

"In Defense of Peace"

Peace is the most cherished desire of all people on earth. There is now no greater aspiration than to remove the threat of a new war of destruction from human society, but peace cannot be strengthened without struggle. Therefore, the implementation by the Socialist States of an active foreign policy based on the general principle of peaceful coexistence, the further mobilization of all peace-loving forces, and the convincing of people that it is now possible to avert a new world war—all this is an urgent necessity of our times. Vladimir Ilich Lenin said: "We must encourage the people to concern themselves with questions of war and peace." This behest of Lenin is being followed by our Party with the consistency and persistence characteristic of Communists.

In struggling for peace, our Party well remembers Lenin's dictum that victorious Socialism exerts its main influence on the

fate of mankind by its economic successes. These successes can only be multiplied under peaceful conditions. In the peaceful economic competition with capitalism, Socialism undoubtedly will gain a decisive economic victory and will insure for the people their right to a higher stand of living than they now have. This will demonstrate to an even greater extent than now the superiority of our social system and will serve as a mighty, inspiring example to all people of the world in their struggle against capitalism and for Socialism.

Comrades, we have all witnessed the Soviet Union's resolute actions in defense of peace. The Soviet Union has been fighting persistently to implement the proposals for general and complete disarmament which the U.N. General Assembly supported last year. As a result of the persistent work of the Soviet Government in the struggle for general and complete disarmament the ten-nation committee was formed. We had hoped that the committee would be able to clear up the obstacles which had accumulated in the disarmament talks. In January 1960 we passed a law in our country on another unilateral reduction of Soviet armed forces, by 1.2 million men.

Economic contacts and cultural relations with many States have expanded. We continue to grant disinterested aid to economically underdeveloped countries. Comrade Khrushchev's visits to the countries of Southeast Asia and to France, as well as his visit to the United States last year, helped spread a correct understanding of the policy of the Socialist countries, made the international atmosphere more healthy, exposed the treacherous plans of imperialism, and created a favorable climate for a summit conference.

The strengthening of the cause of peace has not been to the liking of the imperialist circles, which do not wish international relations to develop in a way favorable to the people. The U.S. Government, acting under the pressure of monopolies, which make enormous profits from the arms race, chose the path of direct provocation against our country and against the cause of peace. American air pirates intruded in Soviet skies, while Eisenhower and the American Government cynically declared their right to violate our sovereignty, allegedly in the interests of safeguarding their own security. By sending spy planes over our country and by refusing to admit honestly its guilt for these acts of brigandage, the U.S. Government torpedoed the summit conference. Through inadmissible pro-

crastination and unwillingness to conduct serious negotiations on disarmament the Western powers made it impossible for the Socialist countries to participate further in the 10-nation committee. The imperialists have provoked a new flareup of the cold war to whip up once again the arms race and to increase the fever of military preparations.

This course in international relations bodes no good for the imperialists. We, of course, are not afraid of the warlike machinations of the aggressors. The era of the imperialist policy or diktat has gone. Strength is now on our side. The working people of the Soviet Union and all the countries of the mighty Socialist camp have worked hard to safeguard the growth of the economic might of their States and to strengthen their defense capacity.

When the American spy planes—and one must note that these were their best planes—appeared in our skies, they crashed, and at the same time American military arrogance was taken down a peg or two. We resolutely declared then and still declare that the same thing will happen in the future. We have an old saying that everyone is on the front-line, whether at a military council at the front or in a factory at home, and he who would test again our military might will get what he deserves.

Today we are strong, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev has said, and tomorrow we shall be stronger still! And you will wait in vain, gentlemen, for the time when you will smile at our weakness.

The international situation today is such that the Soviet Union and all Socialist countries and peace-loving peoples are able to subdue excessively zealous torch-bearers of war. Unmasking the policy of imperialists, we present in contrast a real program of peace and international cooperation. While the imperialists intensify the arms race, we present constructive proposals on general and complete disarmament, firmly convinced that this is the hub of all vital questions of the present day. Comrade Khrushchev, at the U.N. session and during his other speeches in New York, razed to the ground the mendacious bourgeois propaganda alleging that the Soviet Union does not want control over disarmament. "Accept disarmament," Comrade Khrushchev said, "and we shall accept any control."

West German revanchists, into whose hands attempts are now being made to put contemporary weapons, are openly making territorial claims and threatening war in central Europe. We demand that

the Bonn imperialists be curbed. We urge the conclusion of a peace treaty in accordance with the actual situation that has arisen since World War II. We insist on the elimination of the occupation status of West Berlin, which has outlived itself. It is high time for the Western powers to understand our attitude at last and to stop testing the patience of the Soviet and other peace-loving peoples.

"Imperialism Is Growing Weaker"

We propose to the Western powers that they undertake honest talks between States on outstanding issues in international relations. We believe that is the most sensible way of lessening international tension. Certain Western leaders, specifically Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of Great Britain, have often expressed themselves in favor of the expediency of such talks. Yet the latest steps taken by the British Government fill us with serious doubts about the sincerity of Mr. Macmillan's statements, about the British Government's desire to ease international tension. Only a few days ago, Mr. Macmillan told Parliament that an agreement had been reached between Britain and the United States. Under the terms of this agreement the U.S. Navy will get a base in Scotland near Glasgow, Britain's second largest city, for submarines armed with rockets and nuclear weapons. The base is meant to be a home port for U.S. atomic submarines with rocket and nuclear arms. The U.S. military command plans to dispatch these vessels into the neighborhood of the USSR sea frontier. Who can fail to understand that this is a very dangerous adventure by the U.S. brasshats, an adventure aimed at a serious worsening of the international atmosphere and fraught with dire consequences for its U.S. inspirers and their British allies?

It is noteworthy that Mr. Macmillan conducted the talks about this base during his stay in the United States when he was attending the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly, which discussed disarmament as one of the main issues. He discussed the question of the base with the Americans. With the Soviet delegation, however, Mr. Macmillan discussed the question of the need for talks to solve pressing international questions. It follows that the British Government is attempting to move at the same time in two diametrically opposite directions. It is obvious that these acts cannot be reconciled one with another. Paying lip service to an easing of tension, the British Government is in fact taking an active part in provocative measures by the

American militarists aimed at aggravating the international situation, at wrecking talks and transforming them into ballyhoo, a screen for the continuation of the nuclear arms race. This is not to mention that such actions by British leaders bind Britain still more firmly to the American chariot which American generals and admirals inclined to adventure are striving to control. Such acts sharply intensify the danger for Britain itself in the event of a conflict arising. It is not fortuitous that the report of the conclusion of the Anglo-American agreement on setting up bases for American submarines in Britain gave rise to serious disquiet among the British public, which apparently manifests more concern for the fate of its country than its leaders do.

Comrades, of greatest importance to the historic destinies of peoples is the immediate liquidation of the remnants of colonialism, which still strangle tens of millions of people. It is impossible to tolerate this disgrace on earth any longer. The proposal of the Soviet Government that the United Nations adopt a declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples is an urgent demand of the times and the voice of mankind's conscience.

Some prominent statesmen in imperialist countries, in an attempt to weaken the immense impression which the Soviet proposal made on world public opinion and to minimize the great attractiveness of the declaration to the peoples of colonial and dependent countries, are trying to prove that the declaration contains nothing else but incitement to rebellion in the colonies. This kind of police yardstick suits only very vicious people who do not want to acknowledge the vast changes which are taking place in the world and who recognize only their own profits and their right to rob other peoples. But there is no right of this kind, it is not a right, but iniquity, and the peoples reject it.

Through its proposals for the defense of peace, the Soviet Government has given impetus to and considerably expanded the front of struggle for peaceful solution of acute international problems. In all parts of the world, people today see more clearly the path of struggle for peace, freedom, and the sacred right of the peoples to decide their own destinies.

The vigorous foreign policy of the USSR and of all Socialist countries, and the successes of the peace partisan movement already have produced substantial results. Imperialist policy is undergoing a deep crisis. The moral and political isolation of American imperialism, the

bulwark of the militarism and colonialism that the peoples hate, is increasing daily. This is confirmed by the overthrow of the bloody Syngman Rhee regime in South Korea, the fall of the openly pro-American Bayar-Menderes regime in Turkey, the indignation of the Japanese people against the U.S.-Japanese military pact, and the mounting tide of the national liberation movement among the peoples of Africa. The struggle of the peoples of Latin America, who are being inspired by the example of the peoples of heroic Cuba, is gaining momentum.

All this means, comrades, that the position of imperialism is growing continuously weaker while the position of the fighters for peace, for the national independence of peoples, for Socialism is becoming ever stronger.

"Monolithic Unity"

Comrades, the unity of the countries and the peoples of the great Socialist camp, the unity of all Communist and Workers' Parties, is one of the most important conditions for a lasting peace on earth and for the gaining of new successes by the working people in their struggle against imperialists. Our Party and our people will spare no effort to consolidate this unity. Armed with Marxist-Leninist theory, Communists are guided by Lenin's proposition that only a knowledge of the fundamental features of a given age can serve as a foundation for evaluation of the more detailed peculiarities of this or that country. The accurate, remarkable directives of Lenin serve as the basis of the understanding and correct correlation of international and national tasks by each detachment of the international Communist movement.

Communists are the most consistent fighters for the fundamental national interests of their nations. At the same time, they express the common interests and aims of all toiling mankind. Fidelity to

the principles of creative Marxism, ability to understand correctly and to apply Communism in the new historic situation, international solidarity—in these lie the great strength of the international Communist and Workers' movement.

The fraternal solidarity of the Communist and Workers' Parties and the friendship and mutual aid among the Socialist States are the source of the invincibility of the countries of the Socialist camp and a guarantee of their successful progress toward Socialism and Communism.

Loyal to Marxism-Leninism, the CPSU, and our government, the working people of our homeland will firmly and consistently strengthen the unity and the might of the Socialist camp and the unity of the international Communist and Workers' movement and will carry on unswervingly the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems and strengthen the friendship of all peoples.

Comrades: Soviet people know that for all the successes and for the wonderful future they have achieved they are obligated to the wise leadership of the Communist Party. Our people love their Party, and as the great Lenin used to say: "They trust the Party, seeing in it the spirit, honor, and conscience of our epoch."

The Communist Party has conquered and now conquers through the monolithic unity of its ranks, through its boundless loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, through its creative approach to this great revolutionary teaching, and through its irreconcilability to any revisionist distortion or dogmatic deadening of this teaching.

The Party bases its entire varied activity on the Leninist principle of combining theory and practice in an organic way. It is constantly developing Marxist-Leninist theory, enriching it with new propositions and conclusions that correspond to historical conditions. In a masterly way, it implements theory through

a clear and tangible policy and, like an experienced helmsman, skillfully guides Soviet society toward Communism.

The Party correctly decides on complex problems of leadership in the country's political and economic life and improves Socialist democracy. The sources of our Party's strength are its unbreakable and close ties with the masses and its boundless faith in the mighty creative forces of the people. At the same time, the Soviet people have boundless faith in their own Party and follow it confidently and boldly. Many years of living experience have taught them that the Party's only vital interest has been, is, and always will be the interest of the people, the happiness of toilers.

Unity of purpose, unity of will, and unity of action between Party and people are the greatest force in the struggle for the victory of Communist society.

Comrades: We live and work, we struggle in a great and glorious age of the victory of the ideas of the October Revolution, the victory of Marxism-Leninism.

Marxism-Leninism and the ideas of October are triumphing in the victories of Communist construction in our country!

Marxism-Leninism and the ideas of October are triumphing in the unshakable unity and growing strength of the mighty Socialist camp!

Marxism-Leninism and the ideas of October are triumphing in the successes of the international Communist and Workers' movement, in the growing national liberation movement, and in the struggle of the peoples for peace throughout the world!

Long live the glorious Leninist Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the inspirer and organizer of all the victories of Communist construction!

Long live the great banner of October, the banner of Marxism-Leninism, guiding the people in the struggle for the bright future of all mankind, for Communism!



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